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Preface
The United States faces concerns about productivity and competitiveness, a lack
of consistency with major trading partners, and a bewilderment with the complexity of
the current tax system. All of these factors contribute to an increasing interest in
numerous proposals to change the federal tax system drastically.
For years, there have been concerns that foreign competitors may get the upper
hand in the international marketplace because their value-added taxes are rebated to their
exporters at the border whereas U.S. exporters get no relief from income tax. Economists
and tax policy experts have expressed concerns about various aspects of the U.S. tax
system—its inefficiency, its complexity, its excessive intrusion into activities of businesses
and individuals. As a result, a number of consumption tax alternatives have been floated—
such as the Business Transfer Tax (by Senator Roth in 1985) and a cash flow
consumption tax (by the Treasury Department in 1977)—but none gained political support
substantial enough to consider enactment a serious possibility.
All of that has now changed. Recently a number of proposals with serious political
backing have been presented. Tax reform will almost certainly be a major issue in the
1996 Presidential campaign—and in the Congress for the foreseeable future.
The purpose of this study is to educate and enlighten the membership of the
AICPA Tax Division, the general membership of the AICPA, executives, financial and
tax officers of corporate and business America, members of Congress and their staffs,
and other interested parties with regard to how these different approaches operate.
Analysis is provided of “big picture” aspects as well as ease of compliance and
administrability of the various proposals. Analysis is also provided on the overall effect
of each proposal on industrial sectors, both those who emphasize export and those who
rely more on importation, and on the general economic effect on savings.
An attempt is made to help identify the “winners” and “losers” in business sectors
under various proposals, as well as to compare the impact on individuals at various
income levels. The analysis of business is not limited to corporations; it includes
personal-service businesses that will become subject for the first time to a second level
of tax even though they operate in unincorporated form. It must be emphasized that in
spite of the length of this study, it represents only an initial survey.

iii

O f the major proposals, only the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax currently has a fairly
comprehensive plan expressed in statutory text together with detailed explanatory narration.
Commentators already have noted “missing pieces” and challenged certain inconsistencies
in it. For the others, proposed statutory language is either very terse or non-existent; the
framework o f this analysis being based on sponsors’ press releases, media interviews and
other published statements. As a result, significant gaps exist and an ultimate analysis is not
yet possible. Thus the intent o f this document is to add to common understanding o f the
proposals’ operation, their advantages, and the deficiencies through an objective analysis.
Moreover, the analysis was made on the basis o f sponsors’ statements that their proposals
are intended to replace the present Federal income tax system. A much different analysis
would have been required if any o f the proposals were to supplement or be an “add-on” to
our current system. As the process unfolds, more specific analyses and policy studies may
be required.
There is no intention at this time to express preference for any o f the alternatives or
to make an AICPA policy statement on whether any of these alternatives would be preferable
to our current income tax system.
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P A R T I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
The Current Debate

Summary
•
Members o f Congress have expressed considerable interest in repealing
both the individual and corporate income taxes and replacing them with
consumption taxes. No major industrialized nation has ever repealed its income
tax.
•

There are fo u r basic types of consumption taxes:
1.
retail sales tax
2.
credit-invoice value-added tax
3.
subtraction method value-added tax
4.
individual consumption tax

•
Compared to income taxes, consumption taxes provide greater incentives
fo r saving. However, because saving is concentrated in high-income households,
consumption taxes can impose a relatively larger burden on low-income
households.
•
Although the term "flat tax" generally means a tax with a single rate, in
the current debate the term refers to a single-rate value-added tax collected in
part from business and in part from individuals. In its proposed form, the Flat
Tax would eliminate most tax preferences and thereby significantly reduce
complexity.
•
Although there are substantial opportunities fo r simplification, it is
reasonable to expect that any consumption tax enacted into law will include
numerous exceptions and special rules. Thus, it is unlikely any new consumption
tax will be as simple as proponents insist.
A.

Farewell, Income Tax?

The United States is in the early stages o f a major debate about a fundamental
restructuring o f its tax system. The magnitude of change contemplated is
unprecedented. Under numerous proposals currently being considered, all Federal

1

income taxes—accounting for over $700 billion in revenue in 19951—would be
repealed. Some proposals also provide substantial relief from payroll taxes, which
provide nearly $500 billion in revenue.2 These would be replaced by taxes on
consumption. It is true that most industrialized countries have adopted consumption
taxes. However, these taxes largely served as replacements to unwieldy systems of
excise taxes.3 No major industrialized country has ever repealed its individual and
corporation income taxes.
Many current proposals for restructuring the U.S. tax system are as sweeping
in concept as they are in terms o f revenue. There are at least four components to the
current debate:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

Competitiveness. The proposed changes intend to increase competitiveness
of domestic businesses through increased capital formation and, in the case
o f some proposals, by improving the terms o f international trade.
Tax Simplification. The proposed changes aim to eliminate the complexity
of the current system.
Tax Reform. The proposed changes would repeal most o f the special tax
breaks in current law.
Redistribution. The proposed changes may significantly redistribute the
burden o f taxation. In particular, compared to income taxes, consumption
taxes are considered to be more burdensome on low-income households.

If enacted, the proposed changes would make the Tax Reform A ct o f 1986 look like
an insignificant piece o f legislation. Given the enormous difficulties in achieving
passage o f that legislation, long-time observers of the process are skeptical. Yet few
are willing to write-off the possibility o f enactment o f a consumption tax. Leaders
o f both major political parties have voiced support and introduced legislation to
radically restructure the U.S. tax system. Fundamental reform is now on the front
burner, and the 1996 election is likely to turn up the heat.
1The Office and Management and Budget estimates that in fiscal year 1995 the Federal government will receive
$151 billion in revenue from the corporation income tax, $589 billion from the individual income taxes, and $484
billion in revenue from payroll taxes. See, U.S. Executive Office of the President (1995), p. 23. One o f the two
leading consumption tax proposals would include substantial tax credits for most payroll taxes—collecting total
receipts from new taxes to more than $ 1 trillion annually.
2The Armey flat tax proposal explicitly repeals the estate and gift tax, while others, such as Rep. Archer have
suggested this should be addressed as part o f a national sales tax.
3"The defects o f the cascade turnover taxes (see Chapter 2 discussion) were the driving force behind EEC
adoption o f the value-added tax. The multiple taxation of products, relatively favorable taxation of concentrated
enterprises, and uncertain border tax adjustments combined to create an intolerable situation in the common
market." Carlson (1980), p 71.
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This a remarkable turn o f events given the poor prospects for passage o f any
type o f consumption tax until just recently. Consumption taxes have gone from
political obscurity to political celebrity in less than a decade. The nadir o f
consumption tax popularity was immediately after the 1980 defeat o f former Ways
and Means Committee Chairman Al Ullman, who had proposed a value-added tax
(VAT) prior to his failed re-election bid. There were some proposals for consumption
taxes during the 1980s, but none with any prospect o f passage or even serious
consideration by Congress. Significant congressional interest in consumption taxation
did not rekindle until the early 1990s as Congress became increasingly concerned
about U.S. competitiveness. This interest gained further momentum with the 1994
elections, and the concept o f consumption taxation now enjoys the support o f many
Congressional leaders.
Prior to recent developments, the proponents o f consumption taxation were
mainly business leaders concerned about capital formation and economists concerned
about deficit reduction. Their efforts went largely unnoticed except by a few tax
professionals. Now there is interest among the general public, and press coverage o f
the issue is widespread. There is particular interest in the proposed Flat Tax.
Proponents claim that the Flat Tax is so simple that businesses and individuals would
only have to file postcard-sized returns. This has great appeal to a general public
frustrated with the complexity of the current system.
One key development in the politics of consumption taxation is the appearance
o f an emerging consensus among certain political groups about the use o f
consumption tax revenues. In the past, consumption taxes have been proposed to
increase government spending, to reduce the deficit, and even to reduce income and
payroll taxes. In all o f these cases, the current tax system would largely remain
intact. Furthermore, proposed consumption taxes usually had rates in the single
digits. Most of the current support for consumption taxation is conditioned upon use
o f revenues for elimination o f individual and corporate taxation.4 Replacement
consumption taxes could easily have tax rates that exceed 20 percent.5

4T h e rapidity of this change in sentiment about the nature of consumption taxes for the United States is evident
by comparing the tone o f the current debate to that of several relatively recent studies. The working assumption
of these studies is that any new consumption tax would be an add-on, rather than a substitute, to the current system.
See, for example, U.S. Department of Treasury (1984), McLure (1987), U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1992),
U.S. General Accounting Office (1993), and Metcalf (1995).
5According to the Congressional Budget Office (1995), it is estimated that the individual income tax and
corporate income tax would generate $772 billion and $172 billion in fiscal year 2000. Also according to the
CBO, a broad-based 5-percent VAT would generate $198 billion in fiscal year 2000. Therefore, a broad-based
VAT would have to have a rate o f approximately 25 percent to replace revenue lost from repeal o f the individual
and corporate income taxes.
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Recognizing the difference between an add-on consumption tax and a
replacement consumption tax is critical for ascertaining the economics as well as the
administration o f the tax. Only a replacement consumption tax has the potential to
increase private saving.6 Only a replacement consumption tax has the potential to
significantly reduce complexity. Unlike many other recent studies o f consumption
taxation, this volume will focus attention almost exclusively on consumption taxation
as a replacement for the current system o f income taxation.7
B.

Consumption Tax Alternatives
1. Comparison to Income Taxes

The most important difference between an income tax and a consumption tax
is that a consumption tax eliminates the tax burden on income from saving and
investment.8 Under a consumption tax, income that is saved is not taxed. By
providing greater rewards for saving than an income tax, replacement consumption
taxes have the potential to increase private saving. Most economists believe that the
lack o f saving lies at the core o f the current shortcomings in the U.S. economy. If
saving does indeed respond positively to increases in its after-tax return, a
replacement consumption tax could increase private saving. Increasing saving would
likely increase domestic capital formation, which in turn boosts the productivity o f
U.S. workers, boosts real wages, and increases the rate o f economic growth.
Saving, however, is something that the wealthy do more o f than the poor.
Therefore, consumption taxes generally place greater overall burden on low-income
households than do income taxes. This potential to shift tax burden to low-income
households is the major objection to consumption tax, but savings differences are not
the only reason. A proportional, rather than progressive, rate structure is another
major factor.
Finally, consumption taxes often are implemented in such a manner that
imports are subject to tax while exports are exempt. Most economists believe that
such "border tax adjustments" do not have any significant impact on international

6The impact of consumption taxes on saving is discussed in Chapter 6.
7In order to emphasize the context of this study, the term "replacement consumption tax" will be frequently used.
8A VAT can be based on income or consumption (Break (1985)), but income based VATs are not currently
under consideration.
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trade. Nevertheless, consumption taxes may still have impacts on international trade,
particularly if they can be used to improve economic performance by increasing
saving.9
2. Different Types o f Consumption Taxes
There are four major types of consumption taxes that are relevant to the current
debate:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

a retail sales tax,
a credit-invoice value-added tax,
a subtraction method value-added tax; and
an individual consumption tax.10

A retail sales tax is a tax on final sales by retail businesses to consumers. Imposed
by almost all of the States, it is a tax familiar to most Americans. A value-added tax
is a tax on the value added of all businesses--the difference between a business’s gross
receipts from the provision o f goods and services less costs o f goods and services
acquired from other businesses. There are two major types o f value-added taxes
under consideration: the credit-invoice method VAT, used by most U.S. trading
partners, and the subtraction method V A T , currently the favorite o f consumption tax
advocates in the United States. (The Flat Tax is a type o f subtraction method VAT.)11
An individual consumption tax is a tax on each individual's annual consumption,
measured as the difference between that individual’s annual income and annual
saving.
3. Comparison o f Types o f Consumption Taxes
The major argument in favor of adopting any consumption tax is its potentially
favorable impact on U.S. competitiveness. The major political obstacle is its potential
to be regressive. These potential impacts are largely similar for each o f the four
m ajor types o f consumption taxes. Choosing among them is not a matter o f
economics,

9The impact of consumption taxes on trade is the subject of discussion in Chapter 7.
10The terms "personal consumption tax" and "expenditures" tax are also often used to describe an individual
consumption tax.
11The terms “personal consumption tax” and “expenditures” tax are also often used to describe an individual
consumption tax.
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There are, however, several important differences among these types o f
consumption taxes. Each imposes different compliance costs—not only in terms o f
total cost but also in terms o f the distribution o f these costs across taxpayer groups.
Each o f these taxes also imposes different administrative costs on government. Some
of these taxes would certainly face vigorous opposition from the States while others
probably would not. Some o f these taxes would be vigorously opposed by our trading
partners while others likely would not. The taxes also differ in how they are
perceived by the public—some appear as highly visible separately stated regressive
taxes on consumers, while others are considered “hidden taxes” imposed on business.
One other difference is their degree o f flexibility. Different types o f
consumption taxes vary in their ability to provide preferential treatment to certain
types of products and to certain classes o f taxpayers. As a matter o f pure tax policy
the broadest consumption tax base would be preferable. Special exceptions reduce
the economic efficiency o f a consumption tax.12 However, no matter how desirable
from an economic or administrative perspective, political reality makes it unlikely.
Providing special exceptions to broad-based consumption taxes is common to all
consumption taxes currently in existence. And this has been the American way of
implementing tax policy. As a matter o f political acceptability, a tax that is better
able to accommodate special interest provisions ultimately may prove to be more
salable.13
C.

Simplification and Broadening the Tax Base

As noted, it is not just the adoption a consumption tax, but the replacement
o f income taxes with a consumption tax that lies at the center o f the current debate on
restructuring the U.S. tax system. As enormous as this change would be, the scope
of the current debate is even broader. The public interest in the Flat Tax is indicative
o f the breadth o f issues now "on the table."
Like other consumption tax proposals, the Flat Tax would eliminate the
individual and corporate income taxes and would replace them with a broad-based
consumption tax collected from both business and individuals. But the Flat Tax
proposal does not stop there. It entirely revamps the rate structure. It replaces the
12N arrow ing the tax base reduces efficiency for at least three reasons. First, exceptions cause consumers to
distort their consumption and businesses to alter their production in order to avoid tax. Second, rates o f tax will
have to be increased to make-up for revenue losses due to special exceptions. Third, a broad consumption tax base
in general would be easier to administer.
13On the other hand, some would prefer to make special interest provisions as difficult as possible to
accommodate. This is a somewhat naive strategy given that Congress's desire to compromise and accommodate
has rarely been constrained by concerns about complexity or economic efficiency. And taxpayers are less inclined
to complain about complexity when that complexity is accompanied by tax relief.
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progressive rates of current law with a single tax rate for both business and for
individuals. It is a radical base-broadening tax reform, eliminating numerous credits,
exclusions, and deductions intended to achieve a wide variety o f social and political
objectives. It is also, in its current form, massive simplification. Any one o f these
changes on its own would be an extraordinary legislative event.14,15
There is little doubt that current tax law is often incomprehensible to most
taxpayers and that there is tremendous interest in simplification. What is less clear is
how well consumption tax alternatives in practice would fare in terms o f
administration and compliance costs. Although a move from consumption taxation
generally has the potential to reduce complexity, it is an open question whether
significant simplification can actually be realized.16
1. Complexity Inherent in the Income Tax
Some o f the complexity under current law is unique to the income tax, and a
switch to a pure consumption tax would eliminate this complexity.17 This is
particularly true for business taxation and the taxation o f income from saving and
investment. For example, depreciation and amortization provisions ordinarily would
be replaced with expensing.18 There would, therefore, no longer be disputes over
capitalizing business development costs because all business costs are immediately
deductible. Costs o f inventories would be deducted at the time costs were incurred.
The corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum tax would be
eliminated. The notoriously complex rules surrounding corporate distributions,
liquidations, and reorganizations would become almost entirely obsolete. And
because most consumption taxes are “territorial”--[that is, tax is only imposed on
activity within its borders- all foreign source income would be exempt from U.S. tax,

14 Much confusion arises because the more general, generic term "flat tax" is used interchangeably with the
specific flat tax proposals offered by Majority Leader Armey and others. Although it has a nice ring to it, the
term flat tax is not the best description o f the proposals now bearing that label. First o f all, the term is not pre
cisely applied because there would actually be a second, zero tax bracket for low-income households who are
allowed large personal exemptions. At the same time, the term is overly broad. In the context o f taxation, "flat"
is an adjective that is usually applied to rates. Flat tax rates can be applied to a consumption or an income
base. Furthermore, a tax system with a single rate o f tax need not be simpler than a system with multiple rates.
15Thus, there are small "f" flat taxes and capital "F" Flat Taxes. In this volume, most references will be to the
specific proposals like those offered by Majority Leader Armey and will therefore be capitalized.
16See AICPA (1990).
17This is the basic theme o f U.S. Treasury (1977) and Bradford (1980).
18Although every major proposal has included a provision for expensing, it is not inherent to a value-added tax.
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eliminating the need for foreign-tax-credit and for anti-deferral rules.19 Furthermore,
under a consumption tax, most income generated by personal saving would
effectively be exempt from tax.20 As a result, a replacement consumption tax
eliminates the need for the complicated rules associated with preferential treatment
of types of saving by individuals. For example, complex rules concerning pensions,
IRAs, tax-exempt bonds, annuities and life insurance could be eliminated because all
saving would receive tax-favored treatment.21
2. Complexity Shared by Income and Consumption Taxes
Nevertheless, many o f the issues that are the source o f complexity under the
current income tax will remain equally complex after the switch to consumption
taxation. For example, the age-old problem o f distinguishing between business
expenses and expenditures on personal consumption does not disappear. Business
meals, home office deductions, and education expenses are just three areas o f
contention that will remain in any realignment from income to consumption taxation.
3. Complexity Due to Special Provisions
Then there is the complexity in current law that is due to special tax breaks and
limitations on those breaks. It is often remarked that consumption taxes appear
simpler than income taxes because they are idealized proposals untainted by
legislative compromise. If history is any guide, consumption tax proposals will
accrete complexity as they move through the legislative process and as subsequent
Congresses amend the initial legislation.22 A great deal o f complexity under current
law is a by-product o f a political system that endeavors to compromise rather than
simplify— and o f a system that wishes to use the tax code to achieve a wide variety
o f social and economic objectives that have little to do with raising revenue.
M any consumption tax proposals, especially those o f the Flat-Tax variety,
include significant base broadening. For example, under the Armey proposal, the
exclusion o f employer-provided benefits from the tax base and the deductibility o f
home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and local taxes would be
19Complex source rules, however, would still be an issue as they are under the income tax system.
20As shall be explained in greater detail in Chapter 6, the exclusion of saving from the consumption tax base is
the equivalent of exempting investment income from tax.
21As shall be explained in greater detail below, consumption taxes provide relief for investment in capital either
by exempting investment income from tax or by allowing deductions for investment. Senators Nunn and Domemici
have proposed allowing deductions for new investment in municipal bonds and retaining the exemption of interest
from these bonds.
22The higher the rates the more likely this is to occur.
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eliminated. Clearly, if in addition to transforming the income tax base to a
consumption tax base, Congress also undertook broadening the tax base, much
additional simplification would result.23 It is not so clear, however, why such tax
reform will be more successful under the umbrella of consumption taxation than
under that o f income taxation. Special interest groups would surely mount massive
lobbying efforts to proposed curtailment o f benefits. While the political dynamics
surrounding tax law changes may be different now than in the past, it seems unlikely
the system is immune from the influence o f special interests.
4. Complexity Unique to Consumption Taxes
In the move from an income to a consumption tax, simplicity is not entirely a
one-way street. It is likely that some new complexities will arise as the imposition
o f consumption taxes introduces new administrative and compliance issues not
present under the income tax. For example, a credit-invoice value-added tax would,
in many respects, increase record-keeping requirements o f businesses. Under the
credit-invoice method, business would be required to retain records o f all invoices in
order to earn tax credits. At a minimum, under a subtraction method VAT, taxpayers
would be required to revise their accounting procedures so as to include a set o f books
using alternative capital recovery methods and to differentiate non-deductible internal
costs from deductible external costs. An individual consumption tax would require
taxpayers and tax authorities to maintain previously unrequired records o f changes
in their total savings balances and net indebtedness.
5. Complexity During Transition
Finally, there is the enormous issue o f transition. In order to avoid penalizing
taxpayers caught between the old income tax and any new consumption tax, complex
transition rules are likely to be included into any new tax plan. For businesses, there
are likely to be special rules for cost recovery o f previously acquired (but not fully
depreciated) capital. For individuals, some sort o f provision for basis recovery on
existing assets would likely be included (so that only gains, and not the entire
proceeds on the sale o f existing capital, would be subject to tax). The general public,
tax departments o f businesses, and tax advisors would have to be educated as to the
working of this new system. IRS employees would play a major role in this process,
but they also would have to be educated. Finally, the IRS would have to devise new
tax forms, instructions, audit procedures, and regulations.

“ However, this is not always the case. For example, the Armey Flat Tax would eliminate the deductibility of
employer-provided health insurance. Separating the costs of this insurance from other costs could impose a new
compliance burden on taxpayers.
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This discussion of complexity has presupposed that any new consumption tax
would be used to replace the income tax. If instead the consumption tax was an add
on tax--i.e., consumption tax revenues were used for deficit reduction, or governmentprovided universal health coverage, or were only sufficient to reduce (and not
eliminate) income taxes--the imposition o f this second tax system on top o f the
current one would result in a vast increase in the complexity o f the U.S. tax system.
D.

Objective o f This Study

The primary objective o f this study is to provide insight to tax professionals,
business and legal advisors, businesses, and policymakers about the impact of
consumption taxes. Chapters 2 through 5 provide a description of the four major types
of consumption taxes. Chapters 6 through 8 review the major economic policy issues
surrounding the new tax. Chapter 9 introduces, in general terms, the issues that are
likely to be o f concern to businesses under any new consumption taxes. Chapters 10
and 11 describe the two leading proposals now under consideration by policymakers
in Washington. Chapters 12 and 13 provide detailed estimates o f the impact o f these
proposals on business and individual tax liability. Chapter 14 through 17 examine the
special problems that consumption taxation poses for housing, financial institutions,
charitable organizations, state and local governments, and financial statements.
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PART II. THE MAJOR TYPES OF
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Chapter 2
A Retail Sales Tax

Summary
•
A national retail sales tax might be an attractive revenue source because
it is relatively uncomplicated and fam iliar to most Americans.
•
Some issues that are particularly problematic fo r a Federal retail sales
tax are:
1.

potential fo r widespread evasion by small retailers;

2.

potential fo r widespread evasion by business purchasers o f items
fo r personal use; and

3.

objections by States to sharing a major revenue source.

•
The validity o f these issues increases with the tax rate. While it does not
seem likely that a retail sales tax is a good replacementfo r income taxes, it might
be viable as a supplement to existing taxes.
A.

Introduction

In weighing consumption tax options, it seems reasonable to start with the
familiar. Most Americans encounter retail sales taxes every day. They are levied by
forty-five states and by numerous local jurisdictions. Americans seem to have
accepted the current level o f state sales taxes, and they do not seem to bear them the
same hostility that they have for income taxes.24 Although retail sales taxes are highly

24See Break (1985).
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visible in that they are separately stated from purchase prices, most consumers face
no compliance burden. Retail businesses file sales tax returns and make sales tax
payments to State and local authorities.25
From the perspective o f promoting economic efficiency, a retail sales tax
should tax all consumption equally in order not to distort consumer choices and to
keep tax rates low. Only fin a l sales by businesses—that is, sales by businesses to
consumers—should be subject to tax. The taxation o f sales by businesses to other
businesses would result in over-taxation o f consumption because final sales would
bear not only retail sales tax but also the costs o f whatever taxes are paid on inputs
used to produce, market, or distribute consumer products. This over-taxation o f
certain products was a major factor contributing to the adoption o f European and
Canadian value-added taxes.
Because retail sales taxes are imposed on final sales within the taxing
jurisdiction, they are, in effect, exempt from tax goods produced within and sold
outside that jurisdiction. Similarly, the tax would also be imposed on goods produced
outside and consumed inside the jurisdiction. Thus, a Federal retail sales tax would
exempt exports and impose a tax on imports. This feature, shared with many
consumption taxes, is particularly attractive to domestic businesses competing in the
international market place.26
In practice, states retail sales taxes fall short o f the ideal o f taxing all
consumption once. On the one hand, states exempt many final goods and services.
This results in undertaxation o f some sectors. On the other hand, states tax many
intermediate goods. This results in over taxation o f some sectors.
B.

Statutory Exemptions

In practice, state governments exempt many types of goods and services from
sales tax for a variety of reasons. Some products are exempted from taxation because
they are considered necessities—such as food, clothing, and housing. Because
necessities are generally a larger fraction of income for the poor than for the wealthy,
such exemption confers tax relief that is proportionately greater for low-income

25The objections raised by the states to a Federal retail sales tax are discussed in Chapter 16.
26Thus, retail sales taxes operate under the destination principle. When exports are included in the tax base and
imports are not taxed, a consumption tax is said to operate under the origin principle. It would be possible to
structure a retail sales tax to operate under the origin principle, but in practice, retail sales taxes and value-added
taxes utilize the destination, not the source, principle. As shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7,
economists believe consumption taxes should operate under the destination principle so that consumer choice
between imports and domestically produced goods is not distorted.
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households. (However, as shall be discussed in detail later, granting such relief still
leaves the poor bearing a greater relative burden than the wealthy.) Some services,
like many types o f financial services, are exempt because o f the great difficulty in
identifying the amount o f such services.27 Some services, like those provided by
governments (Federal, state, and local) and charitable organizations, are exempt
because it is difficult to place a dollar amount on these services--and because it is
good politics. Finally, other goods are exempt because they are considered “merit”
goods that deserve public support—such as goods and services provided by charities.
It is also quite common for state sales taxes to provide broad exemptions for services.
For whatever reason exemptions are granted, they generally increase the
administrative burdens of tax authorities and compliance burdens o f taxpayers, in
addition to impeding economic efficiency. It is widely acknowledged that the
administrative costs of a retail sales tax would be greatly reduced if no exemptions
or special rates were allowed.28 Much time and debate are involved in identifying
exactly which items should be exempt from taxation. Once these items have been
identified, retail businesses must distinguish taxable from nontaxable sales. In the
case of service providers, invoices to customers must allocate total charges between
taxable products and nontaxable provision o f services.
This complexity is not inherent in the structure o f the tax, but the result of
political considerations. It seems highly unrealistic to assume that enactment o f a
consumption tax would not include tax relief for certain sectors. Political
considerations will likely complicate the administration o f any retail sales tax.29 All
states with sales taxes—as well as almost every country with a retail sales tax or valueadded tax—provide numerous instances o f preferential treatment.30 There is nothing
in the history o f the Federal tax legislative process to suggest that a Federal
consumption tax would be untainted by special interest provisions.

27See Chapter 14 for a discussion o f the difficulties in taxing financial services.
28See, for example, U.S. Treasury (1984), Cnossen (1989), and General Accounting Office (1980).
29This is the working hypothesis made by McLure (1987), former Deputy Assistant Secretary o f Treasury for
Tax Policy, in his study of value-added taxation. The major reason for his preference for a credit-invoice valueadded tax over a subtraction method value-added tax is its superior ability to accommodate the political
compromises that he considers inevitable.
30One notable exception is the broad-based single-rate VAT introduced by New Zealand in 1986. The only
significant exemption is rental payments for residential housing.
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Proponents o f various consumption tax plans with no special tax relief will face a
heavy burden in explaining how their proposals can maintain their conceptual
simplicity in the face o f a myriad o f political forces.
C.

Taxation o f Intermediate Goods

Even if all exemptions for politically-favored consumer products were
somehow eliminated, the problem of separating taxable sales to consumers from nontaxable sales to businesses would remain. State governments generally use two
methods-both imperfect--to help separate retail sales from non-retail sales. The first
is to grant "exemption certificates" to business taxpayers. The second is to impose
sales tax on some types o f products irrespective o f whether sales are retail or not.
Because o f the bluntness o f each o f these tools, retail sales taxes overtax final sales
o f some products at the same time they undertax sales o f other products.
W hen intermediate goods are taxed, the purchase price o f the final product
embodies not only the tax on the final sale, but also the tax on inputs to the final
product. For example, if a state sales tax o f five percent is imposed on delivery
services, and sales taxes also apply to the purchase o f gasoline and computers that
account for 20 percent o f the cost o f delivery services, the total state-imposed sales
tax on delivery services is six percent. This phenomenon is referred to as tax
"cascading." Cascading can result in higher tax burdens on products that happen to
use more intermediate goods subject to tax. It can also result in unfair competition
within industries if firms provide their own intermediate inputs and their competitors
must purchase intermediate inputs in taxable transactions.
In its 1984 study of consumption taxes, the Treasury Department reported that
approximately 20 percent o f state sales taxes were collected on intermediate goods.
This occurs because certain products, such as gasoline, tools, and office equipment,
are sometimes taxed regardless of whether they are used by business or by consumers.
It is not clear whether cascading is an inherent problem o f retail sales taxes. As
discussed below, a thorough sorting out o f business and non-business uses o f certain
types o f property would at a minimum add complexity and might greatly increase
compliance costs. State governments probably consider these non-retail taxes a
relatively painless method o f raising revenue.
As shall be explained further below, cascading is not an issue under a valueadded tax (under either the credit-invoice or subtraction methods). For example,
under the credit-invoice method, any taxes paid on intermediate sales between
businesses would be rebated to the business making sales to consumers. In the
example used in the prior paragraph, the taxes on gasoline (collected by the gas
station) and on computers (collected by the computer dealer) would be rebated to the
company providing delivery services to consumers.
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It is also important to note that the tax treatment of exports may be problematic
when a sales tax system includes some non-retail sales. Unlike a value-added tax, a
retail sales tax has no mechanism for rebating non-retail taxes on exports. Even if
rebates are attempted, they usually can only be implemented with a rough estimate
as to the amounts o f tax paid at intermediate levels. If the burden o f proof is placed
on exporters to demonstrate the payment o f tax at intermediate levels, it is lik ely given the difficulty exporters would have identifying and documenting taxes paid by
all their suppliers (and at prior levels of production)--that the rebates will be less than
the taxes paid, resulting in a penalty on exports. On the other hand, governments
predisposed to promoting their exports may be generous in their estimates o f
intermediate level taxes in order to use rebates as a mechanism for export subsidies.
Cascading has been recognized as a problem by foreign governments that have
relied heavily on sales taxes. Moreover, the problem o f cascading taxes—particularly
in the context o f international trade--is often cited as a major reason for adoption o f
value-added taxes throughout the world.
D.

Evasion by Business Purchasers

Under a retail sales tax, it may be possible for businesses—especially closelyheld businesses—to claim exemption on items that are used wholly for personal
consumption. States usually grant businesses "exemption certificates" that allow them
to make purchases without payments of sales tax. There is, however, little to prevent
bearers o f exemption certificates from purchasing items and then using them for
personal consumption.
Beyond checking the validity of the exemption certificate, it is not reasonable
to expect sellers to aid much in enforcement. In order to determine whether items
should be taxable or tax-exempt, sellers would have to know the use to which items
would be put. Sellers o f goods and services cannot read buyers' minds to know the
intended use of purchased items. And o f course, sellers do not want to lose a sale,
much less the goodwill o f a customer, by challenging purchasers.
Unless special precautions are taken, a retail sales tax places little burden o f
proof on business purchasers. The only way business purchases can be audited is if
the seller retains records o f business purchases, including the business purchasers'
taxpayer identification numbers. Even with such exhaustive record keeping, the
threat of audit in most cases would not be significant, given the small amount o f tax
any single taxpayer could evade with purchases from a single retailer. These issues
exist now and mechanisms are in place to control tax avoidance, but attempts at
evasion may increase at higher levels o f tax.
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There may be a greater threat of audit in the case o f big-ticket items—such as
automobiles and personal computers—that have extensive business and personal use.
In these cases, it does not seem inappropriate to require recordkeeping o f taxpayer
identification numbers by sellers. Still, detection o f evasion would require audit o f
both sellers and purchasers. One alternative possibility is for the government to
consider rebates instead o f exemptions for large ticket items (such as rebates payable
upon receipt o f valid invoices to tax authorities). Rebates, however, would entail
substantial administrative costs.
The problem of distinguishing business items from personal-use items is hardly
restricted to retail sales taxation or to consumption taxes in general. Under the
income tax, small business owners have similar incentives to claim business
deductions for items o f personal use. (In fact, the higher the marginal rate o f income
tax, the greater the incentive for evasion.) Under the income tax, however, the
business must stand ready to defend all deductions claimed, and even a valid business
deduction improperly documented can be disallowed. Under a credit-invoice VAT,
businesses may attempt to claim credits on items purchased for personal use.
Similarly, under a personal consumption tax or a subtraction method VAT, closelyheld businesses may attempt to deduct as business expenses the cost o f items
purchased for personal consumption. Thus, evasion through overstatement o f
business expenses is a significant concern under almost any tax.
There is, however, a critical difference in detecting evasion under a retail sales
tax versus other consumption taxes: evasion by retail sales tax purchasers would
require cross-checking and the auditing of multiple taxpayers. Under other types of
taxation, evasion can be detected by audit of the purchaser. Given the difficulty even
in the best of circumstances o f distinguishing business- from personal-use items, the
problem o f evasion by business purchasers under a retail sales tax cannot be easily
dismissed.
E.

Evasion at the Retail Level

Perhaps the most cited difficulty with enactment o f a Federal retail sales tax
is the likely lack o f compliance by retailers. The tax rate o f a Federal sales tax that
would be necessary to replace income tax revenue would almost certainly exceed 20
percent.31 Most tax administrators believe that ten or twelve percent o f gross receipts
is the maximum burden that may be reasonably placed on a sector comprised o f
numerous small businesses.32 Because tax is imposed only at the point o f final sale,

31See Chapter 9, Table 9.8.
32See McLure (1987), p. 107, Tait (1993), p. 18, and Tanzi (1994), pp. 48-52.
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weaknesses in collections at that point would be particularly harmful to compliance
compared to an income tax or value-added tax in which the compliance burden is
spread more evenly across businesses and, in the case of the individual income tax,
on tens of millions of individual taxpayers. Compliance by small business is already
an issue under both the Federal income tax and state sales taxes. In fact, under a
VAT, many commentators argue that significant exemptions--or subsidies—should be
granted to small businesses because of the high compliance costs. This would not be
possible under a retail sales tax without a substantial loss o f revenue.
Real world experience seems to support the comments o f tax administrators
that there is an upper limit on the rate o f retail sales tax. While most countries with
value-added taxes have standard rates o f 15 or 20 percent, retail sales tax rates are
usually less than 5 percent. Among developed economies other than the U.S., only
Iceland and South Africa now have retail sales tax rates in excess o f 10 percent.33
Given this evidence, and given the existence o f current State sales taxes, there seems
to be little room for an additional Federal sales tax that would not result in significant
compliance problems for both state and Federal tax collectors. Nevertheless, the
retail sales tax cannot be ignored as an option as an add-on tax. As concluded by one
prom inent commentator when asked about the viability o f retail sales tax for the
United States: "The answer to the question is simple.
Provided the retail sales tax rates are low and not too different between (especially
neighboring) countries, the retail sales tax is a good alternative to the VAT."34

33Tait (1988), p. 18.
34Tanzi (1994), p.51.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Reasons Why Evasion is a Larger Problem
Under A Retail Sales Tax Than A Value-Added Tax
Understandably, many politicians--as well as the general public—are more
comfortable with the notion of replacing the income tax with a sales tax than a valueadded tax. However, o f the two alternatives, many tax experts only consider valueadded taxation viable. The purpose o f this appendix is to summarize why a retail
sales tax is not held in high esteem by tax administrators.
There are several reasons why enforcement is a problem at the retail level
under any kind o f tax:
•

It is not usually possible to cross-check retailer sales with the records of
purchasers because taxable sales by retailers are made to consumers.

•

The retail sector has a relatively large proportion o f small businesses. Evasion by
small business is more likely than by large business because audits are much less
likely and the relative costs o f compliance higher.

•

The life expectancy o f a small retail business is short.
discontinued business can be difficult and costly.

Collections from a

A retail sales tax imposes its entire compliance burden on the sector from which
collections are most troublesome.35 The retail sector must remit far greater amounts
of revenue under a sales tax than under a VAT or an income tax. In addition, a retail
sales tax imposes the unique compliance burden o f requiring a separation o f receipts
between taxable sales to consumers and nontaxable sales to other businesses.

35Although there is more total revenue at risk under a retail sales tax, it is interesting to note that on the margin
the incentives for retailers to evade tax are no more than they would be under a value-added tax with an equal rate.
(Furthermore, marginal incentives are likely to be larger under an income tax, assuming the rate of income tax is
greater than the rate o f consumption tax.) Assuming the national sales tax rate was 25 percent, one dollar of
unreported retail sales reduces tax revenue by 25 cents. One dollar o f unreported retail sales would also reduce
revenue by 25 cents under a 25-percent VAT. (A small business owner in the top bracket can reduce income taxes
by 40 cents on each dollar.) Taxpayers’ marginal incentives, however, may not be all that matters in determining
the amount o f tax evasion. For example, the dependency of the retail sales tax on small business would mean
greater noncompliance under a retail sales tax. In addition, if retailers can totally avoid being identified as
taxpayers or if collection is difficult (for example, in the case of firms going out-of-business), the rewards for sales
tax evasion can be greater under a retail sales tax than under a VAT (or an income tax).
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Chapter 3
The Credit-Invoice Method VAT

Summary
•
Almost every industrialized country has a credit-invoice value-added tax.
The credit-invoice VAT, however, is not among the proposals currently receiving
the most attention in the United States.
•
A credit-invoice VAT imposes new compliance costs on business by
requiring both seller and buyers to keep detailed records o f each transaction.
Compliance costs increase substantially as the number o f tax rates and the
number o f exemptions increase.
•
This recordkeeping improves compliance thorough cross-checking o f taxes
(paid by sellers) with credits (claimed by buyers). It also eliminates the need fo r
retailers to distinguish sales to business from sales to consumers.
•
R e lie f from the VAT is provided through exemption and through zero
rating. In general, zero-rating provides more satisfactory results than simple
exemption from tax.
A.

Introduction

Currently in the United States there is tremendous interest in consumption
taxes, but there is little interest in the consumption tax most widely used in other
countries. The credit-invoice method VAT is the method most popular with foreign
governments for implementing a consumption tax. Nevertheless, the credit invoice
method is not receiving any significant consideration on Capitol Hill.
M ost o f what has been written about consumption taxes--particularly
concerning administration and compliance issues—has focused on the credit-invoice
method. And while there are important differences between current U.S. proposals
for consumption taxes (non-credit invoice) and foreign VATs (credit invoice) in
place, there are a sufficiently large number o f similarities that the United States can
benefit greatly by taking into account the experience o f other countries.
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Finally, the credit-invoice method cannot be written off as an option for the
United States. It seems fair to say that until just a few years ago, the credit-invoice
method VAT was among the most--if not the m ost-viable consumption tax options
under consideration in the United States. The prospect for a credit-invoice method
VAT could rise again if concerns about compliance become greater, or if Congress
decides that it must provide exemptions to governments, nonprofit institutions, and
certain businesses. It is interesting to note that the Canadian government proposed
a subtraction method VAT in the mid-1980s but ultimately adopted a credit-invoice
method in 1991.36
1. The Concept o f “Value A dded"
For each business “value added” is the contribution o f its labor and its capital
to national output. It may be measured using either o f two methods: the subtraction
method or the addition method. Under the subtraction method, value added is
measured as the difference between the firm's sales and the firm's purchases from
other businesses. Under the addition method, value added is calculated as the sum
of a firm's payments to its workers and return to owners (and lenders) o f the firm for
the use o f their invested capital. The difference between the two methods is
illustrated in the following example:
Table 3.1
Calculation of Value Added
by Subtraction and by Addition
Income Statement
Sales

$100

Less Payments to
Other Businesses
Less Wages

$40
$50

Equals P rofit

$10

A. Value Added by Subtraction
$100
Sales
Less: Payments to
$40
Other Businesses
Equals value added

$60

36Substantial revisions to the Canadian value-added tax are now under consideration. Canada retained its income
tax system.
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B. Value Added by Addition
$50
$10

Wages
Plus Profit

In this example, value added equals $60 when measured as the difference between
business receipts and payments to other businesses (the subtraction method). Value
added also equals $60 when measured by addition o f wages and profits (the addition
method). It is important to note that financial flows (i.e., the payment and receipt
o f investment income as well as any increase or decrease in investment balances)
between businesses are not included in the calculation. Most notably, interest income
is not included in gross receipts and interest payments are not deductible.
The addition method is rarely applied in other countries nor has it been
included in any proposals for Federal taxation in the United States.37 The subtraction
method is currently used in Japan, and this method is now receiving the most
consideration in the United States. In concept, the credit-invoice method is more
closely related to the subtraction method.
2. The Equivalence o f Final Sale Price to Total Value Added
In a m odem economy, the process by which most consumer products are
brought to market involves a long chain o f production and distribution comprising
many businesses. In this chain each business purchases goods and services from
other businesses. These purchases from other businesses serve as inputs to the goods
and services provided by that business to its own customers. At the end o f the chain
are retailers who make sales to household consumers. Table 3.2 provides an example
showing how the sum o f value added equals the retail price o f the goods sold to the
final consumer. At each link in the production-distribution chain the business adds
value to its purchased inputs.

37The addition method is used by the State of Michigan. The Michigan Single Business Tax is generally
considered to be very complex. The addition method has also been considered for use in determining value added
of financial institutions, which is difficult to measure under more conventional methods of calculating VAT liability.
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Table 3.2 The Value Added Chain
B usiness Chain
Purchases
Sales
Link # 1: Farmer
0
20
20
Link # 2: M iller
50
50
Link # 3: Baker
100
Sum

Value Added
20
30
50
100

•

Link #1. In this simple example, the fanner uses his own land and seed and
purchases no inputs from other businesses. He sells his wheat for 20 cents. This
20 cents is the farmer's value added.

•

Link #2. The miller purchases the wheat from the farmer for 20 cents. The wheat
is then ground into flour and sold to the baker for 50 cents. The difference
between the 50-cent sale and the 20 cents of cost is the miller's value added.

•

Link #3. The baker purchases the flour from the miller for 50 cents. The flour is
then used to bake bread and sold to consumers for one dollar. The difference
between the one-dollar sale and the 50 cents o f cost is the baker's value added.

The example shows that the total value added at each stage o f the production process
equals the final sales price.
By not specifying how the cost o f "purchases" would be measured, the above
example abstracts from the important issue of capital cost recovery. All proposals for
credit-invoice VATs, as well as most credit-invoice VATs currently in force
throughout the world, allow a benefit for the entire cost o f capital expenditures in the
year o f purchase (i.e., to be "expensed"), instead of allowing a benefit o f the cost over
the life o f the asset. As shown in an Appendix to this chapter, in order to make a
value-added tax a consumption tax, it is essential to allow the expensing o f capital
purchases.38
B.

Overview o f the Credit-In voice M ethod
1. The Basic Mechanics o f the Credit-Invoice M ethod

Under the credit-invoice method, tax is imposed on each firm's gross receipts.
In addition, tax credits are available to the extent each business can show that its
suppliers paid tax on their sales to that business. The amount o f creditable taxes
38If, instead o f expensing, capital purchases were amortized using depreciation schedules reflecting their true
decline in value, the tax would be equivalent to an income tax.
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appears on the invoice provided by suppliers to the business. For example, in Table
3.2, the miller had $50 o f sales and $20 o f purchases from the farmer. If the rate o f
tax is 10 percent, the miller pays $5 o f tax on gross receipts and also receives $2 of
credit. The $2 o f credit corresponds to the tax paid by the farmer, and this $2 is
reported on the invoice provided by the farmer to the miller. Table 3.3 summarizes
the basic operation o f a credit-invoice method VAT as it would apply to the example
shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.3 The O peration of a 10-Percent Credit-Invoice VAT
Com pared to a 10-Percent Retail Sales Tax
Business Chain
Link # 1: Farmer
Link # 2: M iller
Link # 3: Baker
Total

Sales
20
50
100

Gross VAT
2
5
10

C redits
0
2
5

Net VAT
2
3
5

Retail Tax
0
0
10
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7

10

10

The table also shows that, because total value added equals the retail sales prices, a
comprehensive value-added tax imposes the same total burden as a comprehensive
retail sales tax (with the same tax rate).
2. Comparison to a Retail Sales Tax
Because a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT (with the same rate)
generally impose the same amount o f tax on the same tax base (i.e., total final sales),
economists believe that the taxes will have largely the same impacts on saving,
international trade, and the distribution o f income. To economists, the differences
between a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT are primarily matters of
administration and compliance.
In order to better understand the credit-invoice method, it is useful to divide the
calculation of tax liability into two parts: (1) the calculation o f gross VAT and (2) the
calculation o f credit.
The calculation o f gross VAT is largely similar to a retail sales tax. Both taxes
apply the rate o f tax to gross taxable sales. Because both taxes are, usually,
separately stated at the cash register, they are both highly visible to consumers.39

39The separate statement o f tax is a feature o f all retail sales taxes and many VATs. It would be possible, with
some minor adjustments, to impose both taxes without this feature.
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Both taxes routinely exempt exports. To the extent there are exemptions or special
rates for certain types o f products, taxpayers must differentiate between sales of
exempt and non-exempt products under both taxes.
There are, however, some important differences between the calculation of
gross VAT and a retail sales tax. In one respect a retail sales tax is simpler than the
calculation o f gross VAT: a retail sales tax only applies to retail business while a
VAT applies to all business. On the other hand, a retail tax is more complicated than
gross VAT because under a VAT, it is not necessary to make a distinction between
sales to business or sales to consumers. Under a VAT, all sales by businesses are
taxable. If the purchaser is a business, the tax will be creditable. Thus, one o f the
most vexing administrative problems o f a retail sales tax is absent under a VAT.
The most important distinguishing feature o f the credit-invoice method is the
second part of the VAT calculation—the calculation o f credits. There are no tax
credits under a retail sales tax. Under the credit-invoice method, gross liabilities o f
businesses are substantially reduced by credits. It is noteworthy that businesses earn
credits only for taxes paid by other businesses. The credits are only allowed if the
taxpayer has a verifiable record o f taxes paid by the seller. This unique
interdependence of tax liability is important for at least two reasons.
The first reason is administration and compliance. All transactions between
businesses are subject to tax and both buyer and seller must keep records of tax
liability associated with that transaction. If the buyer does not maintain a detailed
record of the date of purchase, the type of product, the identification o f the seller, and
the amount o f tax paid by the seller for each transaction, the VAT credit can be
denied for that transaction. (See Box 3.1) Not surprisingly, tax authorities like this
feature o f the VAT. All credit claims by purchasers can be cross-checked with the
records o f sellers.40 On the other hand, the credit-invoice VAT places an enormous
new compliance burden on businesses that is not present under a retail sales tax or an
income tax.

40Under a VAT, final sales to consumers cannot be cross-checked because only sellers maintain records. So,
in the case o f final sales, credit-invoice VATs have the same type of enforcement problems as retail sales taxes.
Because consumers do not maintain detailed records of their spending, underreported sales cannot be cross
checked against the records of purchasers.
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Box 3.1
Invoice Information Retained by Buyers and Sellers For Each
Transaction Under a Credit-Invoice VAT41

• Name and address o f person issuing invoice
• VAT registration number
• Serial number o f the invoice
• Date and issue of the invoice
• Date of supply o f goods or services
• A description o f goods and services
• Amount charged, excluding VAT
• Rate o f tax
• Name and address o f customer

The second reason why interdependence o f tax liability is important is its
unusual effect on tax exemption. Under an income tax or almost any other type o f
consumption tax, exemption only affects the exempted taxpayer, and exemptions
generally reduce overall tax receipts. However, under the credit-invoice method o f
calculating VAT, the impacts o f exemption can extend far beyond the exempted
party, and tax exemption can even have the unintended side effect o f increasing
taxation. This is explained more fully in the following section.
3. Exemption from a Credit-Invoice Value-Added Tax
One o f the more tedious aspects o f learning about value-added taxation is
understanding how tax relief may be implemented. In practice, value-added taxes
usually have numerous special rates and exemptions. There are two basic methods of
providing tax relief under a VAT: exemption and zero-rating. Understanding the
impact o f exemption and zero-rating is critical to understanding the impacts o f a
credit-invoice VAT on those sectors and products frequently provided VAT relief,
such as food, housing, medical care, small business (including farmers), exports, used
goods, state and local governments, financial intermediaries, and charitable
organizations. In addition, the differences between exemption and zero-rating also
serve to highlight some important differences between the credit-invoice and
subtraction methods o f calculating VAT.

41Tait (1988), pp. 279-280.

25

Exemption of a business under a credit-invoice VAT removes tax liability and
the availability o f credit, leaving the business in a zero-tax position. This is not,
however, the end o f the story. It is still possible for an exempt business to face a
significant burden from a VAT. Overall burden may increase because business
customers o f an exempt business will be unable to receive tax credits on purchases
from the exempt business. In a competitive market, the exempt business that gives
its customers invoices without credits will have to reduce its prices or lose sales.
W hile exemption can increase burden—it can also reduce burden or leave it
unchanged from what it would be without exemption. Whether exemption from a
credit-invoice VAT increases, reduces or does not affect burden depends on where
in the production-distribution chain exemption is granted:
1.

If a business at the beginning of the production chain is exempt, no tax
is paid by the exempt business, but an additional amount o f tax is paid
by the next business in the chain that exactly offsets this. In this case,
total VAT liability is the same as in the case without exemptions.

2.

If an intermediate business is exempt from tax, the business making
purchases from that exempt business is not able to credit any taxes paid
by business earlier in the chain. Thus, the purchaser from an exempt
business pays as much tax as if no tax were previously paid. In this
case, total VAT liability is greater than the case without exemptions.

3.

If a retailer making final sales is exempt from tax, all taxes on value
added prior to purchases by the retailer are properly paid and the value
added by the retailer is exempt from tax. In this case, total VAT
liability is less than the case without exemptions.

These three points are illustrated in Table 3.4. While exemption is seemingly the
most straightforward way o f relieving administrative burden, its impact on the tax
burdens associated with different products can be markedly uneven. As a rough rule
o f thumb, however, it can be noted that businesses that provide goods and services
to other businesses will generally be hurt by exemption, while businesses that provide
goods and services to consumers will generally benefit from exemption.
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Table 3.4
The Effects of Exemption at Various Stages
of Production Under a Credit-Invoice Method
No
Exemptions

Exempt
Farmer

Exempt Miller

Exempt
Baker

2
0

Farmer
Gross VAT
Credits

2
0

-

2
0

Net VAT

2

-

2

2

Miller
Gross VAT
Credits

5
2

5
0

-

5
2

Net VAT

3

5

-

3

Baker
Gross VAT
Credits

10
5

10
5

10
0

-

Net VAT

5

5

10

-

Total VAT

10

10

12

5

In general, the degree of overtaxation associated with any product will be greater, the
closer the exempted business is to the retail level. Thus, exemption o f millions of
small farmers, with relatively small purchases from other businesses,42 is unlikely to
result in significant overtaxation of food and might well be justified by the significant
reduction in compliance and administrative costs.
It should also be noted that under credit-invoice VATs, many businesses would
be due refunds because a significant portion o f their sales is not subject to tax.

42Furthermore, to help alleviate any overtaxation when farmers are exempt, farm implements, seed, and fertilizer
can be exempt from tax.
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4. Zero-Rating as an Alternative to Exemptions
The large and uneven economic distortions that can result from exemptions has
led to the use o f zero-rating as an alternative to exemption. When the sales o f a
business are zero-rated, the business must still become part o f the VAT system and
file annual returns. However, the business’s compliance burden is not so much an
issue because zero-rated taxpayers receive refunds. (In fact, under most VAT systems
where exemptions are allowed, many businesses opt to remain zero-rated taxpayers.)
A zero rated business pays no gross VAT but is eligible for credits. Besides being
good for the zero-rated firm, the economic impacts are much more even than under
a system of exemptions. Any zero-rating before the retail stage does not impact total
liability o f a final product. And zero-rating at the retail stage results in complete
exemption o f a product. These points are illustrated in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5
The Effects of Zero-Rating at Various Stages
of Production Under a Credit-Invoice Method
No Zero
R ating

Zero R ated
F arm er

Z ero R ated
M iller

Zero R ated
B aker

Farmer
Gross VAT
C redits

2
0

0
0

2
0

2
0

Net VAT

2

0

2

2

M iller
Gross VAT
C redits

5
2

5
0

0
-2

5
2

Net VAT

3

5

-2

3

Baker
Gross VAT
C redits

10
5

10
5

10
0

0
5

Net VAT

5

5

10

-5

Total VAT

10

10

10

0
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C.

Concluding Remarks

Despite widespread acceptance throughout the rest o f the industrialized world,
perceived high compliance costs and the perceived similarity to sales taxation have
kept the credit-invoice method from playing a prominent part in the current
consumption tax debate in the United States. Instead a somewhat similar alternative—
the subtraction method VAT—lies at the core o f almost all current consumption tax
proposals. This is the topic o f the next chapter.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
How to Make a VAT a Consumption Tax
One o f the most prominent features o f a consumption tax imposed on
businesses is the immediate write-off o f the full price o f capital purchases. (Under
a credit-invoice VAT, the equivalent of expensing is achieved by allowing a tax credit
for the full price o f capital purchases.) Expensing does more than just simplify the
tax and enhance its political appeal, it is the feature o f a value-added tax that makes
it a consumption tax. The example in Table 3A.1 illustrates why.
In this example, it is assumed that the economy is composed o f two industries
-a consumer-goods industry and a capital-goods industry. Value added is most often
calculated by allowing deductions for the entire purchase price o f new capital (i.e.,
expensing). In this case, total value added in the economy equals total consumption
o f 100. If, however, value added is calculated by allowing depreciation instead of
expensing, then total value in the economy equals total income o f 105. Thus, a valueadded tax with depreciation (instead o f expensing) would not be a consumption tax
but an income tax.
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Table 3A.1
Expensing Makes a VAT a Consumption Tax

INCOME STATEMENTS:
( 1) Sales
(2) Purchased capital
(3) Depreciation
(4) Wages
(5) Profits
VALUE ADDED
- -T W O M ETHOD S:
Value added (depreciation
method) Sales (1) minus
Depreciation (3)
Value added (expensing
method) Sales ( 1) minus
Purchases (2)
EC O N O M IC
STATISTICS:
Total Income Equals
Wages Plus Profit
Consumption Equals Total
Income Less Net
Investment Equals
Consumption

Consum erGoods Industry

Capital-Goods
Industry

100
25
20
70

25
0
20

125
25
20
90

10

5

15

80

25

105

75

25

100

Total Economy

105
100
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Chapter 4
The Subtraction Method VAT

Summary
•
The subtraction-method VAT is the general type o f consumption tax now
receiving the most attention on Capitol Hill.
•
No country except Japan (using a 3-percent rate) has any experience
implementing a subtraction method VAT
•
A subtraction method VAT is likely to be simpler to administer than a
credit-invoice VAT.
•
Besides being somewhat simpler, a subtraction method VAT may be more
politically viable than a credit-invoice VAT. A subtraction method VAT has an
appearance similar to that o f the corporation tax while a credit-invoice VAT
more closely resembles a sales tax.
A.

Introduction

Although its proponents may not like to admit it, the subtraction-method VAT
has a great deal in common with the credit-invoice VAT. The tax base is calculated
as the difference between business receipts and purchases from other businesses. So,
like the credit-invoice method, the starting point in calculating tax liability is gross
business receipts. Instead of credits, however, the subtraction method uses deductions
to modify the tax on gross receipts to a value-added tax. Given the same tax rate, the
subtraction and credit-invoice methods collect the same amount of tax from taxpayers.
This is illustrated in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1
Comparison of the Subtraction Method
and the Credit-Invoice Method
10% C redit Invoice
VAT

1 0 % Subtraction
M ethod VAT
L in k # 1: F arm er
Sales
Purchased Inputs
Value-added
VAT

20
0
20
2

Sales
Gross Tax
Invoice Credits
VAT

20
2
0

L ink # 2 : M iller
Sales
Purchased Inputs

50
20

Sales
Gross Tax

50
5

30

Invoice Credits

2

VAT

3

Value-added
VAT
L ink #3: B aker
Sales
Purchased Inputs
Value-added

3

100
50
50

VAT

5

Total
VAT

10

Sales
Gross Tax

2

100
10

Invoice Credits

5

VAT

5
10

Gross receipts do not include financial income or other proceeds from sale of
financial assets. Nor do they include export sales. There are deductions only for
inputs purchased from other businesses. There are no deductions fo r wages p a id to
one's own employees or fo r interest payments. On the other hand, capital
expenditures are written o ff when purchased, and business inputs are deducted when
purchased even i f they only accumulate in inventory. A simple comparison of the
corporate income tax and the subtraction method VAT is presented in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2
Com parison of C orporate Income Tax and a
Subtraction M ethod VAT
Income
Tax
Business Receipts—Domestic
Business Receipts—Exports
Interest Income
Total Gross Receipts
Business Purchases
(Other than capital)
Wages
Interest Expense
Depreciation
Capital Spending

Total Deductions
Tax Base

5

VAT
90
-

105

90

35
45
10
10

35

100

15

50

5

40

90
10

-

There are no significant differences in the economic impacts between a
subtraction method and credit-invoice method VAT. Like the retail sales tax, both are
taxes on consumption (assuming immediate deductions for capital expenditures).
Both equally have the ability to increase capital formation and improve
competitiveness. Both potentially have the same impacts on the distribution o f the
tax burden. There are, however, three important differences between the creditinvoice method and the subtraction method: ( 1) differences in compliance and
administrative costs, (2) different degrees o f flexibility, and (3) differences in the
perceived similarity to a retail sales tax.
B.

Administration and Compliance

The basic difference between the credit-invoice method and the subtraction
method VAT is that tax liability under the subtraction method tax paid by purchasers
may be calculated without reference to taxes paid by sellers. Generally, proponents
argue that this greatly reduces the compliance burden in two ways. First, businesses
selling products do not have to provide tax information on invoices to business
customers or retain records of these invoices. Secondly, businesses buying products
do not have to retain special tax records of each purchase in order to claim credits.
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Under the subtraction method, businesses can use annual accounting flows
similar to those used under current financial and tax accounting rules to calculate tax
liability. Businesses would not be required to keep detailed records o f each
transaction. It is important to note, however, that current accounting records would
have to be supplemented to determine the subtraction method liability. For example,
cost categories such as cost of goods sold and advertising would have to be divided
between (non-deductible) internal costs and (deductible) purchases from other
businesses. In addition, the subtraction method VAT permits deduction o f the full
purchase price of capital when acquired. Similarly, inventory items (such as supplies,
repair parts, and other items usually capitalized under an income tax) are deducted
when purchased, not when removed from inventory.
Despite these adjustments, it seems likely that a subtraction method VAT
entails lower compliance costs for business taxpayers than a credit-invoice VAT.
This simplification, however, comes at the cost of increased potential for evasion and
less flexibility.
Under a subtraction method VAT compliance is likely to be lower than under
a credit-invoice VAT because it is more difficult for tax collectors to cross-check
business tax returns under the subtraction method. Duplicate records of invoices held
by sellers and business purchasers make it much easier to identify unreported sales
under a credit-invoice VAT. Tax evasion by retailers not reporting sales to
consumers, however, is still a problem under the subtraction method as it is under the
credit-invoice method and the income tax.43
C.

Flexibility

Many commentators have pointed out that a credit-invoice VAT is much better
able to accommodate tax relief for particular products and particular business sectors
than the subtraction method.44 This lack o f flexibility is considered by some to be an
advantage o f the subtraction method VAT because an absence o f preferential
treatment would reduce complexity and improve economic efficiency. On the other
hand, this inflexibility is seen as a disadvantage by those who believe some types o f
special relief are desirable or inevitable, and without the ability to accommodate
certain sectors o f the economy (e.g., farmers, health care providers, state and local
governments, charitable and cultural organizations) a value-added tax should not or

43If VAT rates are lower than current income tax rates, the incentives to underreport sales would be less.
44See, for example, Congressional Budget Office (1992), McLure (1987), and U.S. Treasury (1984).
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could not be enacted. This point deserves serious attention because it is important in
determining how the tax will be administered and in determining the political
dynamics surrounding its passage (as well as post-enactment modifications).
Like a retail sales tax and credit-invoice VAT, preferential treatment o f
products (e.g., food, exports) under a subtraction method VAT is effected by
identifying those products at the retail level and excluding them from the tax base.
As noted above, preferential treatment adds significant administrative and compliance
costs but no more so for the subtraction method VAT than a retail sales tax or a
credit-invoice VAT. Therefore, a subtraction method VAT can be effectively
administered at multiple rates as long as preferential rates are imposed at the retail
level.45
The critical difference between the subtraction and credit-invoice methods is
preferential treatment before the retail level. A credit-invoice VAT is particularly
well-suited to provide preferential treatment for non-retail sales (e.g., small farmers).
As shown in Table 3.5 in the prior chapter, the sales of the zero-rated taxpayer escape
tax and even generate rebates for that taxpayer, but the overall taxation o f the final
product is unchanged. As a result, the credit-invoice VAT does distort consumer
choice, and therefore ultimately is not likely to bestow any particularly large benefits
on the zero-rated business.
Unlike the case o f zero-rating under a credit-invoice VAT, preferential
treatm ent o f non-retail sales under a subtraction method VAT results in uneven
taxation o f final products. If non-retail sales are exempt (or subject to preferential
rates),46 there is no tax on the seller's value added. However, unlike a subtraction
m ethod VAT, the lost revenue is not made up further along the production chain.
Thus, exemption at the intermediate level does provide relief for the final product.
This is illustrated in the first column (Example #1) of Table 4.3 where the
intermediate producer--the miller—is exempt from the system.

45If preferential rates were provided at the retail level, a subtraction method VAT would face the problem similar to that encountered under a retail sales ta x -o f distinguishing retail from non-retail sales. However, the
item s likely to receive preferential treatment under a VAT—off-premise consumption o f food, clothing, public
transportation, and medical care—are much easier to identify as retail sales than those at issue under a retail sales
tax—such as tools, personal computers, and automobiles.
46Zero rating is not an alternative under a subtraction method VAT (unless it is significantly modified to be
similar to a credit-invoice VAT).
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Table 4.3
The Distortionary Effects of Exemption of Intermediary Sales
Under the Subtraction Method
Exam ple #1:
Final Product Fully
Taxable

Exam ple #2
Final Product
Exem pt from Tax

20
0

20
0

20
2

20
2

Miller—EXEMPT
Receipts
Purchases

50
20

50
20

Value-Added
VAT

30
0

30
0

Baker-TAXABLE
Receipts
Purchases

100
50

0
50

Value-Added
VAT (or Refund)

50

-50

5

(5)

Total Value-Added
Tax (or Refund)
Note:
VAT Using C reditInvoice M ethod

7

(3)

10

0

Farmer—TAXABLE
Receipts
Purchases
Value-Added
VAT

However, if there is preferential treatment o f non-retail sales under a
subtraction method VAT and final sales are excluded (e.g., exports, food), the
preferentially treated final sales do better than being exempt or zero-rated. Their tax
is not only eliminated, but they get a subsidy because they, in effect, are being
granted a rebate for taxes not paid at prior levels. This is illustrated in the second
column (Example 2) o f Table 4.3.
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There are three responses to the problem o f exemption o f intermediate product
sales under a subtraction method VAT. One is to not allow preferential rates or
exemption of products before the retail level. (This seems to be the response favored
by most proponents o f subtraction method VATs.) It is important to note that such
a restriction does not hinder implementation o f policies intending to promote trade
(e.g., exemption o f exports) and policies intending to provide relief for low-income
households (i.e., exemption o f food and medical care). Such a restriction, however,
would be an impediment to providing relief for small business and small farmers who
often face a disproportionate compliance burden and are at the same time politically
influential.
The second response to the problem is to disallow deductions for business
purchases on which no tax was paid. This would require sellers reporting to buyers
that tax was paid and the buyer and seller keeping records o f all transactions. The
administration of such a system would be much different from that o f a credit-invoice
VAT.
Finally, the problem—particularly if not o f a large magnitude-- c a n simply be
ignored: allow deductions even though there have been exemptions prior to the retail
level.
D.

Perceived Similarity to a Retail Sales Tax

Economists are often indifferent in their choice o f consumption taxes because
different types o f consumption taxes are widely believed to have similar economic
impacts. Politicians, on the other hand, are acutely sensitive to the differences
between consumption taxes. This is because the public has a very different
perception about the various types of consumption taxes, and politicians realize that
it is the public perception of consumption taxes that will drive the political debate.
There are two notions o f a subtraction method VAT that make it more
attractive to the general public than a credit-invoice VAT. The first is its dissimilarity
in appearance to a sales tax. The second is its similarity in appearance to a corporate
income tax.
Retail sales taxes are widely perceived as regressive taxes. From the point of
view o f the final consumer, a retail sales tax and a credit-invoice VAT are
indistinguishable. Both types of tax are collected at the cash register and are
separately stated from the retail prices.
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If a subtraction method VAT is not separately stated (as under all recent
proposals), it does not have the appearance o f a sales tax. Moreover, the subtraction
m ethod VAT imposes significant tax liabilities on large businesses as does the
corporate income tax. This similarity in appearance to the corporate income tax
should not be discounted. Many current proposals would use the revenues from a
subtraction method VAT to replace the corporate income tax. Much o f the current
public affinity for the corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum
tax is due to the perceived unfairness o f large corporations not paying tax. Given the
history o f the corporate income tax and the corporate alternative minimum tax, it is
likely there would be a significant public outcry if large corporations paid no tax.47
It is not only the public's perceptions that matters in the choice between the
credit-invoice and subtraction methods. State governments may be more willing to
accept a "hidden" subtraction method VAT that does not visibly compete with its
retail sale tax base than a credit-invoice VAT that does. The perceptions o f foreign
governments also matter. However, in this case, it is preferable for the tax to be
considered a sales tax. Under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
"indirect taxes" (like sales taxes) may be rebated at the border, but "direct" taxes (like
the individual and corporate income taxes) may not.48 This is an area o f strong
controversy and debate.

47Even though almost all economists believe the burden of a consumption tax falls on consumption, and many
economists believe the burden of the corporate income tax is borne by capital, replacement of the corporate income
tax with a subtraction method VAT might be politically acceptable. It probably is more palatable than the
replacement of the corporate income tax with a retail sales tax—even though economists consider both proposals
are economically equivalent.
48The impact of consumption taxes on international trade is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 5
The Individual Consumption Tax

Sum m ary
•
Unlike other types o f consumption taxes that are collected from businesses, an
individual consumption tax is collected from individuals. Households would file
annual returns as they now do fo r the income tax.
•
To its proponents, the major advantage o f an individual consumption tax
compared to other consumption taxes is that the inherent regressivity o f the
consumption tax base may be offset with a progressive rate structure.
•
Under the tax, consumption is calculated by subtracting net savings from total
income. This deduction fo r net savings presents numerous practical difficulties,
particularly during the transition from an income to a consumption tax.
•
The major disadvantage o f an individual consumption tax compared to other
consumption taxes is its complexity.
A.

Introduction

R etail sales taxes and value-added taxes are consum ption taxes collected from
businesses. In contrast, an individual consum ption tax49 is im posed solely on
individuals. U nder an individual consum ption tax, individuals w ould file annual
returns as is done under current individual incom e tax rules. The defining difference
betw een the current incom e tax and an individual consum ption tax is that

49The individual consumption tax is also referred to as the "personal consumption tax" or the "expenditures
tax." Sometimes the individual consumption tax that is part o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal is called the
"Savings Exempt Income Tax" (SEIT) or the "Unlimited Saving Allowance" tax (USA tax.).
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the new tax would allow an unlimited deduction for net annual additions to saving.
In order to arrive at net additions to saving, additions to savings must be reduced by
dissaving in the form o f additional borrowing.
The basic calculation o f an individual consumption tax is illustrated with the
following simple example:
Table 5.1
Calculation of the Individual Consumption Tax
Income
Plus
New Loan for Automobile Purchase
Reduction in Mortgage Principal
Net New Debt
Less
Beginning o f Year Bank Balance
End o f Year Bank Balance
Increase in Saving

$100
$15
($10)
$5
$40
($50)
($10)

Equals Consumption Tax Base

$95

In this example, a family has $100 of wage and interest income. Because it has taken
out a new car loan of $15 and paid off $10 o f mortgage principal, its net new debt is
$5. This is $5 over and above income available for consumption. On the other hand,
the family was also able to increase its bank balance by $10. This is $10 of income
not used for consumption. Thus, after adding and subtracting from loan and savings
balances, this family has $95 available for consumption.
Many commentators have noted that an individual consumption tax is probably
the most complex o f all types o f consumption taxes.50 Despite this additional
complexity, some still consider individual consumption taxes an attractive option
because o f their unique ability to address issues o f regressivity. Because the tax is
levied on households and not businesses, there can be a progressive rate structure.
Retail sales taxes and value-added taxes (levied on businesses) can only alleviate

50See, for example, Graetz (1979), Kuttner (1987), and Toder (1995).
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regressivity through adjustments to the tax base and/or with administratively complex
refundable credits. As shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, preferential
treatment o f necessities is administratively complex and economically inefficient.
Moreover, such adjustments to the tax base are not particularly effective in achieving
distributional objectives. An individual consumption tax, on the other hand, can
achieve almost any desired distribution of after-tax income solely through adjustments
to the tax rate.
Thus, at first glance, it appears an individual consumption tax is the best o f
both worlds. There need not be a tradeoff between economic efficiency and equity.
An individual consumption tax has all of the economic benefits o f a consumption tax
base. At the same time, the tax can be made to be just as progressive as the current
income tax. The individual consumption tax has not, however, received even a small
fraction o f the attention o f that is given to other consumption taxes.
Except for brief temporary appearances in India and Sri Lanka, tax authorities
around the world have had no experience with an individual consumption tax. The
Treasury Department proposed an individual consumption tax in 1942 to help fund
wartime spending and reduce consumption, but the proposal got nowhere in Congress.
The Treasury Department again brought attention to the idea with a major study o f
tax reform in 1977, but again the plan was just presented as an option--and did not
receive serious consideration by Congress. More recently, however, the individual
consumption tax has received significant attention as one (along with a subtraction
method VAT imposed on business) o f the two major components o f the legislation
(S. 722) proposed by Senators Nunn and Domenici in April o f 1995. Until the
introduction of this legislation, there had been no serious congressional consideration
of an individual consumption tax.51
The problem with an individual consumption tax is the difficulty in finding
a workable method o f calculating the deduction for new saving--the deduction that
lies at the heart o f an individual consumption tax. In order to better understand the
issues involved, it is useful to differentiate "old saving" (that is, the individual net
wealth at the time of enactment of the tax) from "new saving" (additions to net wealth
after enactment). It is likely that the two would be treated differently under any
individual consumption tax.

51Chapter 11 provides more detail o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal.
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B.

New Saving

New saving would be treated like deductible contributions to an individual
retirement account (IRA) that had no limitations on the amount o f deductions or the
timing o f withdrawals. Taxpayers would deduct all income saved, including net
additions to bank, mutual fund, and brokerage accounts; all purchases o f stocks,
bonds, and other financial instruments; and all investments in partnerships and
proprietorships. When funds were withdrawn from such investments—whether in the
form of income or reduction of principal, the entire amount o f the proceeds would be
subject to tax.52
Conversely, proceeds from new loans or other forms o f indebtedness would
be included in the tax base, while payments o f both interest and principal would be
deducted.
The computation of the deduction for new saving would require knowledge o f
the annual change in the outstanding balance o f each taxpayer's investments and
indebtedness. Under an individual consumption tax, the custodian o f each investment
and indebtedness account would have to report these amounts to taxpayers once a
year as they now report interest earned and paid.
C.

Old Saving

Saving accumulated before the enactment is more problematic than new saving
for two reasons. The first is a matter of compliance. The second is a matter of
fairness.
Once an individual consumption tax comes into effect, all additions to saving
would be deductible and all withdrawals would be taxable. Shifting funds from one
investment to another (e.g., depositing a dividend in a bank account) has no tax
consequences because receipts (dissaving) are exactly offset by saving. A large
revenue loss could result, however, if somehow existing wealth was undetected by tax
authorities, and then these funds were deducted when invested in new forms. This
could occur if prior to enactment individuals drew down their saving and held it in
cash. The investment o f this cash subsequent to the enactment date would result in

52With regard to taxing the entire proceeds from investment, tax professionals can think in terms of the entire
amount being gain. Tax basis is zero because the entire value of the initial investment is written off when the
investment is made.
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deductions despite lack of additional new saving. In order to prevent this, it has been
noted that it may be necessary to require taxpayers to declare (subject to certain de
minimis rules) their outstanding cash balances at the outset. It is not clear how such
a requirement would be enforced.53
The other important transition issue is primarily a matter o f policy. Under the
standard operating rules o f an individual consumption tax, all proceeds from saving
are included in gross receipts and subject to tax. The taxation o f the entire proceeds,
however—and not just capital gains, dividends, interest, and other capital incom eresults in large tax penalties in the case of existing saving. Thus, the standard
operating rules o f the tax would result in harsh treatment o f old saving, and many
would consider such tax treatment a retroactive tax increase. This burden would fall
primarily on the elderly who draw down their saving during retirement.54
In order not to impose a double burden on the elderly (and others drawing
down saving to consume), special transition relief is required. One method o f
providing this relief would be to treat existing saving like new saving and allow the
balance of existing saving to be deducted at the time o f enactment.55 Then, under the
regular rules of the individual consumption tax, all proceeds can be included when
the assets are sold or the account is closed out. There are, however, several potential
objections to this type o f transition relief. First, given the enormous amount o f
individual wealth outstanding in the United States, this deduction for all existing basis
would result in an enormous revenue loss (and an increase in tax rates to pay for the
loss). Secondly, a significant portion of old saving received favorable treatment under
the income tax (IRAs, pensions, life insurance, annuities, and tax-exempt bonds).
Having never been subject to tax (or having received substantial tax relief), this
saving would not be subject to "double taxation" upon enactment o f an individual
consumption tax. Third, given that two major objectives o f implementing a
consumption tax are to increase saving and to simplify taxation, some propose moving
to a new system "cold turkey," (i.e., without transition relief) because tax relief for
old saving does nothing to increase incentives for new saving and such rules are

53Perhaps U.S. citizens could be required to exchange their green money for red money.
54It is important to recognize that the burdensome taxation of old saving under an individual consumption tax
with transition relief is exactly equivalent to what would be experienced under a retail sales tax or a value-added
tax.
55This deduction of basis is equivalent to selling the asset at the time of enactment and paying income tax on any
gain, and then reinvesting and deducting the entire proceeds.
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extremely complex.56 Finally, some question whether the "retroactive" tax burden
imposed on old saving is truly "unfair".57 They conclude that it is entirely appropriate
to impose an additional tax burden on the elderly given the transfer o f wealth being
exacted by the Social Security system from the current work force to current
retirees.58 This last view--if it ever gets serious attention in the political arena—will
undoubtedly be met with fierce opposition from those savers that would have their
after-tax income subject to tax a second time under the consumption tax.
D.

Tax Rates Under an Individual Consumption Tax

Although particular proposals must be evaluated with a full array o f details,
two general observations can be made about tax rates that might prevail under a
replacement consumption tax. In general, because total consumption is less than
income, it can be expected that a consumption tax will have higher rates than an
income tax. (If, however, significant base broadening occurs, this need not be the
case.) Second, because upper-income families consume proportionately less o f their
income than lower-income families, it is generally necessary for a consumption tax
to have more steeply graduated rates than under current law in order to achieve the
same degree o f progressivity as current law.
E.

Overview o f the Four Major Types o f Consumption Taxes and Preview o f
Following Chapters

This and the prior three chapters have attempted to provide some operational
details o f different types o f consumption taxes. Table 5.2 provides a summary
comparison o f some o f the major features o f these taxes. Columns A and B o f this
table highlight some practical issues already discussed. Administrative issues and
public perceptions o f these taxes vary dramatically. Columns (C) through (F)
summarize the economy-wide effects o f these taxes. Despite their considerable
operational differences, these taxes in their basic form s do not have fundamentally
different effects on growth, trade, inflation, and the distribution o f income. These
economic issues are explored in more detail in Chapters 6 through 8.

56This is the position taken by Sam Gibbons, ranking minority member o f the House Ways and Means
Committee. See, Gibbons (1994).
57See, Graetz (1977).
58See, M akin (1987).
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Each o f the four major types o f consumption taxes (like any tax) has its
weaknesses. From Table 5.2, the following conclusions may be drawn:
•

Because regressivity is a major problem with consumption taxes, the ability to
implement a progressive rate structure could make the individual consumption tax
a highly attractive option. An individual consumption tax, however, loses much
o f its luster because o f its complexity—particularly with regard to computing a
deduction for saving.

•

A retail sales tax is generally perceived as regressive and may not be enforceable
at rates necessary to make it a replacement tax. Nevertheless, the perceived
simplicity o f a retail sales tax is attractive to voters.

•

Many o f the enforcement problems prevalent under a retail sales tax disappear
under a credit-invoice VAT. Like a retail sales tax, however, a credit-invoice VAT
is highly visible and perceived as regressive by the public. Moreover, it imposes
substantial new compliance burdens on businesses. Even the credit-invoice
VAT’s advantages over other VATs--its ability to effectively provide product and
business exemption-is often perceived as a weakness by those who would prefer
a consumption tax not have any special tax breaks.

•

From the standpoint of political viability, the subtraction method VAT appears to
pose the least difficulty. Administrative and compliance costs seem relatively
low. Except for the individual consumption tax, it is no better or worse than most
other consumption taxes with regard to growth or income distribution. Moreover,
because it is promoted as a tax on business, the public may have some trouble
recognizing its regressivity (no matter how much economists may insist this is the
case).59

After reviewing some major economic issues in Chapters 6 through 8, the
remainder of this study-- Chapters 9 through 17—is devoted to describing how actual
proposals might impact business. One major finding is that a replacement subtraction
method VAT would radically shift the tax burden from individuals to businesses.
Furthermore, within the business sector, it radically shifts the burden from capital- to
labor-intensive industries.

59See Chapter 9.
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The Flat Tax modifies the basic structure o f a subtraction method VAT by
removing the wage component of value added from the business tax base and, instead
imposes a wage tax on individuals. In so doing, the Flat Tax distributes the tax burden
between businesses and individuals and across businesses in a manner that much
more closely resembles current law. (To be sure, there are still major differences, but
these differences in tax payments are far less than those that would be experienced
under a "plain vanilla" subtraction VAT.) Given that a consumption tax with a less
radical alteration in tax collections is likely to have more political viability, the Flat
Tax may be viewed as a political refinement o f the subtraction method VAT.
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Promotes
Growth (to
Extent Saving
Increases)

Promotes
Growth (to
Extent Saving
Increases)

Promotes
Growth (to
Extent Saving
Increases)
Promotes
Growth (to
Extent Saving
Increases)

Like State
Sales Taxes

Like State
Sales Taxes

Like
Corporate
Income Tax

Like
Individual
Income Tax

Enforcement
Problems at
High Rates

High
Compliance
Costs
(Particularly
with Multiple
Rates)
Most
Information
From Existing
Books
Problems
with
Deduction for
Saving

(1)
Retail
Sales
Tax

(2)
CreditInvoice
VAT

(3)

Subtraction
VAT

(4)
Individual
Consumption
Tax

Probable
Effect
on Growth

(C)

(B)
Perception

(A)
Complexity

Replacement
Tax

Regressive

Regressive

Regressive

May Improve
Trade
Balance (if
Saving
Increases)
May Improve
Trade
Balance (if
Saving
Increases)

May Improve
Trade
Balance (if
Saving
Increases)
May Improve
Trade
Balance (if
Saving
Increases)

One-time
Increase in
Price Level (if
Fed Goes
Along)
One-time
Increase in
Price Level (if
Fed Goes
Along)

One-time
Increase in
Price Level (if
Fed Goes
Along)
Tax on
Individuals
Less Likely to
Increase
Prices

Depends on
Rate
Structure

(F)
Impact on
Income
Distribution

(E)
Probable
Effect on
Trade

(D)
Probable
Effect on
Inflation

Table 5.2
Summary Comparison of Major Types of Consumption Tax

PART III. THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES
Chapter 6
The Effect of Consumption Taxes on
Saving, Inflation, and the Business Cycle

Summary
•

Proponents o f consumption taxation argue:
(1)

saving is critical to long-term economic growth

(2)

the current U.S. saving rate is low compared to the rate o f U.S.
saving in the past and compared with rates o f saving in other
countries

(3)

the replacement o f an income tax with a consumption tax would
increase the after-tax rate o f return on saving (by eliminating the
bias against saving inherent in the income tax)

(4)

an increase in the after-tax rate o f return on saving will increase
private saving.

•
There is broad agreement among economists about all o f these points
except the last one: economists dispute the magnitude o f the response o f private
saving to a replacement consumption tax. Given the uncertainty o f economic
analysis, it is unlikely any consensus about the general impact o f taxes on saving
will emerge in the foreseeable future.
•
A replacement consumption tax is unlikely to have much impact on the
business cycle.
•
A consumption tax may have a one-time impact on the price level i f the
Federal Reserve increases the money supply.
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A.

Introduction

Capital formation is a critical ingredient o f economic growth, but the money
has to come from somewhere. The vast majority o f funds necessary to purchase new
equipment, new plant, new roads, and new technology come from saving. Without
increases in saving, any increase in one type o f investment (e.g., new machinery)
m ust be at the expense o f other types o f investment (e.g., technology). With more
capital, workers have more tools that enable them to be more productive. Productivity
growth leads to higher wages and a higher standard o f living.
The financial markets channel funds to purchasers o f capital who need the
funds. Although there is a tendency to focus on personal savings by individuals—
prim arily in the form o f pensions and accounts with financial intermediaries—
significant funding for capital spending in the United States comes from other
businesses (i.e., retained earnings), State governments (that generate budget
surpluses), and foreign individuals and businesses investing in the United States.
It is important to note that saving can also be negative as well as positive.
W hen consumption exceeds income, there is a drain on funds available for capital
investment.
Therefore, from the standpoint o f capital formation, reducing
indebtedness by individuals is just as important as increasing savings by individuals.
O f course, the biggest culprit o f them all when it comes to dissaving is the deficitprone Federal government. It is often remarked that the surest method o f increasing
national saving is to reduce the Federal budget deficit.
There is substantial disagreement among economists about the impact o f a
replacem ent consumption tax on saving and economic growth. Some claim the
impact is dramatically large. Others argue it is imperceptibly small. Unfortunately,
this difference of opinion is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Decision makers
in both the private and public sectors will have to evaluate consumption taxes with
this uncertainty.
B.

The Low Level o f U.S. Saving

Since peaking in 1978 at 8.1 percent of total Gross Domestic Product, the
annual rate o f saving in the United States has rarely exceeded four percent. As shown
in Table 6.1, net saving by individuals, by businesses, and by governments have all
declined.
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Table 6.1
Components of National Saving as a Percentage of GDP
Average over
Period:
1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-92

Net Personal
Saving
4.7
4.7
5.5
4.8
3.5

Net Business
Saving
2.8
3.6
2.6
1.6
1.6

Net Govt.
Saving
-0.1
-0.1
-1.0
-2.5
-3.5

Total National
Saving
7.4
8.1
7.2
3.9
1.7

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (1995).
Not only is the U.S. rate of savings low by historical standards but, as shown in Chart
6.1, it is also extremely low in comparison to other major industrialized countries.

Chart 6.1
NATIONAL SAVING AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP,
1989

Source: Joint Committee on Taxation (1995).
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C.

The Impact o f Taxes on the Rate o f Return

Two fundamental observations can be made about the impact o f taxes on
saving. The first is that an income tax penalizes saving: the more an individual saves,
the greater his or her lifetime tax burden. This is illustrated in the example in Table
6.2.
Table 6.2
Comparing the Income Tax Burden of a Spender and a Saver

Assumptions:
PRE-TAX RETURN
TAX RATE
AFTER TAX
RETURN

A.

8 .0 %
3 0 .0 %
5 .6 %

" spender"
PERIOD 1

PRESENT VALUE

PERIOD 2

INCOME

$ 1 0 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

SAVING

$ 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

CONSUMPTION

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

TAXES

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

S . "SAVER"
PERIOD 1

PRESENT VALUE
INCOME

$ 1 0 0 .0 0

SAVING

$ 7 0 .0 0

CONSUMPTION

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

TAXES

$ 3 1 .5 9

$ 3 0 .0 0

PERIOD 2
$ 5 .6 0
($ 7 3 .9 2 )
$ 7 3 .9 2
$ 1 .6 8 60

In this simple example, two individuals live only two periods ("working years" and
"retirement"), and they start out with the same initial wealth (from wages or
inheritance) o f $100. The "spender" consumes all o f his wealth during his working

1.68 tax at 6% rate of return has a present value o f $ 1.59.
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years. The "saver" invests and does not consume anything until retirement.
Proponents argue that despite the same initial opportunities and the same lifetime
wealth (measured as the present value o f lifetime consumption), the burden o f
taxation is greater for the saver.
The second fundamental observation about taxes and saving is that a
consumption tax neither rewards nor penalizes saving. The burden o f taxation is the
same irrespective o f an individual’s savings behavior. The example in Table 6.3
shows the tax burden o f the saver and spender under a consumption tax.
Table 6.3
Comparing the Consumption Tax Burden of a Spender and a Saver
PRE-TAX RETURN
TAX RATE

8 .0 %
3 0 .0 %

A . "SPENDER"
PERIOD 1

PRESENT VALUE

PERIOD 2

INCOME

$ 1 0 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

SAVING

$ 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

CONSUMPTION

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

TAXES

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

B . "SAVER"
PERIOD 1

PRESENT VALUE

PERIOD 2
$ 8 .0 0

INCOME

$ 1 0 0 .0 0

SAVING

$ 1 0 0 .0 0

($ 1 0 8 .0 0 )

CONSUMPTION

$ 7 0 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0

7 5 .6 0

TAXES

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 3 0 .0 0

$ 3 2 .4 0 61

The present value o f an individual's lifetime tax burden is unaffected by the amount
o f saving under a consumption tax. Thus, a consumption tax does not—by itself—
provide any incentive to increase savings. The benefit to saving is the removal o f the
income tax from saving income.

61Present value.
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D.

Evidence o f the Responsiveness o f Savings to Tax Changes

Calculations like the ones presented above are often used to illustrate the
detrimental impact o f income taxation on after-tax return to saving. There is,
however, substantial uncertainty about whether this change in the after-tax return to
saving will affect the amount o f saving. Moreover, it is not even clear for a given
change in the rate o f return what direction the change in amount may be.
It is natural to expect that an increase in the returns to saving will increase
saving: With greater rewards for saving, individuals will do more o f it. The opposite,
however, may also be true. This may be understood by considering the case o f a
"target saver." A target saver would be an individual who saves to achieve a certain
dollar amount of future consumption (e.g., tuition for a child’s college education). An
increase in the after-tax rate o f return on saving would reduce the amount o f savings
necessary to achieve the desired amount o f saving.62 Another example o f target
saving that declines with increases in rate of return is the funding o f defined benefit
pension plans: when interest rates increase, employers can more easily meet their
pension obligations and therefore reduce their funding o f pension plans.
Empirical research by economists does little to clear up the ambiguity as to the
effects o f a consumption tax on saving. (In fact, given the importance o f the
responsiveness of savings to changes in the after-tax rate of interest, there have been
remarkably few studies that attempt direct empirical estimates. This is because of the
significant practical difficulties in formulating meaningful statistical tests.). Many
economists believe that saving is not responsive to the rate o f interest or that
statistical tests are not conclusive.63 Others believe that saving is responsive to the
return on savings.64
The work o f Michael Boskin, former Chairman o f the President's Council of
Economic Advisors, is frequently cited by proponents o f consumption taxes as
evidence o f the responsiveness o f savings to changes in taxation. His estimates of
responsiveness of saving are at the upper end of empirical estimates. At the other end
o f the spectrum, many economists believe that changes in the after-tax return to
saving has little or no effect on saving. In order to ascertain the order o f magnitude

62For example, suppose the parents o f a newborn wish to provide $100,000 of college tuition to their child on
the child’s eighteenth birthday. If the rate o f interest is 8 percent and the parents’ tax bracket is 30 percent, they
would have to save $3,182 annually to accumulate $100,000 in eighteen years. If their savings is exempt from tax,
they only need to save $2,472 annually in order to achieve their objective.
63See, for example, Boskin (1978).
64See, for example, von Furstenberg (1981).
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o f the possible effects o f a consumption tax, Boskin's work can be used as a point of
reference as a reasonable upper-range empirical estimate o f the responsiveness o f
saving to taxes. A reasonable lower range estimate is no effect at all.
Boskin’s best estimate is that for a one percent increase in the after-tax return
to saving there will be a 0.4 percent increase in the amount o f saving. Thus, with the
elimination o f an income tax with a rate o f 40 percent,65 there would be an increase
in personal saving of approximately 25 percent.66 Using the data shown in Table 6.1
above, it can be seen that using this estimate a replacement consumption tax would
have increased personal saving from 4.8 percent to approximately 6.0 percent during
the 1980s and from 3.5 percent to 4.3 percent during the 1990-1992 period.67
If, on the other hand, the elasticity of saving is close to zero—as maintained by
many economists—tax changes will have little impact on saving.
E.

The Impact o f Saving on Growth

Given the magnitude o f these estimates, it is unlikely that any change in
taxation can fundamentally solve the problem o f low saving in the United States.
Assuming the upper-bound estimates o f responsiveness are correct, a replacement
consumption tax would result in a significant increase in saving, but such an increase
would only partially offset the large recent declines in the personal saving rate in the
United States. For example, assuming an elasticity o f saving o f 0.4, a replacement
consumption tax that became fu lly effective in 1990 would do little more than restore
the rate o f personal saving to that which prevailed during the 1980s. From an
international perspective, these changes also seem small. The most optimistic
estimate of increases in the saving rate resulting from a replacement consumption tax
still results in a rate o f U.S. saving rate far below that o f most trading partners.

65Although there are many instances in which the marginal rate o f tax on saving exceeds 40 percent (e.g.,
dividends received by individuals subject to both individual and corporate tax, and capital gains due to inflation
that are subject to tax), the vast majority o f private saving in the economy is taxed at rates below 40 percent (e.g.,
saving by those not in the top marginal bracket, pension saving, life insurance, annuities, and IRAs.)
66The elimination o f a 40 percent tax raises the after-tax rate of return by 67 percent. (For example, if the
before-tax rate o f return is 10 percent, the after-tax would increase from 6 to 10 percent.) The elasticity of 0.4 is
multiplied by 67 percent to arrive at an estimate of 26.7 percent increase in private saving.
67There is a class of theoretical models, known as "life-cycle" models, which predict extremely high responses
o f saving to changes in the interest rate. (Savings elasticity's in the order of magnitude o f 1.0 or 2.0 are common
in these models.) These models in general have wide acceptance as theoretical constructs in the economics
profession, but there have been no compelling explanations of why the high responsiveness o f saving to changes
in the interest rate predicted by these models is not observed in the economy. For arguments for and against the
usefulness o f the life-cycle models o f savings see Starrett (1988) and Summers (1988).
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If upper-range estimates are correct, savings would increase by approximately
one percent of GDP (in 1995)--about $70 billion. An increase in $70 billion in saving
sustained over a period o f years can result in a substantial increase in the nation’s
productive capacity. In ten years, for example, this would result in a net increase in
the capital stock of $700 billion. If that capital had a rate o f return o f 10 percent, that
would be a $70 billion permanent increase in the economy, an increase of
approximately one percent.68
F.

Impact on the Business Cycle and Inflation
1. Business Cycle Effects

Up to this point this chapter has focused on long-term "supply-side" effects of
a replacement consumption tax. Although widely discredited since its heyday of
influence in the 1960s, the predicted impact o f a consumption tax by "demand-side"
or "Keynesian" economists still deserves consideration (if only because it has so long
dominated the textbooks and press reports). In a nutshell, Keynesian economics says
if there is significant unemployment and less than full capacity utilization, the
economy can be expanded because increases in government deficits can help spur
private and public spending.
This type o f reasoning has lead to some concerns that a tax on consumption
could be a significant drag on the economy that could lead to recession. There are
many good arguments to discredit this claim, but perhaps the best in this case is that
most consumption taxes under consideration would be offset by reductions in income
taxes. Because there would be no change in the deficit, the impact on overall demand
would be small.69

68This calculation is provided to give an understanding o f a reasonable order o f magnitude in the potential
change in the economy that results from an increase in saving. Economists alternatively might use models
employed in a branch o f economics known as "growth theory." In this framework, one might observe that the
return to capital (in the form of corporate profits, interest, and some reasonable portion o f proprietorship income)
accounts for about 20 percent o f GDP (i.e., about $1.5 trillion), and the current size of the business capital stock
producing that GDP is about $10 trillion. $700 billion of saving could increase that capital stock by about 7
percent. If income from capital also increased by 7 percent, this would be an increase in national income o f about
$150 billion (or about 2 percent of GDP).
There are two reasons to expect this measurement might be biased upward. First, it is common to assume that
capital is subject to diminishing returns, i.e., the additional $700 billion in capital is unlikely to be as profitable as
the initial $7 trillion. Second, measured capital does not take into account intangibles (such as patents, trademarks,
goodwill, etc.). To the extent profits may be attributable to these factors, increases in tangible capital might not
be accompanied by rates of return that include returns to both tangible and intangible capital. (Although, it is often
argued that capital formation spurs technological innovation).
69The case can be made that placing a heavier tax burden on consumption and a lesser burden on saving will
dampen overall demand (macroeconomists refer to this as the theory of the "balanced-budget multiplier"), but these
impacts—to the extent they exist at all—are likely to be small and temporary. Any reductions in overall demand due
to reduced consumption are likely to be offset by increases in spending on plant and equipment.
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2. Inflationary Effects
Because it is widely believed that the burden o f consumption taxes will result
in higher prices, there are concerns that a consumption tax will be accompanied by
an increase in the rate o f inflation.70 If consumption taxes imposed on businesses are
passed forward in higher prices, the effect on the price level will depend on the rate
of tax and the comprehensiveness of the tax base. If the rate o f tax is 15 percent, and
the tax applies to 80 percent o f the goods and services in the economy, the increase
in the price level that accompanies the imposition o f the tax could be 12 percentage
points.
Because changes in the price level are ultimately controlled by monetary
policy, any increase in the price level from a consumption tax would have to be
accommodated by the Federal Reserve (i.e., a 12-percent increase in the price level
would have to be accompanied by an increase in the money supply o f approximately
12 percent). Because the Fed's actions are not under the direct control o f Congress
or the President, it is difficult to know how the Fed policy would react to the
imposition o f a large consumption tax.
It is also important to stress that any changes in the price level due to the
imposition of a new consumption tax (or an increase in the rate o f an existing tax) are
likely to be one-time changes in the price level and not permanent increases in the
rate o f inflation.
G.

Conclusion

In terms o f its impact on saving, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding
the enactment o f a replacement consumption tax. "Definitive" statements about a
consumption tax's impact on saving and economic growth should be accepted warily.
One thing that does seem clear is that even under the most optimistic assumptions, it
seems unlikely that a replacement consumption tax can increase U.S. saving to a level
comparable to that o f its major trading partners.
Potentially the impact on long-term economic growth can be significant. If
saving is not responsive to tax changes, however, the impacts on growth will be small.
In summary, with regard to economic growth, a replacement consumption tax is
unlikely to do any harm but does have significant upside potential. Most conclude
its impact on inflation will be a short-term initial increase only.

70The choices faced by business will be (1) raise prices, (2) absorb costs, or (3) reduce wages (because there
is no income tax).
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Chapter 7
Consumption Taxes and International Trade

Summary
•
M ost consumption taxes operate under the "destination principle" (that
is, they tax domestic consumption not domestic production).
•
In order to effect the destination principle, value-added taxes rebate tax
on exports and impose import duties. These are known as "border tax
adjustments."
•
Border tax adjustments are necessary to maintain a level international
playing fie ld between domestic and foreign producers.
•
Consumption taxes that replace income taxes may improve the trade
balance i f they can increase national saving.
A,

Introduction

A major issue in consumption taxation is whether or not tax should be levied
on domestic production—in which case exports would be taxed and imports would be
exempt—or on domestic sales—in which case exports would be exempt and imports
would be taxed. The difference may have important implications for international
trade.
Taxes on production are said to follow the "origin principle." Taxes on sales
are said to follow the "destination principle." From an economic perspective, the
destination principle is superior to the origin principle because it is less likely to
distort consumers' choices between domestic and imported goods. In practice, most
consumption taxes are imposed only on domestic sales.71 In addition, most

71Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rebates are allowed for exports and taxation of
imports are allowed in the case o f indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are taxes imposed on products, such as retail sales
taxes and VATs using the credit-invoice method tax. Border tax adjustments are not allowed in the case of direct
taxes. Direct taxes are imposed on wages and profits. Even if border tax adjustments on direct taxes were allowed
under GATT, it is not at all clear how they would be implemented. Generally, one would expect the amount of
corporation tax associated with the final sales price of any product to be positively related to the capital intensity
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consumption tax proposals--with the notable exception o f the Flat Tax--are imposed
on domestic sales. Income taxes, on the other hand, are typically imposed on
domestic production.72
Throughout this study it has been emphasized that it is important when
evaluating a consumption tax to distinguish the case o f an add-on consumption tax
from a replacement consumption tax. This is particularly true in evaluating
international issues. As shall be discussed in greater detail below, most economists
believe that consumption taxes levied on the destination principle are neutral with
regard to international trade. Therefore, an add-on consumption tax operating under
the destination principle does not have any major effect on the trade balance. In
contrast, many economists believe that income taxes, levied on the origin principle,
can be detrimental to international trade. Therefore, it is only when a consumption
tax replaces an income tax that there may be a benefit to international trade.
This chapter provides a more detailed discussion o f the arguments for and
against these assertions.
B.

Border Tax Adjustm ents

It is easy to apply the destination principle under some consumption taxes. For
a retail sales tax and a personal consumption tax, the taxation of purely domestic sales
follows naturally from the mechanical application of the tax.73 For value-added taxes,
however, a concerted effort must be made. In order for value-added taxes to apply
to only domestic sales, there must be special rules for both domestic production sold
abroad (i.e., exports) and foreign production sold domestically (i.e., imports). These
special rules are called "border tax adjustments." To relieve exports o f tax, firms
exclude receipts from exports sales from the tax base. To tax imports, duties are
imposed at the border. Without border tax adjustments, value-added taxes would be
levied on domestic production.

of its production. However, beyond this generalization, there is no clear guidance as to how much corporate tax
should be attributed to a product Any method of allocating a firm's corporate tax to its exports would be arbitrary.
Taxation o f imports would even be more problematic. Arbitrary assignments of tax would have to be estimated
from the amount of tax paid by domestic firms computing similar products. Given that profitability varies
considerably from year-to-year, border tax adjustments on imports would have to be recalibrated frequently. Such
changes, however, could never be frequent enough because import taxes are imposed on transactions, but profit
taxes o f firms selling comparable products are not computed—even on a preliminary basis—until several months
after the end of the taxable year.
72The United States provides some partial relief from its income tax for certain types of exports.
73A retail sales tax achieves the destination principle by only taxing domestic retail sales. A personal
consumption tax only taxes domestic consumers, so imported goods are subject to tax and exported goods are
excluded.
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International competition for sales into domestic markets is preserved by use
o f border tax adjustments on imports. With these adjustments, goods produced
abroad and domestically are both subject to the same tax. For example, under a 10percent VAT, all domestic goods and services are taxed at a 10-percent rate and
imports are subject to a 10-percent duty at the border. Even though border tax
adjustments on imports to some may have the appearance o f a tariff, there is no
discrimination against imports or favoritism to domestic producers because both the
sales o f importers and domestic producers are subject to the same tax.
International competition in overseas markets is preserved by border tax
adjustments on exports. With these adjustments, exported goods are exempt from tax
as are the goods of their foreign competitors selling in foreign markets. For example,
if the United States levied a 10-percent destination-principle VAT, exports to Canada
would be exempt from U.S. tax as would goods produced and sold in Canada.
Sometimes this preferential treatment o f exports vis-a-vis goods sold in domestic
markets is likened to an export subsidy, but as can be seen by the above example, they
are necessary to maintain a level playing field between overseas markets.
In conclusion, border tax adjustments in and o f themselves appear not to have
any significant impacts on trade. On the contrary, economists argue that border tax
adjustments are necessary to maintain a level international playing field for traded
goods. Yet, there are still many reasons to believe consumption taxes may have a
positive impact on the trade balance i f consumption tax revenues are used to reduce
income taxes or to reduce the Federal budget deficit.
C.

Trade Balance and Saving
1. Introduction

To the extent that a consumption tax increases saving, there may be a positive
impact on the trade balance. This is because there is a linkage between domestic
saving and the value o f the dollar, and—in turn—between the value of the dollar and
the trade balance. If domestic saving increases, there is generally less need for
foreign capital to finance domestic investment. Reduced capital inflows into the
United States mean that foreign investors have less need for U.S. currency. A
reduction in this demand for dollars causes its price to drop (just as a reduction in the
demand for apples causes the price of apples to drop).
This decline in value—or depreciation—of the dollar is beneficial to U.S. trade.
A depreciation of the dollar means that foreigners wishing to purchase U.S. goods (in
dollars) will find these goods less expensive in their currency. This decline in price
will stimulate increased exports. Similarly, a depreciation o f the dollar means that
consumers in the United States will have to pay more in U.S. dollars for foreign goods
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(whose prices are denominated in foreign currency). This increase in price means
reduced imports. Both increased exports and reduced imports improve the trade
balance.
The chain of causation from increased saving to an improved trade balance is
summarized in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1
The Link Between Savings and Trade
Increased (private or public) Saving
Reduced Capital Inflows
Reduced Demand for Dollar
Decline in Value o f Dollar
Lower Export/Higher Import Prices
Increased Exports/Reduced Imports

2. Increased Saving By Reduced Federal Budget Deficits
Deficits by the Federal government are a form o f a negative saving. For the
reasons outlined above, there is broad agreement among economists that the increase
in national saving that would result from reduction in the Federal budget deficit would
reduce the trade deficit. (This is often referred to as the "twin deficits" problem.)
Despite strong sentiment for deficit reduction, however, use o f a consumption tax for
deficit reduction is not currently receiving any notable attention by Congress. In the
current political climate, it seems much more likely that deficit reduction will be
achieved through reductions in Federal spending.
3. Increased Saving By Reducing the Income Tax
Nearly all economists state that income taxes are inefficient taxes because they
penalize individuals for saving. Corporate taxes are particularly inefficient because
they add an additional layer o f income taxation to the income from certain types of
capital (i.e., equity financed) of certain businesses (i.e., corporations). Thus, not only
is there a bias against capital formation, there is additional discrimination across
different types o f capital. Given the absence o f these problems under a consumption
tax, it should not be surprising that replacement of the income tax with a consumption
tax can improve overall U.S. economic performance and the U.S. trade balance in
particular.
If the burden o f income taxation takes the form o f a reduced after-tax return
on investment (i.e., the burden of the income tax is on capital), removal o f the tax will
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increase the after-tax return to saving.74 To the extent that saving responds
positively75 to the increase in the after-tax return on investment, the increase in
domestic personal saving could positively impact the trade balance. The chain o f
causation is similar to that which would result from a reduced Federal budget deficit
(illustrated in Figure 7.1): increased domestic saving reduces the need for inflows o f
foreign capital, reducing the demand for dollars, and causing a depreciation. This
depreciation, in turn, reduces the price o f U.S. exports and increases the price o f U.S.
imports.
D.

Exchange Rate Adjustments

Up to this point, this chapter has ignored the impact o f trade flows on
exchange rates. Exchange rate adjustments can be particularly important in
evaluating origin-based taxes-like the Armey Flat Tax—or any other taxes that might
impact trade. Economists believe that when exchange rates are flexible (as they have
been generally since 1971) even consumption taxes without border tax adjustments
will not distort international trade. This is because exchange rates will adjust in such
a manner that will have the same impact as border tax adjustments.76
The basic argument is best understood with an example. Suppose that a 10percent value-added tax is imposed without border tax adjustments (i.e., like the Flat
Tax). In this case, most economists assume the domestic price level would increase
by 10 percent. Without border tax adjustments, export prices would also increase by
10 percent, and import prices would remain at their before-tax levels. In this case,
exports would be at a competitive disadvantage and imports would be at a competitive
advantage. These changes, however, would reduce the demand for the dollar and, as
a result, cause the dollar to depreciate. Economists believe that equilibrium in foreign
exchange markets could only be restored when the dollar depreciated by 10 percent.
This decline in the exchange rate would obliterate any impact o f the VAT on trade.
As a result o f the depreciation of the currency, imports are 10 percent more

74Even if repeal of the income tax does not increase the return to saving, there can still be a positive impact on
the trade balance. Instead o f reducing profits, the burden of income taxes might be passed forward in the form of
higher prices. Under this alternative scenario, reducing income taxes can reduce prices. A replacement
consumption tax would cause an offsetting price increase. In the context of trade, however, the impact on prices
is not offsetting because a border-adjustable tax (i.e., a consumption tax) would replace a tax without border
adjustments (i.e., the corporate income tax). Thus, if the burden o f income taxes is passed forward in higher prices,
a replacement consumption tax can reduce prices on exports. Although there is no definitive answer to the question
of the incidence of business income taxes, this discussion shows that a positive effect on trade is possible whether
the burden of income taxes is borne by consumers or is borne by business.
75This is the primary topic o f discussion on Chapter 6.
76If indeed it is true that in a world of freely floating exchange rates there is no difference between an originprinciple and destination-principle value-added tax, a strong case can be made for preference for an originprinciple tax because border tax adjustments involve considerable administrative and compliance costs.
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expensive-just as if there were border tax adjustments imposed on imports.
Similarly, as a result o f the depreciation, there is a 10-percent reduction in the price
o f exports that exactly offsets the 10-percent increase in price due to the lack o f
border tax adjustments.
This view is widely held by economists.77 It follows from the basic tenet of
international finance that exchange rates adjust to restore equilibrium to international
markets. In equilibrium, a country’s trade deficit is equal to net foreign investment,
that is,
Imports minus Exports equals Net Capital Inflows
Given this identity, and assuming that net capital inflows are unaffected by the
imposition o f a consumption tax, there is no clear-cut reason to disagree with
economic reasoning. It is likely that any positive impact o f a consumption tax on
trade will be offset by exchange rate movements in order that equality in the above
equation is maintained.78
Therefore, as long as net capital flows are unaffected, exchange rate
movements can eliminate any detrimental impact o f an origin-based tax on trade.
Moreover, because capital inflows are likely to be reduced under a replacement
consum ption tax (as discussed in the previous section), it is still possible for a
replacement origin-principle consumption tax--like the Flat Tax—to positively impact
the trade deficit despite the absence o f border tax adjustments. Thus, even in the
context o f an a non-border adjustable VAT, the central issue is again the impact o f
a replacement consumption tax on saving.
E.

Conclusion

Economists generally agree that (1) it is unlikely for border tax adjustments p er
se to have any significant impact on the trade balance and (2) it is unlikely that a lack
o f border tax adjustments will have any significant impact on the overall trade
balance once exchange rates have adjusted (although they may have some important
differential impacts across industries). In either case, a consumption tax is likely to
77See, for example, Joint Committee on Taxation (1991).
78The above reasoning does not say anything about the differential impact o f these changes across industries.
For example, suppose (as was assumed above in footnote 3) that the burden o f the corporate tax is on consumers
because the tax results in higher prices, and assume the tax is repealed and replaced with a consumption tax. The
repeal o f the corporate income tax will not result in a uniform reduction in prices. It will generally reduce prices
more in high-profit and capital-intensive sectors of the economy. Any offsetting exchange rate adjustment will
uniformly impact the price o f all products. In the end, there may be no change in overall exports, but it may be the
case that capital-intensive firms' exports increased while other firms' exports decreased.
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improve the trade balance only by causing a dollar depreciation that would follow
from any increase in domestic saving. A consumption tax might increase private
saving if it is a replacement tax that increases the after-tax return to saving. A
consumption tax can increase public saving by using revenues to reduce the Federal
budget deficit.
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Chapter 8
Consumption Taxes and Income Distribution

Summary
•
Consumption taxes are widely perceived as placing undue burdens on the
poor. There are two reasons fo r this perception: (1) consumption as a
percentage o f annual income is greater fo r low-income households than highincome households, and (2) consumption taxes generally do not have progressive
rates.
•
Many economists believe that consumption taxes appear more regressive
than they really are. This is because there are systematic biases in the standard
measures o f “rich” and “poor".
•
Nevertheless, any politically realistic consumption tax will likely be
supplemented with features to alleviate the burden on low-income households.
•
The exemption o f necessities is not a particularly effective method o f
reducing regressivity o f consumption taxes.
•
Some fo rm o f tax credit fo r low-income households likely will play an
important role in alleviating the regressivity o f any consumption tax enacted into
law.
A.

Introduction

On average, low-income households consume a larger proportion of thenincome than do high-income households. For this reason, consumption taxes are
widely considered regressive.79 This is particularly true if the consumption tax is
levied—as is often the case—at a single, flat rate.

79If tax as a percentage o f income is greater for low-income households than high-income households, the
tax system is considered "regressive." Conversely, if tax as a percentage of income is lower for low-income
households than high-income households, the tax system is considered "progressive." If tax as a percentage of
income is the same for all taxpayers, the system is considered "proportional."
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Regressivity is the Achilles’ heel o f consumption taxation. No matter how
effective any consumption tax might be in increasing saving, improving the trade
balance, and reducing complexity, such a tax might never become law solely because
it is regressive. In order to be politically viable, the basic structure o f any
consumption tax may have to be substantially modified or supplemented in order to
eliminate its inherent regressivity. Moreover, if a consumption tax replaces the
current income tax, the new tax likely must go beyond avoiding regressivity. In order
to gain acceptance, it may have to be as progressive as current law.80 Methods of
alleviating regressivity are among the most important issues in the design o f
consumption taxation systems, and a variety o f options are available. All o f these
mechanisms, however, greatly increase administrative and compliance costs.
It is also important to recognize that despite the widespread perception of
regressivity by the general public, there have been a variety o f challenges to this
traditional view:
(1)

Government transfer programs that favor the poor should be taken into
account when evaluating regressivity. The benefits provided by these
programs may substantially offset any burden imposed by a
consumption tax on a large portion o f low-income families.

(2)

The economic growth that could result from the imposition o f a
consumption tax could make everybody better off, so the focus on
relative burden may be misplaced.

(3)

It is possible that the corporate income tax is not borne by capital but
by consumers, in which case the current tax system may not be as
progressive as is commonly believed. In that case, a switch to
consumption taxation may not alter the distribution of the tax burden
by as much as is commonly perceived.

(4)

Economic well-being is usually measured by reference to annual
income instead o f lifetime income. Most economists believe that use
of annual income as a measure o f well-being makes consumption taxes
appear more regressive than they really are. Some economists even
argue that a consumption tax is fairer than an income tax.81

80Richard Gephardt, the Minority Leader of the House o f Representatives, has recently proposed an income tax
with a progressive rate structure and few deductions or exclusions. The top bracket is 39 percent and is applicable
to all forms of income including capital gains.
81This argument is often made by David Bradford, a former Treasury Department Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Tax Policy). See, for example, Bradford (1986).
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Although these arguments are well understood by the experts, to-date they have not
entered the mainstream political debate. It is also unclear if they ever will; one
impediment is that they are unfamiliar or relatively difficult to understand.82
In any case, it is likely that methods o f alleviating regressivity--not the larger
question of whether consumption taxes are actually regressive--w ill take center stage
in the consumption tax debate.83
B.

Methods o f Alleviating Regressivity

There are three general methods o f reducing the regressivity o f consumption
taxes. The first is to provide tax exemptions and/or low tax rates for low-income
households and to increase tax rates with the level of income. This type o f progressive
rate structure can only be implemented under a personal consumption tax.84 The
second method is to provide tax exemptions or tax reductions for the products
consumed in greater proportions by low-income households. Tax relief for food and
other necessities is only practical under a retail sales tax or a value-added tax. The
third method is to provide tax credits or direct payments to households to compensate
them for their disproportionate burden. These payments may be implemented under
any type of consumption tax, but are less costly to administer if they piggyback on a
personal income or personal consumption tax already in place.
1. Progressive Rates
As noted, a progressive rate structure is only practical under a personal
consumption tax. If it can be implemented, almost any degree o f progressivity can
be achieved. For example, large personal exemptions could keep tens o f millions of
households free o f tax. Rates could be slightly or steeply progressive. As discussed
in Chapter 5, however, there is considerable uncertainty about the practicality and
popularity o f a personal consumption tax. Calculating the net savings deduction
under a personal consumption tax would entail substantial administrative and

82The Appendix to this chapter provides more explanation of these arguments.
83No matter how meritorious these new methods might be, change will be difficult. To the extent these changes
are not well understood, many will be suspicious of technical changes with such large political ramifications.
Opponents o f consumption taxation are likely to claim that "the books are being cooked" or that “the rules are
being changed in the middle o f the game." As the debate in consumption taxation develops, it will be interesting
to see whether proponents o f consumption taxation will accept the traditional view o f regressivity and fight their
battle on those terms or whether they will try to redefine the terms of the debate.
84Someday it may be technologically feasible to produce nontransferable identification cards electronically
encoded with each consumer’s tax rate. These cards would be presented at the cash register so that retail sales tax
and VAT burdens may be adjusted according to each individual’s circumstances. Still, substantial enforcement
and administrative problems would exist under such a system.
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compliance burdens, making it the most complex o f all major types o f consumption
taxes. A personal consumption tax has never been enacted into law in any modem
developed economy.85
2. Exemption o f Necessities
In practice, the method most often used to alleviate regressivity o f
consumption taxes is the exemption o f products considered necessities. Most valueadded taxes in other countries as well as most retail sales taxes implemented by the
States provide tax relief for food, health care, housing, and other necessities. As
indicated in the following table, these items generally represent a larger fraction o f
income for low-income households than high income households.
Table 8.1
Expenditures on Necessities as a Percentage of Total Consumption
Income
Group

Food at Home

Shelter

Health Care

Total

Lowest
Fifth

17.1%

29.9%

12.2%

59.2%

Highest
Fifth

11.0%

27.5%

11.2%

49.6%

Source: Vasquez (1987), p. 321.
Although tax relief for these items reduces regressivity, a consumption tax with
preferences for certain types o f consumption greatly increases administrative and
compliance costs.86 Preferences also take their toll in terms o f economic efficiency.
When certain consumption items receive preferential treatment, consumers are likely
to rearrange their consumption patterns to avoid tax.87 Distortions result throughout
the economy as consumption shifts towards items receiving preferential treatment.
Furthermore, given the necessity o f achieving certain revenue targets, any exception

85See Chapter 11 for a discussion o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal, which includes—along with a subtraction
method VAT—a personal consumption tax.
86Among the more famous examples was whether or not "Head and Shoulders" dandruff shampoo would receive
preferential treatment under the French value-added tax as a health product. Another administrative nightmare was
determining which food items would be subject to California's "snack tax."
87For example, at a donut shop in Virginia, some patrons were observed eating donuts in their cars in the parking
lot rather than at the counter. This inefficient (and messy) behavior is the result of preferential treatment given
under the Virginia sales tax to carryout food.
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provided for certain items results in higher taxation for other items. These higher
rates o f tax further distort consumption and reduce the economic benefits o f
consumption taxation.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect o f this type o f tax relief is its failure to
substantially reduce the regressivity of the tax. Although, as a percentage o f income,
the benefit of exempting food helps the poor, a substantial portion o f the revenue cost
o f preferential treatment for food provides benefit to upper-income households as
well. Most studies show that tax relief for necessities does somewhat alleviate
regressivity, but not by much. The result of one o f these studies is shown in Table
8.2. The table shows that under a broad based 10-percent value-added tax, the lowest
income class would pay tax equal to 14 percent o f income while the wealthiest
families would pay consumption tax equal to 1.6 percent of income. If the tax base
is narrowed to zero-rate (i.e., to remove tax on) home-prepared food, medicine, and
utilities, the lowest income class would pay tax equal to 9.3 percent o f income while
the tax on the highest income class would remain almost unchanged at 1.5 percent of
income.
Table 8.2
Effective Tax Rates Across Income Classes of a
Broad-Based VAT and of a VAT Excluding Necessities
Adjusted Gross Income ($ thousands)
Proposal
(1) 10% BroadBased VAT
(2) 10% VAT
excluding Food,
Medicine, and Utilities
(3) 13.7% VAT
excluding Food,
Medicine, and Utilities
(equal revenue to (1))

5 0 - 100100 200

+20
0

14.0% 9.1% 7.5% 6.3% 5.1% 4.0% 3.1%

1.6
%

6.3% 5.3% 4.5% 3.8% 3.1% 2.6%

1.5
%

12.8% 8.6% 7.2% 6.2% 5.2% 4.2% 3.6%

2.1
%

010

9.3%

1015

1520

2030

3050

Source: Brashares, Spreyer, and Carlson (1988), p. 171.
Furthermore, in order to make up for the revenue loss by zero-rating
necessities, the overall tax rate must be increased. In this case, the 10-percent rate
must be increased from 10 to 13.7 percent. As a result, the net absolute impact on the
poor as a result of zero-rating o f necessities is small. Under a narrow-based tax, the
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lowest income classes would pay tax equal to 12.8 percent of income compared to the
14 percent they would pay under a broad-based VAT that generated the same amount
o f revenue.
3. Tax Credits and Transfer Payments
Another method o f alleviating the regressivity o f a consumption tax is to
increase the availability o f tax credits or transfer payments to low-income households.
This type o f relief from a consumption tax could take a variety o f forms.
a. Expansion o f the EITC
The earned income tax credit primarily provides refundable income tax credits
to low-income working families who have children.88 The credit was significantly
expanded as part o f the Omnibus Reconciliation Act o f 1993. The advantage of
further expanding the EITC to offset the regressivity o f a consumption tax is that the
administrative structure is already in place and, because it is refundable, the credit can
provide benefits to families who do not pay income tax. The major shortcoming o f the
credit as it is currently structured is that it does not help the poor who are not working
or who do not have children. There are also substantial problems o f fraudulent claims
for the EITC.89
b. Payroll Tax Credit
Allowing consumption taxes to be credited against payroll taxes is another
method of alleviating regressivity. (This is a feature o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal.)
Currently, payroll taxes are imposed in equal amounts on employers and employees.
Each pays a tax of 7.65 percent on the first $61,200 (1995 level) o f wages and 1.45
on all wages above that amount. Given this rate structure, and the absence o f standard
deductions and personal exemptions, the payroll tax is a highly regressive tax. A
payroll tax credit would be somewhat broader than the EITC because it applies to all
workers regardless o f family status. Moreover, the credit can provide relief without
refunds for many low-income working families because the payroll tax applies to
every dollar o f wages while the income tax only applies after personal exemptions
and deductions. If the credit is not refundable, it can avoid encountering some o f the
fraud problems that plague the EITC. However, a payroll tax credit does not help the

88Under changes instituted as part o f the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, some limited relief is available
to working families without children.
89See, for example, Steuerle (1995).
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poor who are unemployed. The payroll tax credit also would not alleviate the burden
on certain low-income retirees who depend on small amounts o f dividend and interest
income.
c. New Broad-Based Refundable Tax Credit
An alternative to a payroll tax credit or an expansion o f the EITC would be to
implement a new refundable credit (or, equivalently, undertake a significant
restructure o f the EITC such that it applied to all low-income individuals regardless
of family or employment status). Ideally, such a credit would be equal or proportional
to the burden o f the consumption tax on low-income households. If successful, such
a program would greatly expand the administrative and compliance costs because
millions o f low-income households who now do not file tax returns would be required
to file.
There may be a problem o f insufficient participation. State experience with
programs designed to provide relief from sales taxes has not generally been successful
in inducing low-income individuals to file tax returns to obtain refunds.90 Compared
to a state credit, the filing rate for a national tax credit might be improved by greater
public awareness (e.g., because o f television) and by a larger amount o f credit that
might be available from a tax with a rate high enough to replace the revenues lost by
the current income tax. On the other hand, there could be a problem o f too much
participation--i.e., fraud--as there has been for the EITC.
d. Transfer Payments
Yet another method o f alleviating the regressivity o f a consumption tax would
be to work entirely outside o f the tax system by increasing government transfer
payments to low-income households. It is important, though, to note that some
government transfer payments would likely increase automatically with the
imposition o f a business consumption tax. This is because many existing programs
automatically index their benefits for inflation. If a household receives all o f its
income in the form of indexed transfer payments, the household will be fully
insulated from the effects o f the tax (e.g., a 10-percent rise in the price level due to
a 10-percent VAT will be matched by a 10-percent increase in government support.)
Examples of indexed transfer payments include Social Security and Federal employee
retirement benefits.

90There have been some successes at the State level. See, Kuttner (1987) for discussion o f New Mexico’s
experience with a refundable tax credit.
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However, many transfer payments are not indexed for inflation, and many lowincome taxpayers bearing the burden o f a consumption tax may not be receiving any
significant assistance from the government. Examples o f transfer payments not
indexed for inflation are unemployment benefits and AFDC benefits.
Upon imposition of a consumption tax, the Federal government could mandate
increases in non-indexed transfers to offset the impact o f the tax. In addition, the
government might use the revenues from a consumption tax to expand eligibility for
existing programs or to fund entirely new programs. While such benefits would not
be captured in standard distributional tables that only record the impacts o f taxation,
they would in fact offset the burden o f a consumption tax.
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Appendix 8A
Why Consumption Taxes May Not Be Regressive
This chapter explored the center stage of the political debate about income
distribution and income taxes: how consumption taxes may be made less regressive.
This appendix examines the somewhat more academic arguments as to why
consumption taxes might not be as regressive as they first appear. Although these
arguments have not yet received attention in the political arena-even proponents o f
consumption taxes do not frequently espouse them—this is unlikely to remain the case
if consumption taxes undergo thorough consideration.
A.

A Broader View o f Government Redistribution

The tax system has a major impact on the distribution o f income, but so do a
wide variety o f government programs. Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food
Stamps, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are just some o f the
Federal government’s spending programs that collectively amount to a massive
redistribution of wealth across income classes and across generations. Some argue
that it is misleading and arbitrary to focus attention on the distributional effects o f the
tax system without looking at the uses o f government revenues as well. For example,
in analyses o f the "fairness" o f the tax system it is common practice to include
refundable earned income tax credits (Internal Revenue Code Section 32) in the
distributional analysis, but AFDC payments (not in the Code)-though in many ways
functionally equivalent—are not included. Certainly one’s views about the
appropriateness of a heavy tax burden on the poor should take into account the use
o f those revenues. A greater tax burden on low-income households may be more
tolerable if those revenues are used to provide food, medical care, and education to
the poor. Nevertheless, the notion o f including both taxes and transfers in
distributional analyses has received remarkably little attention.
B,

Economic Growth

Changes in tax law simultaneously may affect the overall amount o f national
income as well as its distribution. In its official distributional analyses, the Federal
government generally holds economic growth constant. (The main reason for this is
that there is a great deal o f dispute and uncertainty about the impact o f taxes on the
overall economy.) Thus, government distribution analyses assume tax policy is a
zero-sum game.
Despite the difficulties with precise quantification, most economists
acknowledge that a replacement consumption tax will increase economic growth—
particularly in the long run. Many would consider it particularly misleading to
assume economic growth will be unaffected in a distributional analysis o f a
73

replacement consumption tax. Even if the relative burden o f some income classes
increases, it may be possible for all income classes to be better off if all incomes rise
sufficiently.
C.

Incidence

It is critical to recognize that the burden or "incidence" o f a tax is not always
on those writing checks to the government. For example, there is much dispute about
whether the burden o f the corporate income tax is borne by shareholders of
corporations. To some degree the burden may be shared by the owners o f all
businesses (because rates of return are driven lower), by business customers (because
prices rise), or by employees (because wages fall) as a result o f the tax.
In the case of consumption taxes, the general consensus among economists is
that the tax is passed forward to consumers in the form o f higher prices. There is one
im portant caveat, however. If the Federal Reserve does not "accommodate" the
introduction of a consumption tax with an increase in the money supply, it is unlikely
prices can rise.91 In this case, economists believe the burden o f the tax would be
passed backward to employees in the form o f lower wages. If this were to occur,
consumption taxes would still be regressive because wages account for a larger
percentage o f income among low-income households than high-income households.
Still, there is an important difference between a consumption tax that increases prices
and a consumption tax that would reduce wages: the non-working poor who did not
receive government support indexed to inflation would bear a considerably lower
diminished burden under a consumption tax that resulted in lower wages. Thus, there
must always be much uncertainty about how the burden would be shared among lowincome households because it depends so much on the actions o f an independent
Federal Reserve.
It is also important to note that the substantial uncertainty about the incidence
of the corporate income tax can have a large impact on the consumption tax debate.
Almost all major consumption tax proposals call for elimination o f the corporate
income tax. If the burden o f this tax is perceived to be on capital, it is a progressive
tax. This is the current view o f the Treasury Department.92 On the other hand, some
commentators believe the burden of the corporation is passed along—at least partially

91One of the less controversial propositions o f macroeconomics is that changes in the money supply are highly
correlated with changes in the price level.
92See, for example, Toder (1995).
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-to the consumer in the form of higher prices. The more the corporate income tax is
considered progressive, the more difficult it will be for new consumption tax
proposals to maintain distributional neutrality to current law.93
D.

Redefining Regressivity

Perhaps the notion that is most damaging to the idea that consumption taxes
are regressive is recognition that fairness should not be evaluated by comparing taxes
paid as a percentage o f annual income. The problem with using annual income as a
measure o f economic well-being is that many households with low annual incomes
are not really poor. Many individuals with significant wealth earn relatively little
current income. Sometimes this is due to transitions in and out o f the workforce (e.g.,
career switching, child rearing, temporary layoffs.) In other cases, relatively well-off
individuals may earn low incomes because they have not yet entered the workforce
(e.g., graduate students) or they have retired. Trying to alleviate the burden o f these
individuals should not receive the same priority as families with similar incomes and
no wealth, but this type o f distinction is not often made in distribution analyses.
It is sometimes advocated that annual consumption rather than annual income
is a better measure o f economic well-being. Some argue that each individual should
be taxed on consumption rather than on income because income is what one "puts
into” the economy while consumption is what one "takes out." The more accepted
argument is that wealth or lifetime income are better measures o f economic well being
than annual income, and consumption is a good proxy for measuring wealth or
lifetime income.94 Although there is some dissent, the notion that lifetime income is
a better approximation of economic well-being has wide acceptance by economists.
The major issue is not so much with the concept but with the practical application of
the concept. It is much more difficult to measure lifetime income than annual income.
Despite considerable uncertainty about the details, there is little doubt that any
movement away from annual income and toward lifetime income as a measure of
economic well-being will make consumption taxes appear considerably less
regressive.

93Uncertainty about the incidence of the corporate income tax has caused Congressional analysts to simply
exclude the tax from its distributional analysis. For a review of issues surrounding official distribution analysis,
see Sullivan (1995).
94Most economists accept the notion that—in general—changes in consumption are highly correlated with
changes in wealth or lifetime income. On the other hand, annual income varies considerably from year to year and
is not as closely related to wealth.
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PART IV. SOME IMPORTANT DETAILS
Chapter 9
The Impact of Consumption Taxes on Business:
Some Basics

Summary
•
In order to assess the impact o f a replacement consumption tax,
businesses should take into account:
•

tax liability under a consumption tax (over several years)

•

potential changes in the economy

•

potential elimination o f current tax preferences

•

transition provisions

•

changing impacts over the business cycle

•

the impact on financial statements

•
The corporate income tax is a tax on a small slice o f business income:
only income from equity-financed capital in corporate form is subject to tax. In
contrast, a value-added tax is a tax on income from both debt and equity—and it
taxes the capital income generated by partnerships, Subchapter S corporations,
and sole proprietorships as well as corporations.
•
M ore importantly, a value-added tax is also a tax on all wages p a id by
business to employees. For most businesses, total wages and benefits are many
times larger than total interest, dividends, and retained earnings.
•
M ost value-added taxes provide substantial relief fo r firm s that export and
fo r firm s with large new investment in plant and equipment.
•
Nevertheless, on net, the value-added tax base is many times larger than
the income tax base fo r most firms. Whether or not a business has a lower tax
liability under a replacement VAT depends on whether rates can be sufficiently
reduced to offset the increased tax burden due to base broadening.
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For economists it is all very simple. Businesses should not be greatly
concerned about their tax liability under a consumption tax. Once the economy has
fully adjusted to the imposition o f a consumption tax, there will be no burden on
business. In response to a consumption tax, prices will rise and the burden will be
passed forward to customers in higher prices. There is no adverse effect on after-tax
profits.
Businesses, however, are not so sure. The abstractions o f economists--the
"market forces" that make pricing adjustments--are the everyday reality faced by
business. Businesses cannot take for granted that consumption taxes can be
automatically passed forward in the form of higher prices without any adverse impact
on their sales or market share. Therefore, businesses want to know (1) whether they
pay more or less tax under a consumption tax than an income tax and (2) the relative
burden o f each consumption tax. Politicians, in turn, also wish to determine these
impacts in order to ascertain political support and opposition to various plans.
It is inevitable that current consumption tax proposals will be revised and many
new consumption proposals will introduced. At this stage in the process, it is
probably more important for businesses to grasp concepts rather than details about
how consumption taxes can affect businesses. Unfortunately, the instincts o f experts
schooled in income taxation are not particularly helpful under the proposed new
regimes. This chapter tries to help readers become familiar with the new issues that
businesses may confront under a consumption tax.
The analysis is divided into five parts. Part A focuses on the impact o f tax
changes on tax liability—that is, the actual amount o f taxes paid. Part B focuses on
the impact o f changes in the economy that might result from imposition o f a
replacement consumption tax. Part C discusses the impact o f the elimination o f tax
preferences. Part D examines certain issues that arise in the transition from an
income to a consumption tax. And Part E looks at how consumption taxes and
income taxes differ in their treatment of business over the business cycle and over the
firm's own life cycle.
A.

Direct Impacts on Business Tax Liability
1. Retail Sales Tax

Under a national sales tax, only retail businesses collect taxes. Therefore, if
all income taxes were repealed, businesses without retail sales would entirely escape
tax liability (along with approximately 130 million individual tax filers). Retailers
would bear the bulk o f the burden in terms o f compliance costs as well as actual
liability.
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2. Individual Consumption Tax
Under an individual consumption tax, only individuals pay tax. If all income
taxes are repealed, businesses would be entirely exempt from tax. Moreover, there
would be no direct impact on prices because businesses would not have any tax
burden to pass on to consumers in the form o f higher prices.
2. Value-Added Taxes
Unlike gross receipts (the base of the sales tax) or profits (the base o f business
income taxes), value added is not a concept that is routinely encountered by tax
professionals in the United States. Nor is the concept o f value added included on
financial statements. Therefore, the impact o f a replacement value-added tax on a
business's tax liability usually cannot be easily determined. The income tax base and
a value-added tax base are vastly different. The major differences are summarized
in Table 9.1 (Question marks indicate that not all major consumption taxes have that
particular feature.)

Table 9.1
Comparison of a VAT to an Income Tax

Major Advantages o f a VAT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Expensing o f Capital Purchases
Exemption o f Exports from Taxable Receipts (?)
Foreign Subsidiaries Exempt from Tax
Lower Rate (?)
Payroll Tax Credit (?)
Major Disadvantages o f a VAT

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Interest Not Deductible
Wages not Deductible (?)
Fringe Benefits Not Deductible
Import Duty (?)
Noncorporate Business Subject to Business Tax
Local Taxes Not Deductible (?)
Tax Credits and Other Tax Benefits Repealed (?)

With all o f these major changes—some major benefits, some major drawbacks--it is
nearly impossible to know which businesses would be hurt and which would benefit
by a switch to a value-added tax without detailed analysis.
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To begin the comparison o f business tax liability under income and valueadded taxes, this section examines a purely domestic firm, i.e., a firm with no
overseas operations and no international transactions. For the moment also, the allimportant issue o f tax rates will be put aside in order to focus on differences between
income and consumption tax bases.
a. The Nondeductibility o f Interest and Wages
Unlike the income tax, a value-added tax does not include any deductions for
wages or for interest expenses. As illustrated in the following example, these changes
from current law unambiguously broaden the business tax base.

Table 9.2
Example of the Impact of Nondeductibility
o f Wage a nd Interest on th e Tax Base
IN C O M E TAX
SALES
PURCHASES

50
15

SUBTRACTION
VAT
100 SALES
PURCHASES
DEPRECIATION

100
50
15

DEPRECIATION
WAGES
INTEREST

25
3

TOTAL COSTS

93

TOTAL COSTS

65

PROFIT

7

VALUE-ADDED95

35

For many leveraged firms, the loss o f interest deductions could be a major setback96
In general, however, the loss o f deduction for wages and fringe benefits will have a
much larger impact. The significance o f the loss o f the deduction for wages and
fringe benefits can hardly be overemphasized. Even for the most capital intensive
firms, wages are usually many times larger than total profits. In the example, the

95In this example, value-added is calculated using the income method, i.e., capital costs are recovered over time
rather than expensed. All current proposals for a value-added tax allow expensing so that the tax is a consumption
tax. (See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further discussion of why expensing makes a value-added tax a
consumption tax.) Expensing is discussed in subsection b that immediately follows.
96In 1992, for example, corporations had taxable income of approximately $570 billion and interest deductions
o f approximately $597 billion. See, Statistics o f Income Bulletin, Fall (1994), p. 181. Thus, for the corporate
sector as a whole, loss o f the interest deduction would approximately double the tax base.
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value-added tax base is five times larger than the income tax base. This broadening
of the tax base is primarily attributable to the nondeductibility o f wages. As shall be
seen in Chapter 12, when actual data for the U.S. economy are examined, changes in
the tax base o f this order o f magnitude are not uncommon. In fact, for most firms
they are likely to be larger.
b. The Temporary and Permanent Benefits o f Expensing
The prior example neglected one important benefit that is common to all
current VAT proposals: in lieu o f deductions for capital recovery, businesses will be
allowed to expense capital purchases. Expensing provides a significant benefit from
newly purchased capital. The acceleration of capital recovery to the first year
provides a tax benefit that is (under reasonable conditions) approximately equivalent
to tax exemption for all income generated by the capital being expensed.
In the context o f the income tax, expensing provides enormous benefits.
Newly purchased capital is effectively exempt from the tax. Moreover, if newly
purchased capital is financed with debt, the combination o f the deduction for interest
and newly purchased capital can easily generate more deductions than income. In this
case, effective tax rates on new capital are driven below zero, that is, the purchase o f
new capital is not only exempt from tax, it generates deductions that may be used to
shelter other income.
In the context o f the value-added tax, however, the benefit of expensing—while
significant--is not so dominant. As under the income tax, expensing effectively
exempts the income from new capital. For highly-leveraged firms, however, interest
deductibility provided near total exemption from the income tax. For these firms, the
loss o f interest deductibility by itself may entirely offset any benefit from expensing.
Nevertheless, the loss of deductions for wages is far more important. Because income
from capital is a relatively small component of total value added for most firms, the
favorable impact of expensing on a firm’s tax liability in almost all cases will be more
than completely offset by the inclusion o f labor costs in the tax base.
i. Permanent Effects
Although usually small compared to wage costs, the impact o f expensing is
still important. In order to better understand them, it is useful to distinguish
permanent effects from temporary effects. Over the long term, the benefit o f
expensing amounts to the replacement of a depreciation deduction by a deduction for
new capital purchases. On average, it can be expected that a deduction for expensing
will be somewhat larger than a deduction for depreciation. For example, if a firm
grows at a rate of five percent annually and writes off its capital over ten years (using
the straight-line method), it will have an expensing deduction approximately 33
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percent larger than its depreciation deduction. For the economy as a whole, the
National Income and Product Accounts published by the Commerce Department
indicate new capital expenditures are approximately 45 percent larger than economic
depreciation.97 Changes o f this order o f magnitude are illustrated in the following
example:

Table 9.3
Example of the Impact of Expensing
on the VAT Base
SUBTRACTION
VAT
(income method)
SALES
PURCHASES
DEPRECIATION
TOTAL COSTS

50
15

VALUE-ADDED98

SUBTRACTION
VAT (consumption
method)
100 SALES
PURCHASES
EXPENSING
65 TOTAL COSTS
35

VALUE-ADDED99

100
50
20
70
30

ii. Temporary Impacts
A larger impact of a switch from depreciation to expensing occurs in the short
term while taxpayers are able to deduct depreciation o f existing capital in addition to
expensing new capital purchases. (There is some issue as to whether these transition
deductions should be allowed or modified, but almost all proposals currently under
consideration provide such relief.) Over time, o f course, these effects become
increasingly less important.
Because of these types of timing issues, commonly employed "snap shot" cash
flow analyses of changes in tax liability due to a replacement VAT can be misleading
-particularly for capital-intensive firms. Consider the following stylized example
where a highly capital-intensive business that is not growing has 100 each o f income,
capital purchases, and depreciation (straight-line over 10 years) annually.

97Economic Report o f the President (1995).
98In this example, value added is calculated using the income method; i.e., capital costs are recovered over time
rather than expensed. All current proposals for a value-added tax allow expensing so that the tax is a consumption
tax. (See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further discussion of why expensing makes a value-added tax a
consumption tax.)
99In this example, value added is calculated using the consumption method, i.e., capital costs are expensed.
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Table 9.4
Example of Differences in VAT Liability
During and After Transition

SALES
Less
PURCHASES
DEPRECIATION
EXPENSING
INTEREST
TAX BASE

C u rren t
Law
100

VAT
Y ear 1
100

VAT
Y ear 5
100

VAT
Y ear 10
100

(80)
(10)
0

(80)
(5)
(10)
0

(80)
0

(5)

(80)
(9)
(10)
0

5

1

5

10

(10)
0

Under the current income tax, this business can deduct depreciation and interest
expense. Under a subtraction method VAT, the business can expense new capital
purchases and--during the transition-- depreciation on capital in-place prior to the
effective date of the new consumption tax. At the beginning o f the transition period,
the loss o f interest deductions is offset by the ability to expense combined with
deductibility of transition depreciation. This advantage dissipates over time as older
capital is discarded. In this example, by year 10, depreciation allowances for existing
capital are no longer available and--on a cash flow basis--the taxpayer has a larger tax
base than under the income tax.
c. Impact o f a Replacement VAT on International Business
There are three major impacts o f a value-added tax on international business:
(1) the exclusion of exports from the tax base, (2) the taxation o f imports, and (3) the
exemption of foreign subsidiaries and branches of U.S. businesses from U.S. tax. As
noted in Chapter 7, the exclusion of exports and the taxation o f imports—the so-called
"border tax adjustments"--are necessary to effect the destination principle. Under the
destination principle, final goods and services are taxed where they are consumed, not
where they are produced. With one very notable exception—the Armey Flat Tax—
almost all consumption taxes are administered in a manner consistent with the
destination principle.
i. Exports
The exclusion o f exports from taxable gross receipts can have enormous
impacts on some firm’s tax liability. This is illustrated in the following example.
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Table 9.5
Examples of the Importance of Exports
on VAT Liability
EXPORT-INTENSITY
ABOVE
NO
EXPORTS AVERAGE AVERAGE
A. CORPORATE IN C O M E T A X
1000

950

600

0
1000

50
1000

400
1000

(500)
(300)
(100)

(500)
(300)
(100)

(500)
(300)
(100)

(900)
100

(900)
100

(900)
100

22

22

22

DOMESTIC
RECEIPTS

1000

950

600

Less
PURCHASES
DEPRECIATION
EXPENSING

(500)
(50)
(100)

(500)
(50)
(100)

(500)
(50)
(100)

(650)

(650)

(650)

350

300

22

62

-50
-10

DOMESTIC
RECEIPTS
EXPORTS
TOTAL RECEIPTS
Less
PURCHASES
WAGES
DEPRECIATION
TAXABLE
INCOME
CORP. TAX @35%
B. VALUE-ADDED T A X

VALUE-ADDED
VAT @20%
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ii. Imports
Import duties imposed under consumption taxes unambiguously increase
business tax liabilities. Obviously, greater reliance on imports results in greater
tax, as illustrated in the following example.

Table 9.6
Example of the Importance of
Imports on VAT L iability
IMPORT-INTENSITY
ABOVE
NO
IMPORTS AVERAGE AVERAGE
A. CORPORATE IN C O M E T A X
RECEIPTS
PURCHASES
DOMESTIC
IMPORTS
Less
WAGES
DEPRECIATION
TAXABLE
INCOME
CORP. TAX @35%
B. VALUE-ADDED T A X
RECEIPTS
Less
PURCHASES
DOMESTIC
IMPORTS
DEPRECIATION
EXPENSING

1000

1000

1000

(500)
0

(450)
(50)

(300)
(200)

(300)
(100)

(300)
(100)

(300)
(100)

(900)

(900)

(900)

100

100

100

25

25

25

1000

1000

1000

(500)

(450)
(50)
(50)
( 100)

(300)
(200)

(0)
(50)
( 100)
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(50)
(100)

(650)
350

(650)
350

(650)
350

0

50

200

VAT BASE

350

400

550

VAT @20%

22

80

110

VALUE-ADDED
PLUS
IMPORTS

It is important to stress here that the burden of an import duty need not be direct. For
example, clothing manufactured abroad may result in higher costs for clothing
retailers even when retailers purchase their products from wholesalers who do the
importing. It is also important not to examine the impacts o f the import tax in
isolation. Import prices indeed may rise, but it is also possible (as claimed by
economists) that the cost o f domestically produced goods is likely to rise
commensurately. If this is the case, importers should expect increases in costs, but
they should not feel singled out--or necessarily expect any advantages o f switching
to domestic suppliers.
iii. Exemption o f Foreign Subsidiaries
All consumption tax proposals exempt foreign subsidiaries and branches of
U.S. businesses from tax. (This is known as a "territorial" tax system.) Under the
current system, U.S. businesses are subject to tax on their worldwide income.
However, it is standard practice among nations to give host countries primary tax
jurisdiction over multinationals operating outside their home country. The United
States grants U.S. multinational corporations a tax credit for taxes paid. U.S. firms
can only incur U.S. tax liability on their foreign source income if the average tax rate
on foreign source income is below the U.S. rate. Although there are numerous
exceptions, the vast majority o f foreign source income is subject to relatively little
U.S. tax.100
For most firms, the change in tax liability resulting from a switch from the
current system (taxation of worldwide income with foreign tax credits) to a territorial
system will not result in enormous changes in tax liability. However, tax compliance
and international tax planning will be vastly simplified. (This is true, of course, only

100Obviously, the whole system of U.S. tax treaties—based on U.S. worldwide corporate and individual income
taxation—would have to be thoroughly re-examined if the U.S. system were replaced with a territorial,
consumption tax.
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with regard to U.S. Federal income tax. Businesses still have to contend with
numerous issues that result from income taxes imposed by state as well as foreign
governments.)
There are at least three areas where tax considerations will be changed
dramatically under a territorial system:
First, there are location decisions. Under current U.S. tax law, it is highly
advantageous for U.S. multinational corporations to “average” income from a high-tax
jurisdiction (like Germany) with income from a low-tax jurisdiction (like Ireland).
Thus, under the current system, a U.S. multinational corporation with an existing
facility in Germany can reap substantial benefits by opening a second facility in
Ireland. Conversely, a U.S. multinational with a single facility in Ireland will not
necessarily bear the full burden of high German tax rates if a second facility is opened
in Germany. Real world fact patterns are more complex, but the net result is that
current tax considerations in location decisions must take into account the interaction
of new taxes on the existing web of U.S. liabilities. Under a territorial system, the net
tax burden o f locating in a jurisdiction will depend only on the tax rate in that
jurisdiction.
On net, one would expect a switch in the composition of investment away from
high-tax countries to low-tax countries. Currently, the effective tax rate on
investment in low-tax countries is somewhere between the foreign tax rate and U.S.
tax rate. Under a territorial system, the effective rate of tax would be the foreign rate.
This would encourage investment in low-tax countries. Currently, the effective tax
rate in high-tax countries is somewhere between the high foreign tax rate and the U.S.
tax rate. Under a territorial system, the rate of tax would be the high foreign rate.
This would discourage investment in high-tax countries.
Second, there is the issue of repatriation. Under current U.S. law, profits of
overseas subsidiaries are only taxable when subsidiaries pay dividends to their U.S.
parent or when subsidiaries become subject to any o f a number o f complex anti
deferral rules. Under a replacement VAT, anti-deferral rules would be eliminated.
Moreover, the timing o f repatriation o f profits would not be an issue because this
would no longer be a taxable event.
Finally, for both U.S. multinational corporations operating abroad and foreign
multinationals operating in the United States, transfer pricing would no longer be an
issue for Federal tax purposes. This follows not from the tax being territorial, but is
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the result o f border tax adjustments.101 When a foreign multinational imports from
a related corporation, U.S. tax must be paid on the import price, but reducing the
import price only commensurately increases U.S. tax (by reducing deductions for
purchased inputs). So the total tax on a foreign multinational is unaffected by how
prices are set by related parties. Similarly, there is no advantage to manipulating
export prices because gross receipts are entirely exempt from tax in any case. The
following example shows the tax liability o f a dealer importing televisions from a
related manufacturer at $125 and $150. In both cases, total U.S. tax liability is the
same.

Table 9.7
Example of the Irrelevance of Transfer Prices
For a Border Adjustable VAT
A. High T ransfer Price
Gross Receipts
Cost o f Imports

B. Low T ransfer Price
Gross Receipts
Cost o f Imports

200
(150)

200
(125)

75

Value-Added

50

Value-Added

VAT @10%
Import Duty @10%

5
15

VAT @10%
Import Duty @10%

7.5
12.5

Total U.S. Tax

20

Total U.S. Tax

=22

d . Impact o f a Replacement VAT on Noncorporate Business
Under a replacement VAT, all businesses—including Subchapter S
corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships as well as other pass-through entities—
would be subject to tax. If VAT revenues were used solely to replace the corporate
income tax, the new tax would undoubtedly represent a major new burden for non
corporate businesses—particularly service businesses with few inputs other than labor.
M ost consumption tax proposals, however, usually include individual and
payroll tax relief as well. In these cases, it is not always clear whether a replacement
consumption tax will hurt noncorporate business. Under many reasonable scenarios,
it is possible for owners o f noncorporate business to be better off under a replacement
consumption tax. For example, in a system that repealed the current individual and

101Because there are no border tax adjustments under the Armey Flat Tax, there would still be incentive to
manipulate transfer prices. However, the nature of these incentives may be different than under the prevailing 35percent corporate income tax. Because o f the low rate of tax under the Armey plan (17 percent, after a transition
period), there would generally be an incentive (except in the case of transactions with related companies operating
in tax havens with accumulated net operating losses) to set transfer prices of exports high and transfer prices of
imports low.
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corporate income tax system and replaced it with a 25 percent VAT (and assuming
no changes in payroll taxes), a sole proprietorship with $1 million o f wage and profits
paid to its owner would incur $250,000 of tax liability (and no individual tax) under
the VAT but would pay well over $300,000 of individual income tax under current
law.
The treatment o f noncorporate businesses highlights the importance o f looking
at changes to the taxation o f individual as well as businesses per se. The impact o f
the total (i.e., both entity and individual) tax impact on noncorporate businesses will
be examined more closely in the following chapters after the details o f both the
individual and business tax components of new consumption tax proposals have been
discussed.
e. Tax Rates
It is easy to get lost in technicalities and forget about the important, but simple,
details. Obviously, the rate o f consumption tax is critical. W hat rate is reasonable
to expect? There are several possible answers, and they are all over the lot.
Early press reports about the Nunn-Domenici Tax indicated the rate o f tax for
the plan’s business subtraction method VAT could be as low as 9 percent. Its rate on
introduction was 11 percent. (The Nunn-Domenici plan also includes a individual
consumption tax with rates as high as 40 percent.102)
The Armey Flat Tax has a rate o f 17-percent (after a transition period with a
rate o f 19 percent.) The Armey legislation, however, also includes substantial
controls on government spending. So the tax provisions by themselves are not
revenue neutral. The Treasury Department has estimated that a revenue-neutral rate
for the Armey plan would be approximately 24 percent.
As indicated earlier, a broad based VAT would have required a rate o f 25
percent to make up revenues for repealing both the individual and corporate income
tax. If payroll taxes were also repealed, the rate would have to be about 33 percent.
If preferential treatment were granted, rates could even be higher.
In summary, legislation introduced to date has used rates far below the current
35-percent corporate rate. However, as seen from the following table, anything is
possible.103 The table shows that replacing revenues lost due to the repeal o f the
individual income tax would require imposition of a VAT with a rate o f 19.5 percent.

102The rate as high as 40 percent starts at $24,000 or less.
103Data are from Congressional Budget Office (1995), p. 332 and p. 393.
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Replacing the corporate income tax would add 4.2 percent to the VAT rate. And
replacing the payroll taxes would add 15.6 percent to the VAT rate. To totally
replace the current tax system would require a consumption tax rate in excess o f 40
percent. This does not include higher rates that might be required to account for any
permanent or transitional relief.

Table 9.8
Tax Rates Required to Raise Revenue
Sufficient to Replace Current U.S. Taxes

5% B road Based VAT
Individual Income Tax
C orporate Income Tax
Business Payroll Tax
Individual Payroll Tax
E state and Gift Tax
Excise Taxes
B.

Cum ulative
Y ear 2000
($Billions) Replacement Increase in
VAT R ate VAT R ate
Revenue
5.0%
$198.3
$772
$167
$309
$309
$ 20
$ 59

19.5%
4.2%
7.8%
7.8%
0.5%
1.5%

19.5%
23.7%
31.5%
39.3%
39.8%
41.3%

Indirect Impact on Business Through Economic Changes
1. Can Economic Benefits Be Realized?

The most-cited reason for enacting a replacement consumption tax is its overall
positive impact on economic growth. The underlying economic reasoning is basically
this: the replacement o f an income tax with a consumption tax increases the after-tax
return to saving and removes the penalty income taxes impose on saving. To the
extent this increase in after-tax returns increases saving, it is likely that interest rates
will drop and domestic capital formation will increase. Increases in domestic capital
formation means that workers will have more capital to work with and be more
productive. In the long run, this means a higher standard o f living and a larger
economy. The potential economic changes that might result from a replacement
consumption tax are listed in Table 9.9.
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Table 9.9
Summary of Potential Macroeconomic Impacts
o
f a Replacement Consumption Tax
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increased Saving
Reduced Consumer Spending
Reduced (Before Tax) Interest Rates
Increased Capital Formation
Increased Overall Long-Term Growth
Higher Prices (short term)

Despite the widespread acceptance o f this reasoning in political circles, the
reasoning is hardly iron-clad. For example, the numerous tax incentives for saving
and investment already in the current income tax code leave some question as to
whether the switch from the current system (which many economists characterize as
a “hybrid income-consumption tax") to a pure consumption tax will really have that
large an impact on the overall cost of new capital. Second, increased domestic saving
may just be used to fund overseas investment that would have little impact on
domestic capital formation and growth. Third, interest rates may be more influenced
by the flow o f international capital than domestic savings so interest rates may not be
significantly impacted by changes in domestic saving.
These potential shortcomings in the economic reasoning in favor o f
consumption taxes are overshadowed by the central question o f whether these
changes in the after-tax return induced by saving have any impact on saving at all.
This was discussed in some detail in Chapter 6. After decades o f analysis and debate,
it seems fair to say that no consensus has emerged in the economics profession as to
the impact o f a replacement consumption tax on saving. If there is a large impact on
saving, then it is likely that interest rates will drop, domestic capital formation will
increase, and productivity, wages, and the size o f the overall economy will all
increase. If there is no significant impact on saving, there will be little impact on
saving, interest rates, productivity, wages, and economic growth.
2. Uncertainty fo r Business Planners
The problem for business planning is that either scenario is possible.
Predictions are precarious because they depend on empirical economic analyses that
are subject to dispute. Models used by economists are simply not reliable. Moreover,
there is often a remarkable consistency between an economist's political views and
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the results o f his or her economic analysis.104 Despite the conviction o f many
economists as to the impact o f a consumption tax, it seems fair to say economic
modeling has not sufficiently advanced to predict results with any degree o f certainty,
and that the analysis using existing models is inconclusive.105
It will be important for businesses to sort through ideologically charged debate
in order to ascertain the most likely economic impacts o f a consumption tax.
Businesses cannot rule out the possibility that, as a result of enactment of a
replacement consumption tax, overall business conditions might sufficiently improve
so as to offset any negative effects (if any) o f increased tax liability. Business also
cannot rule out that there will not be any perceptible effects o f macroeconomic
conditions as a result o f the changes.
This is particularly difficult for businesses operating in sectors sensitive to
changes in the macroeconomy. For example, financial service businesses may be
more concerned about the impact of a consumption tax on their products than on
direct tax liability. Firms that specialize in lending may be concerned about the new
level playing field for debt and equity financing. Retailers may be concerned about
declines in consumption and the higher cost o f imports. Constructions firms and
manufacturers of consumer durables may benefit from lower pre-tax rates o f interest.
C.

Impact from Loss o f Tax-Advantaged Treatment

Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced or eliminated numerous special
interest provisions, many remain. Their annual dollar value totals in the hundreds of
billions.106 Their elimination would have a large impact on certain businesses--either
directly on tax liability or indirectly through the impact on customers and suppliers.
M ost consumption tax proposals currently under consideration eliminate
numerous special tax benefits (known as "tax expenditures’’) available under existing
law. To many businesses, preferential treatment under current law can provide
significant benefits, and each business's overall appraisal o f a new consumption tax

104For example, it is quite common for economists of liberal persuasion to argue that saving and investment are
unresponsive to changes in taxes while at the same time quite common for conservative economists to believe that
saving and investment are responsive to tax changes.
105The United States has had extensive experience with the investment tax credit since its original enactment
in 1962 until its repeal in 1986. Although there have been hundreds o f studies of the impact of the investment tax
credit, there is no consensus in the economics profession about the impact of the credit on investment.

106See, for example, United States Senate, Committee on the Budget (1992).
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may be dependent on whether or not preferential treatment is maintained under the
new system. To help sort out some o f these issues, it is useful to divide current tax
expenditures into two categories.
7. Obsolete Tax Expenditures
First, there are those tax rules which provide treatment that is considered
preferential under an income tax but would become standard under a consumption
tax. For example, interest on most municipal bonds is exempt from tax under current
law, and this is considered a major tax benefit. Under a consumption tax, all interest
income would be exempt (or provide tax treatment that is largely equivalent to
exemption). Thus, under a consumption tax municipal bond interest would continue
to be tax-free but this would no longer be considered a tax benefit. This type o f tax
expenditure can be called an "obsolete tax expenditure.” A list o f tax expenditures
whose status would no longer be special is provided in Table 9.10. Most o f these tax
benefits are made obsolete by the elimination o f tax on income from capital under a
consumption tax. Some tax expenditures relating to international taxation, however,
would no longer be tax benefit items because under a standard consumption tax
exports are exempt from tax and because all foreign source income would be exempt
from tax.
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Table 9.10
Obsolete Tax Expenditures:
Examples of Current Tax Preferences Eliminated Because
They (or Their Equivalent) are Automatically Provided
Under a Consumption Tax

(1)

Exclusion o f Employer Pension Contribution and Earnings

(2)

Step-Up Basis on Capital Gains at Death

(3)

Accelerated Depreciation

(4)

Deferral o f Capital Gains on Home Sales

(5)

Exclusion of Interest on State and Local Debt

(6)

Exclusion o f Interest on Life Insurance Saving

(7)

Preferential Treatment o f Capital Gains

(8)

Exception from the Passive Loss Rules for $25,000 o f Rental Loss

(9)

N et Exclusion o f Individual Retirement Account Contributions

(10)

Exclusion o f Capital Gains on Home Sales for Persons Over the Age of
55

(11)

Possessions Tax Credit

(12)

Expensing o f R&D

(13)

ESOP Benefits

(14)

Deferral o f Unrepatriated Foreign Source Income

(15)

Expensing for Certain Small Investments

(16)

Exclusion o f Income o f Foreign Sales Corporations

(17)

Favorable Source Rules for Exported Goods

(18)

Deferral o f Interest on Savings Bonds

(19)

Deferral o f Income on Installment Sales

(20)

Exclusion o f Income earned Abroad by U.S. Citizens

(21)

Expensing o f Multiperiod Timber Growing Costs

(22)

Deferral o f Gains from Sales o f Broadcasting Facilities to Minority
Owned Business

(23)

Special Rules for Allocation o f Research Expenditures

(24)

Expensing o f Exploration and Development Costs
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Prior beneficiaries o f tax expenditures made obsolete by a consumption tax may
be hurt by the change even though they receive the same tax benefits under the new tax.
This would happen because relative advantages have been eliminated by a consumption
tax. For example, under current law, many products offered by life insurance companies
provide unique tax advantages not available from products provided by banks and other
financial firms. Elimination o f these special provisions can impact businesses by
eliminating competitive advantages.
It is still possible to restore these items to situations o f relative tax advantage by
providing them with even greater benefits than they receive under current law. It seems
likely that there will be political pressures to retain preferential treatment for certain types
o f investments under a consumption tax. For example, under the consumption tax
proposed by Senators Nunn and Domenici, interest on municipal bonds would remain tax
exempt even though the purchase price o f these bonds is deductible. Retaining this
preferential treatment may solve some political difficulties, but it leaves the new
consumption tax with the same economic distortions and administrative costs as current
law.
2. Consumption Tax Expenditures
Second, there are tax benefits that could still be considered tax benefits after a
switch to a consumption tax. For example, tax credits for research expenditures are
equally viable under a consumption tax and an income tax. These types o f tax
expenditures can be called "consumption tax expenditures," and they are listed in Table
9.11.
W hile obsolete tax expenditures are in effect automatically repealed by a
replacement consumption tax, there is no mechanical linkage between a replacement
consumption tax and repeal of consumption tax expenditures. For example, with regard
to the research credit, all o f the policy reasons for enactment o f the credit remain intact
under a consumption tax. Current rules for the research credit could remain largely
unchanged. The only difference is that the credit would be used to reduce consumption
rather than income taxes.107

107Because o f differences in the tax base, there would be a difference in the utilization of tax credits. Because
almost all firm s, including start-ups, are taxable under a VAT, most firms would be able to use their credits
immediately and would make little use o f carryforward provisions.
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Table 9.11
Consumption Tax Expenditures:
Current Tax Preferences That Could Survive
the Transition from Consumption to Income Tax

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)

Exclusion of Employer Contributions for Medical Insurance Premiums
and Medical Care
Deductibility of Mortgage Interest on Owner-Occupied Homes
Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Deductibility of Charitable Contributions
Exclusion of Social Security Benefits for Retired Workers
Earned Income Credit
Credit for Child and Dependent Care Expenses
Low Income Housing Credit
Exclusion of Benefits for Armed Forces Personnel
Exclusion of Employer Provided Parking
Exclusion of Veterans Disability Compensation
Exclusion of Social Security Disability Benefits
Additional Deduction for the Elderly
Percentage Depletion
R&E Credit
Alternative Fuel Production Credit
Exclusion of Scholarship and Fellowship Income
Exclusion of Employer Provided Child Care
Exclusion of Public Assistance Benefits
Exclusion of Employee Meals and Lodging
Parental Personal Exemption for Students Age 19 and Over
Exclusion of Railroad Retirement System Benefits
Targeted Jobs Credit
Exemption of Credit Union Income
Empowerment Zones
Exclusion of Parsonages Allowances
Special Rules for Allocation of research expenditures
Deductibility of Casualty Losses
Credit for Disable Access Expenditures
Exclusion from Income of Conservation Subsidies Provided by Public
Utilities
Exclusion of Employer Premiums on Accident and Disability
Insurance
Small Life Insurance Company Deduction
Exclusion of Military Disability Pensions
Special Blue Cross/Blue Shield deduction
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(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)

Tax Incentives for Preservation of Historic Structures
Cancellation o f Indebtedness
Tax Exemption for Certain Insurance Companies
Exclusion of Special Benefits for Disable Coal Miners
Exclusion of Employer Provided Educational Assistance
Investment Credit for Rehabilitation of Structures
Exclusion of Veterans Pensions
Expending of Certain Agricultural Outlays
Exclusion of GI Bill Benefits
New Technology Credit
Tax Credit for Elderly and Disabled
Special Rules for Mining Reclamation Reserves
Tax Credit and Deduction for Clean-Burning Fuels

In general, it will probably be more difficult for Congress to eliminate
consumption tax expenditures than those made obsolete by replacement o f income tax
with a consumption tax. These tax provisions would not be eliminated out o f logical
necessity, but in the spirit o f tax reform. As noted in Chapter 1, except for the
political dynamics, there is no particular reason to link the switch from an income tax
to a consumption tax with elimination o f these preferences. Nevertheless, most
consumption tax proposals call for the elimination o f most tax preferences (At one
extreme, the Armey Flat Tax proposal repeals all special interest provisions.)
In all cases, businesses will want to carefully peruse these lists in order to
determine which tax expenditures are of importance to their own tax liabilities as well
as those o f their customers, suppliers, and employees.
D.

Transition Treatment

Although they often sound like nothing more than nebulous technicalities, the
tax rules that govern the transition from an income tax to a new consumption tax can
be o f critical importance to some businesses.
In the context o f income tax legislation, "transition relief" has often been a
euphemism for exceptions that postpone or otherwise mitigate adverse tax changes.
These rules have served more to lubricate the political process rather than to address
inconsistencies in the tax law. In contrast, special rules during a transition from an
income tax to a consumption tax often are necessary to prevent retroactive tax
increases on existing business operations. In many cases, the absence o f special
transition rules can result in businesses being haphazardly subject to tax penalties.
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These tax burdens serve no policy or political objective (except by dumb luck). In
many cases, the incongruities between an income and consumption tax result in
double taxation o f income from business operations set in motion long before
enactment.
There is no doubt that transition relief makes a replacement consumption tax
more complex. During the transition, taxpayers may have to keep records to comply
with rules relating to both the old and new tax regimes. Therefore, even if the new
tax system will ultimately be more simple than current law, during the transition it
m ay be more complicated. Most consumption tax proposals have at least some
transition relief. The major impediment to more complete transition relief is the steep
revenue cost. To pay for transition provisions, most tax plans that include them must
have higher tax rates during the transition period. Because o f the added complexity
and revenue cost, at least one prominent Member o f Congress108 has advocated a
"cold turkey" approach, that is, no transition relief for the switch from an income tax
to a consumption tax.
1. Depreciation
The importance of transition depreciation deductions has already been noted
in Chapter 3. If businesses are not allowed deductions for depreciation allowances
outstanding on the date o f enactment of a replacement consumption tax, these existing
assets will bear a tax penalty (i.e., bear a greater burden o f tax than under existing
law).109 This burden seems particularly harsh when contrasted with the treatment o f
newly-purchased capital which--due to availability o f expensing-- w ould be effectively
exempt from tax. W ithout transition rules allowing depreciation o f existing assets, a
business making an investment in an asset shortly before the effective date will face
a sharp increase in tax while those making the same investment shortly after
enactment will be effectively tax exempt.
Because of the inherent difficulties o f switching to an entirely new system, it
is likely that many months or even years might transpire between the time o f
enactment (or the time when the likelihood o f enactment seems certain) and the
effective date o f a new replacement consumption tax. In this case, the stiff penalty
on pre-enactment investment that results from the absence o f transition relief could
cause a severe slowdown in business investment. This slowdown would likely be
followed by a rapid burst of investment once the favorable tax rules of the new regime
became effective.

108Senior Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, Sam Gibbons o f Florida.
109Closely related to this issue is the treatment of the sale o f partially depreciated plant and equipment after
enactment. Without special transition rules, the full sale proceeds will enter the tax base of the seller.
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2. Amortization o f Existing Inventories
Most consumption tax proposals would allow items put into inventory and
similar capitalized items to be deducted when purchased instead o f when used. Thus,
unlike an income tax, a consumption tax allows deductions for additions to inventory.
However, also unlike an income tax, reductions to inventory are not deductible unless
special transition rules are put into effect In order to not penalize businesses, the
balance o f inventories and other capital items existing on the date o f enactment should
be deductible when balances drop below the date-of-enactment level. Otherwise,
businesses will be denied deductions for legitimate costs.
3. Carryover o f Net Operating Losses and Tax Credits
The availability o f net operating losses can be an important source o f value for
a firm that expects to be profitable in the future. If net operating losses could not be
used under a new business tax, there could be a substantial reduction in a firm’s value.
Similarly, the inability to utilize unused business tax credits against a new business
consumption tax could represent a substantial reduction in value for a business. On
financial statements, unused operating losses and tax credits are shown as pre-paid
tax assets. Their elimination would require a write-off o f that asset.110 The most
prominent business credits under existing law are the alternative minimum tax credit,
the foreign tax credit, the credit for research expenditures, the alternative fuels credit,
and the targeted jobs tax credit.111
4. Accrual-To Cash-Method Accounting
Many consumption tax proposals purport to place all businesses on the cash
method o f accounting. Special transition rules will need to be implemented to prevent
double taxation. For example, income accrued on a transaction prior to the effective
date o f a cash method consumption tax but subsequently determined uncollectable
might not be allowed a bad debt deduction because such deductions are inconsistent
with the cash method.112

110Even if losses can be used under the new system, their value may be reduced if the rate o f tax is reduced. For
a more general discussion o f accounting issues under a new consumption tax, see Chapter 17, also see Gann and
Strowd (1995).
111When the investment tax credit was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, credits carried forward to
taxable years after enactment were reduced by 35 percent.
112N ot all transition rules need be beneficial to taxpayers. Some might argue that reserves for bad debts
accumulated by thrift institutions and certain commercial banks should be taken into income before the expiration
o f an income tax.
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E.

Impact Over the Business Cycle and Over the Life Cycle o f a Firm
1. Business Cycles

Because profits are highly procyclical, taxes on profits have served as an
“automatic stabilizer” for the economy—disproportionately increasing taxes when the
economy is strong and disproportionately reducing taxes during recessions. Under
an income tax, when business is bad, many firms can escape income tax entirely.
Some are even able to collect refunds.
Although collections from a consumption tax are also likely to follow the
business cycle, their variability (in percentage terms) will likely be far less than that
o f a profits tax. The historical patterns are shown in Chart 9.1. The good news for
business is that when profits are high, the burden o f the consumption tax will not
increase dramatically. On the other hand, because the largest component o f valueadded is wages, businesses experiencing severe financial difficulties may still be
liable for substantial business taxes.
2. Start-Up Firms
Lack o f profitability is also characteristic o f start-up firms. Typically, a new
business does not generate income tax liability for several years. If the new business
is not taxed as a corporation, losses are generally deductible against owners’ other
income reported on their individual tax returns. For new businesses that are taxed as
corporations, losses may not be used on owners’ returns, but net operating losses and
tax credits generated during the start-up years can keep the firm free o f income tax
years after profitability has been achieved. This is a stark difference to what firms
may expect under a value-added tax. New businesses—whether incorporated or not—
will have no start-up tax holiday under a value-added tax. Unless losses are very
large, start-up firms are likely to generate tax liabilities right from the beginning o f
their existence.113
3. Business Reorganizations
Under current law, tax specialists go to great pains to minimize both corporate
and individual income tax liability that may be triggered during business
reorganizations. Reorganizations involving changes o f ownership o f a business (e.g.,
merger, sale of a business) or change in entity (e.g., partnership to a corporation) will
not be taxable events under a new consumption tax. (As noted in Chapter 1, this is
a major simplification relative to current law.) If, however, assets—rather than

113This is another respect in which these taxes are more akin to payroll taxes than income taxes.
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ownership shares— are sold or exchanged, the entire proceeds114 from the sale o f
tangible assets (e.g., inventories, plant and equipment) would generally be taxable to
the seller115 and deductible for business purchasers.
F.

Conclusion

Businesses remain unclear about the impact o f a consumption tax on their tax
liability. They want to know (1) whether they pay more or less under a consumption
tax than an income tax, and (2) the relative burden o f each consumption tax.
This chapter has tried to introduce the reader to the key factors that make up
the strange and new consumption tax landscape. The following two chapters provide
some details on the two leading consumption tax plans now under consideration by
Congress.

114Transition rules may allow some or all o f the basis of existing assets to be excluded from tax.
115In general, the sales o f financial assets are exempt from a value-added tax.
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Chapter 10
The Flat Tax

Summary
•
The Flat Tax—proposed by House Majority Leader Dick Armey—is a type o f
value-added tax collectedfrom both businesses and individuals. (Other value-added
taxes are collected only from businesses.) Under the Flat Tax, value added from
labor is collected from individuals in the form o f a wage tax. A ll other value added
is collected from business using a subtraction method VAT modified to allow
deductions fo r wages.
•
Except fo r a standard deduction and some additional deductions fo r
dependents, there are no deductions or credits fo r individuals under the Armey
proposal. M ost notably, deductions fo r mortgage interest, charitable contributions,
and state and local taxes would not be allowed.
•
Unlike almost all other consumption taxes, the Flat Tax does not have border
tax adjustments.
A. Introduction
Before his ascent to Majority Leader o f the House o f Representatives,
Representative Dick Armey o f Texas introduced H.R. 4585, "The Freedom and
Fairness Restoration Act of 1994" in June of 1994. Majority Leader Armey re
introduced largely the same legislation in the 104th Congress as H.R. 2060 on July
19, 1995. At the same time, Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama introduced the same
bill in the Senate as S. 1050.
The proposed legislation provides for a complete overhaul o f U.S. economic
policy consistent with traditional conservative principles of less regulation and less
government spending. In addition, in a few short pages, the bill eliminates the
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individual income tax and corporate income tax systems116 and replaces them with a
consumption tax system unlike any other that ever has been actually implemented.
As a consumption tax, the Flat Tax would not possess the bias against saving that is
so prominent in the current U.S. tax system. However, the Flat Tax is more than a
switch from an income tax to a consumption tax. If enacted as currently conceived,
it would be a massive tax reform that would eliminate dozens o f special interest
provisions. It would also be a massive simplification that would eliminate much o f
the complexity that plagues the current system.
The idea of the Flat Tax is not new. Although the proposal in its current form
lacks many details, it is clear that the Armey proposal is a direct descendent o f a flat
tax proposed by two Hoover Institution scholars, Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka,
in their 1983 book entitled Low Tax, Simple Tax, Flat Tax. The Flat Tax has two
parts: a tax on individuals and a tax on businesses.117
B.

The Individual Tax

Under the Flat Tax individuals pay a wage tax at a flat rate o f 17 percent.
Pension benefits are included in the wage base, but fringe benefits118 and income
earned abroad are excluded. All capital income—interest, dividends, capital gains,
etc.—are untaxed.119 Large standard deductions and additional large deductions for
dependents would remove tens o f millions o f taxpayers from the tax rolls. The
standard deductions and dependent deduction in the Armey bill are shown in Table
10.1 These amounts are for 1996—the first year o f the tax according to the proposed
statute—and would be indexed for inflation thereafter.

116The proposal would retain current payroll taxes but not estate and gift taxes which are specifically removed
from the Internal Revenue Code.
117The most recent version of the Hall-Rabushka, The Flat Tax, can be found in a 56-page special supplement
to the August 4, 1995 edition o f Tax Notes.
118It is important to note, however, that fringe benefits also will not be deductible by employers.
119As under current law, "inside build-up" as well as the proceeds of life insurance policies would be tax exempt.
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Table 10.1
Types of Deduction
Basic Standard Deduction
M arried Filing Jointly
H ead o f Household
Individual
M arried Filing Separately
Additional Deduction Per Dependent

Amount
$21,400
$14,000
$10,700
$10,700
$5,000

The Individual Tax is noteworthy for what it is not. Every itemized deduction
and every tax credit allowed under current law would be repealed under the Flat Tax.
Most important among these are the mortgage interest deduction, the deduction for
state and local taxes, and the deduction for charitable contributions. The major
individual tax expenditure items that would be repealed under the Flat Tax are
summarized in Table 10.2.

Table 10.2
Special Tax Provisions Repealed
Under the Individual Flat Tax
•

Deduction for Mortgage Interest

•

Deduction for Property Taxes

•

Deduction for Income State and Local Taxes

•

Deduction for Charitable Contributions

•

Exclusion o f Scholarship and Fellowship Income

•

Exclusion o f Employee Awards

•

Credit for Child Care and Dependent Expenses

•

Earned Income Tax Credit

•

Deduction for Casualty and Theft Losses

•

Tax Credit for Elderly and Disabled

•

Additional Standard Deduction for Blind and Elderly
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The basic operation of the Individual Flat Tax is illustrated in the following
example. If the currently proposed structure is maintained, the tax would be simpler
than the current income tax for many individuals—particularly those taxpayers with
itemized deductions and those with significant capital income.

Table 10.3
The Flat Tax on a Family
of Four in the Year 2000
A. FLAT TAX
Wages
Standard Deduction120
Dependent Deductions

$70,000
$29,579
$11,975

Total Deductions

$41,554

Tax base

$28,446

Tax @17%

$4,836

B. CURRENT LAW
Wages
Personal Exemptions
Standard Deduction

$70,000
$11,736
$7,604

Total Deductions

$19,340

Taxable Income

$50,660

Tax Paid in 15% Bracket
Tax Paid in 28% Bracket

$6,826
$1,443

Total Tax

$8,269

120The estimated inflation adjustments for the years 1996-2000 used in these calculations are those currently
used by the Congressional Budget Office in its official revenue estimates. The CBO assumes an inflation rate of
approximately three percent annually.
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Much o f the reduced complexity in the individual tax is the result o f the
elimination of exceptions to general rules. The special rules that exempt certain types
of capital income cease to be relevant because all capital income is exempt from tax.
It would no longer be necessary to have complex rules to differentiate exempt from
non-exempt capital income. This is not, however, good news for everyone. Many
political objectives could be seriously frustrated by this change. For example, there
would no longer be any tax benefit to investing in municipal bonds. State and local
governments would no longer enjoy competitive advantages in capital markets.
Likewise, life insurance and annuities would no longer be tax-advantaged vis-a-vis
other investments (because other investments would also receive the same tax benefit
that life insurance now enjoys). Life insurance companies would no longer have a
major tax advantage over their bank and mutual fund competitors. Table 10.4 lists
some tax expenditures that would become obsolete under the Flat Tax.121

Table 10.4
Items Described as Tax Expenditure Items That Lose
S p e cial Emphasis Because All Capital Income Is Exemp

t

•

Exclusion o f Investment Income on Life Insurance and Annuity
Contracts

•

Exclusion o f Investment Income from Structured Settlement
Accounts

•

Deferral o f Gain on Sale

•

Exclusion o f Gain on Home Sales for Person Age 55 and Over

•

Exclusion o f Interest on State and Local Bonds

•

Maximum 28% Tax Rate on Long-Term Capital Gain

•

Exclusion o f Capital Gains at Death

•

Exclusion o f Interest on Education Savings Bonds

•

Deferral o f Interest on Savings Bonds

121The Flat Tax assumes the elimination o f specific items described as tax expenditures. Some argue that the
need for these programs and indirect expenditures still exist and that these expenditures will be brought back in
a different form.
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C. The Business Tax
The Business Flat Tax would be imposed on all corporate and noncorporate
businesses. Thus, under the proposal “flow-through” entities—such as sole
proprietorships, partnerships, and Subchapter S corporations which are not currently
subject to an entity level tax--would be subject to tax along with Subchapter C
corporations. The tax base, referred to as "gross active income,” starts with gross
business receipts and has deductions for ( 1) material inputs, (2) wages and
compensation paid, including contributions to pension (but not other fringe benefits),
and (3) investment in capital. No other deductions would be allowed. Because capital
purchases would be expensed, there would no longer be any depreciation deductions
(but there is likely to be generous transition relief that allows depreciation on capital
in place before the date of enactment). The basic operation o f the Business Flat Tax
is illustrated in the following example.

Table 10.5
Basic Operation of the Business Flat Tax
GROSS RECEIPTS
Less
MATERIALS COST
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
EMPLOYEE
COMPENSATION

100
20
10
40

TOTAL
COSTS
Equals

70

TAX BASE

30
5.10

TAX @ 17%

As with the Individual Flat Tax, the Business Flat Tax is noteworthy for what
it excludes. Table 10.6 is a partial list o f repealed business tax credits:
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Table 10.6
Some Tax Credits Repealed Under the Flat Tax
•

Research Tax Credit

•

Energy Tax Credits

•

Rehabilitation Tax Credit

•

Low-Income Housing Credit

•

Tax Credit for Orphan Drug Research

•

Targeted Jobs Tax Credit

Also, many current tax expenditures would become irrelevant because they
would be made obsolete by general provisions o f the new tax. For example, deferral
of tax on income generated by businesses operating abroad is no longer an advantage
because the business tax is a territorial tax excluding all foreign source income.
Similarly, generous depreciation provisions available under current law no longer
provide a tax advantage because all capital expenditures are expensed.

Table 10.7
Some Current Business Tax Benefits
•

Deferral o f Income o f Controlled Foreign Corporations

•

Expensing o f Exploration and Development Costs

•

Section 179 Expensing

•

Expensing o f Magazine Circulation Expenses

•

Possessions Tax Credit

D. Equivalence o f the Flat Tax to a Subtraction M ethod VAT
One way o f gaining insight into the operation o f the Flat Tax is to view the
Business and Individual Taxes as a single tax collected from two sources. When
combined, the two tax bases approximate a consumption tax base. In fact, if the
Individual Tax did not have standard deductions, the Flat Tax base would exactly
replicate the tax base o f a subtraction-method value-added tax. The two taxes are
compared in Table 10.8:
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Table 10.8
Comparison of th e Flat Tax and a Subtraction Method VAT
SUBTRACTION
METHOD VAT

THE FLAT TAX

A. BUSINESS TAX

A. BUSINESS TAX

100

100 GROSS RECEIPTS

GROSS RECEIPTS

Less

Less
MATERIALS COST

20

MATERIALS COST

20

CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES

10

CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES

10

E M PL O Y E E
C O M PE N SA T IO N

40

TOTAL CO STS

30 TOTAL C OSTS
Equals

Equals
TAX BASE

TAX @ 17%

B. INDIVIDUAL TAX

-N O N E -

70

___ 70_ TAX BASE

11.90 TAX @ 17%

___ 30_

5.10

B. INDIVIDUAL TAX

E M PL O Y E E
C O M PE N SA T IO N

40

Less
STANDARD
DEDUCTIONS

15

Equals
TAX BASE

25

TAX @ 17%

0.00 TAX @ 17%

4.25

TOTAL TAX

11.90 TOTAL TAX

9.35

NOTE:
TO TA L TAX
WITHOUT STANDARD
DEDUCTIONS

11.90

Under a subtraction method VAT, all tax is collected from businesses. From gross
receipts, deductions are allowed for purchases of material and for capital expenditures
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but not for employee compensation and interest. The Flat Tax allows business to
deduct employee compensation but then taxes employees directly on this
compensation.
E. Economic Effects
Because o f its equivalence to a subtraction-method value-added tax, many of
the economic effects o f the Flat Tax are the same as those o f a broad-based
consumption tax. For example, because the corporate income tax is eliminated, the
proposal eliminates the bias against capital formation in the corporate sector.
Because the tax does not apply to income from capital, the bias against capital
form ation in general under current law is entirely eliminated. To the extent the
current tax system is an impediment to saving and capital formation, the Flat Tax
could foster increases in productivity, wages, competitiveness, and economic growth.
The major impediment to passage o f the Flat Tax in its current form--as with
most consumption taxes-- is that these taxes are generally considered regressive. This
is the case because it is generally assumed that consumption taxes are passed forward
in prices and low-income households spend more in proportion to their incomes than
do high-income households. Although there is much dispute about how to measure
the distributional effects o f consumption taxes, it is noteworthy that a recent Treasury
study122 showed that the Armey Flat Tax would hurt families with incomes below
$200,000 and help those with incomes above $200,000.123
One notable difference between the Flat Tax and other consumption tax
proposals is that the tax is not imposed on imports and there is no tax relief for
exports. Such "border tax adjustments" are common to consumption taxes currently
in place around the world and common to all current consumption tax proposals.
(Chapter 9 presents some calculations showing that the absence o f border tax
adjustments makes a large difference to exporters.)
F. Political Prospects
A key attraction of the Flat Tax is its simplicity relative to current law. Under
the proposal, corporate income taxation would be eliminated, the minimum tax would
be eliminated, taxation o f overseas earnings would be eliminated, documentation of
depreciation, interest, and charitable contributions would no longer be necessary, and

122See Toder (1995).
123With regard to distributional issues, it is important to note that the proposal would repeal the earned income
tax credit.
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there would be no taxation of interest, dividends, and capital gains. Proponents claim
that under the proposal both individuals and businesses would file tax returns the size
of a postcard. There can be little doubt that this proposal in its current form is simpler
than current law for a large number o f taxpayers.
It is unlikely, however, that the tax would be so absolutely simple as
proponents claim. First o f all, many issues under current law would remain
problematic under the Flat Tax. For example, under either tax there is no bright line
between business expenses and personal consumption in the case o f self-employed
individuals. Second, new issues arise that are not present under current law. For
example, the value of employee fringe benefits, which business cannot deduct under
the Flat Tax, must be calculated. Finally, it is often remarked that it is not really fair
to compare a tax system functioning in the real world to an idealized system that has
not yet been subjected to the political maneuvering necessary for passage into law.
If history is any indicator, it seems likely that in the name o f political expediency the
proposal would rapidly be burdened with special exceptions and adjustments as it
moved through the legislative process.
O f course, the tax must also raise sufficient revenue. The Treasury
Department claims that the 17-percent Armey Flat Tax would reduce tax collections
by nearly $250 billion annually. Given the low probability o f reductions in
government spending by this amount, and given the current intolerance for larger
Federal deficits,124it seems likely that any Flat Tax enacted into law would have a tax
rate greater than 17 percent. The Treasury Department estimates125 that the Armey
proposal would require a rate o f approximately 24 percent to raise the same revenues
as the corporate and individual income taxes it would replace.126

124Early in the 104th Congress, a balanced-budget amendment passed the House o f Representative and missed
obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate by one vote.
125See Toder (1995).
126If current revenue estimating methodologies were altered to take into account possible economic growth
resulting from the proposal (i.e., so called "dynamic" revenue estimates), the revenue neutral rate could be lower.
At this time, it is unclear whether the new Congress will adopt this new approach and how significant its impact
might be.
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Chapter 11
The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax

Summary
•
The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax proposal eliminates the individual and
corporate income taxes and imposes a new consumption tax on individuals and
a new consumption tax on businesses.
•
The Individual Tax is a personal consumption tax with a progressive rate
structure and a top rate o f 40 percent. Unlike the Armey plan, favorable
treatment is retained fo r housing, charitable contributions, and state and local
income taxes.
•
The Business Tax is a subtraction method consumption tax with a rate o f
11 percent. The tax applies to all businesses, not ju st corporations.
•
The Nunn-Domenici proposal contains complicated transition rules under
both the Individual and Business Taxes fo r deducting basis o f assets acquired
before the effective date o f the new system.
A.

Overview

After years o f preparation, Senator Sam Nunn o f Georgia and Senator Pete
Domenici o f New Mexico introduced the 293-page "USA Tax Act o f 1995" (S. 722).
Like flat tax proposals, the Nunn-Domenici plan would completely eliminate the
individual and corporate income taxes127 and would replace them with a system of
consumption taxes levied on both individuals and business.
There are important differences, however, between the Armey Flat Tax and the
Nunn-Domenici USA Tax. For example, unlike the individual portion o f the Flat
Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax would have progressive rates and would

127The Nunn-Domenici proposal would retain the current estate and gift taxes and current payroll taxes, but
subject to a carryover in tax basis at death.

112

allow deductions for mortgage interest, charitable contributions, and state and local
taxes. Unlike the business portion of the Flat Tax, the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax
would not allow deductions for wages. The Nunn-Domenici proposal, however,
would allow all employer and most employee payroll taxes to be credited against the
new tax. Furthermore--unlike the Flat Tax, but like most consumption taxes—the
proposal imposes tax on imports and exempts exports, i.e., the tax is border adjusted.
B.

The Individual Tax
1. In General

The Individual Tax under the Nunn-Domenici plan is an individual
consumption tax. Under the tax, individuals would file annual returns much as they
do under current law. Moreover, they would include on this return their "gross
income" that is similar to adjusted gross income under current law, and they would
deduct itemized deductions and allowances for personal exemptions in order to arrive
at taxable income. The key difference between the current individual income tax and
the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax is a deduction for additional saving. In fact, the
"USA" in the proposal’s title refers to Unlimited Savings Allowance.
Under the proposal, gross income includes wages, salaries, interest, dividends,
distributions from proprietorships and partnerships, pension benefits, proceeds from
life insurance and annuity contracts128, and—with some important exceptions—the
entire proceeds of asset sales. In order to arrive at taxable income, individuals would
first deduct generous "Family Living Allowances" and personal exemption amounts.
These are summarized in Table 11.1.

128As under current law and the Flat Tax, the inside build-up on life insurance would be exempt from tax. Under
current law and the Flat Tax, proceeds from life insurance policies are exempt from tax.
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Table 11.1
Personal Exemptions and Family Living Allowances
Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan
P ER SO N A L E X E M P T IO N
$2,250

A ll R eturns
F A M IL Y L IV IN G A LL O W A N C E
Form o f Return
Joint
Surviving spouse
H ead o f Household
Individual
M arried filin g separately

$7,400
$7,400
$5,400
$4,400
$3,700

Thus, a family of four would not be liable for individual tax unless their gross income
exceeded $16,400.129 All o f these amounts are for 1996 and would thereafter be
indexed for inflation. It is interesting to note there is no standard deduction.
2. Itemized Deductions
The Nunn-Domenici proposal would allow five itemized deductions for the
following purposes:
(1) mortgage interest
(2) charitable contributions
(3) tuition for education and training
(4) additional savings
(5) transition basis
The deductions for mortgage interest and charitable contributions would
operate under the same rules as apply under the current individual income tax system.
The deduction for education expenses would be a new itemized deduction. The
deduction would allow for tuition relating to post-secondary education. It would be
limited to $2,000 per year per eligible student and could not exceed $8,000 per
household annually. As noted above, the Nunn-Domenici plan includes a deduction

129Of the approximately 115 million individual income tax returns filed in 1990, 47 million were for households
with adjusted gross income o f less than $15,000.
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for saving. This deduction is similar to the deduction for contributions to individual
retirement accounts, except there would be no limitations on the amounts that could
be contributed and no restrictions on withdrawals.
Except for the transition-basis deduction and the deduction for new saving
(both discussed below), no other deductions would be allowed under the new
Individual Tax. In particular, deductions would not be allowed for state and local
property taxes, moving expenses, casualty losses, and medical expenses.
3. Tax Rates
The tax rates under the Nunn-Domenici plan are summarized in Table 11.2.
Table 11.2
Individual Tax Rates Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan
— Taxable Income by Filing Status—

— Tax Rate in Each Year—

M arried
Filing
Jointly

Head o f
House
hold

Unmarried
Individual

Married
Filing
1996
Separately

2000
1997 1998 1999 and
after

Up to
$5,400

Up to
$4,750

Up to
$3,200

Up to
$2,700

19%

15%

13%

10%

8%

$5,400$24,000

$4,750$21,100

$3,200$14,400

$2,700$12,000

27%

26%

25%

20%

19%

Over
$24,000

Over
$21,100

Over
$14,400

Over
$12,000

40%

40%

40%

40%

40%

As noted above, individuals can always lower their taxes by saving instead o f
spending. Nevertheless, the low thresholds for the top tax brackets mean that a large
number o f middle-class taxpayers would be subject to the 40-percent tax rate.
4. Tax Credits
As under current law (and unlike under the Flat Tax), a refundable earned
income tax credit would be available under the Nunn-Domenici plan. An innovation
o f this provision o f the Nunn-Domenici plan is the credit for the employee portion o f
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payroll taxes. Under current law, the employee portion o f payroll taxes equals 7.65
percent o f the first $61,200 (1995 level) o f wages and 1.45 percent on all wages
above that amount. No other tax credits would be allowed.
5. Example
Table 11.3 presents a simple example that illustrates the basic operation o f the
tax and compares it to current law.130 Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, this family
with wages income o f $70,000 can deduct a living allowance and itemized
deductions, and taxes are reduced by a payroll tax credit. Under the Nunn-Domenici
proposal, however, this family is subject to a higher rate of tax.
Table 11.3
Computation of Individual Tax Under
The Nunn-Domenici Plan for a Family of Four in the Year 2000
A. N U N N -D O M ENICI INDIVIDUAL TAX
$70,000
10,199
8,386
7,000

Wages
Less Personal Exemptions
Less Living Allowance

Less Itemized Deductions

44,415

Equals Taxable Income

490
4,005
6,888

Tax at 8%
Tax at 19%
Tax at 40%

11,383
5,355

Total Tax
Less Payroll Credit

6,028

Net Tax
B. C U R R EN T INDIVIDUAL IN C O M E TAX
Wages

70,000

Less Personal Exemptions
Less Standard Deduction
Equals Taxable Income

11,736
7,604
50,660
6,826
1,443

Tax at 15%
Tax at 28%

8,269

Total Tax

130See Chapter 13 for more examples o f the operation of the Nunn-Domenici proposal.
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6. Treatment o f Saving
a. General Rules
At the core of the Nunn-Domenici proposal is its treatment o f personal savings
The following section summarizes the basic mechanics. Before getting mired in the
details, it may be helpful to keep in mind four main points:
(1)

Net additions to savings are deductible.

(2)

N ew borrowing is included in income (but most mortgage,
automobile, and credit card indebtedness is exempt from this
rule).

(3)

Withdrawals from accounts and proceeds from sales are
included in income.

(4)

There are deductions for basis o f assets held before January 1,
1997. For investors with less than $50,000 o f basis, basis may
be deducted ratably over three years. For other investors, basis
may only be deducted when there is net dissaving, generally
during retirement.

Deductible additions to savings include deposits in all types o f banks, mutual funds,
brokerage and retirement accounts as well as the purchase or investment in stock,
bonds, certificates o f deposits, ownership interests in partnerships and
proprietorships, life insurance, and annuities. Conversely, withdrawals from these
accounts and sales o f these assets are included in the tax base. Purchases o f land
(whether directly or indirectly) and collectibles are not deductible.
New borrowing increases tax but not if borrowing is "exempt." Exempt
borrowing includes:
(1) up to $1 million of mortgage indebtedness;
(2) up to $25,000 o f debt used to purchase a consumer durable;
(3) credit card charges paid within the first billing cycle; and
(4) any other debt up to $10,000.
Needless to say these exceptions remove most personal indebtedness from
consideration. It is unclear what in the statute or in practice will prevent taxpayers
from borrowing and using the loan proceeds for deductible saving. For example,
under the proposal, an individual could get a $25,000 deduction by taking out a
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second mortgage with a principal o f $15,000 and borrowing $10,000 secured against
a new $10,000 certificate of deposit. This would result in large revenue losses for the
government with no net increase in private saving.
b. Pre-Effective Date Basis
Under the general rules o f a personal consumption tax, all new savings are
deductible and the entire amount withdrawn (in the case o f a account) and the entire
proceeds o f a sale (in the case of a savings asset) are subject to tax. Thus, there is no
need to distinguish between principal and interest or between gain and basis.
This cash-flow approach creates serious difficulties during the transition from
an income tax to a consumption tax. Without transition relief, assets purchased before
the effective date o f the new consumption tax are penalized. From the perspective o f
an income tax, these assets are overtaxed because basis as well as gain is subject to
tax. From the perspective o f a consumption tax, these assets are overtaxed because
no deduction was received when the original investment was made. In effect, assets
whose holding period straddles the effective date are whipsawed between the two
systems—subject to more tax than they would be under either system when fully
phased in. This is illustrated in Table 11.4.
In Panel A o f the table, the taxpayer earns $10,000 that is subject to tax at 28
percent which leaves $7,200 available for investment. Earnings are subject to tax
annually but are plowed back into investment. At the end o f five-years, the taxpayer
has $9,526.64. In Panel B the taxpayer also earns $10,000 and this entire amount is
available for investment under an individual consumption tax where saving is
deductible. Over the life of the investment (in this case, five years) the income is not
subject to tax. In the last year, however, the entire proceeds o f the investment
($13,604 plus $1,088) are subject to tax, leaving the taxpayer with $10,579.16. Thus,
after five years, a taxpayer in the 28-percent bracket who is saving $10,000 o f
earnings is more than a thousand dollars richer under a consumption tax than he or
she would be under an income tax.
In Panel C the taxpayer is caught between an income tax and a consumption
tax and gets the worst o f both. When the taxpayer makes the initial investment there
is no deduction for saving, but when the taxpayer liquidates the investment the entire
proceeds are subject to tax. This leaves the taxpayer with only $7,459—a far worse
outcome than under the income tax.
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Table 11.4
Return on an Investment of $10,000 is Earnings
Under an Income Tax, Under Consumption Tax, and During the
Transition From an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax
A .IN C O M E TAX

(1) BEGINNING BASIS
(2) INCOME
(3) TAX
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) + (2) - (3)

1997
8053.33

576.00
161.28

1996
7614.72
609.18
170.57

190.79

1999
9007.79
720.62
201.77

7614.72

8053.33

8517.20

9007.79

9526.64

1995
10000.00
800.00

1996
10800.00
864.00

1997
11664.00
933.12

1998
12597.12
1007.77

1999
13604.89
1088.39

0.00
10800.00

0.00
11664.00

0.00
12597.12

0.00
13604.89

4114.12

1998
8881.81

9592.35

1995
7200.00

644.27
180.39

1998
8517.20
681.38

B. FU LLY PHASED IN CONSUM PTION
TAX

(1) BEGINNING BASIS
(2) INCOME
(3) TAX
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) + (2) - (3)

10579.16

C. SW ITC H T O CONSUM PTION TAX IN 1996, W ITH O U T
TR A N SITIO N R E L IE F

(1) BEGINNING BASIS
(2) INCOME
(3) TAX
(4) ENDING BASIS (1) + (2) - (3)

1995
7200.00

1996
7614.72

1997
8223.90

576.00

609.18

657.91

710.54

767.39

161.28

0.00

0.00

0.00

2900.73

7614.72

8223.90

8881.81

9592.35

7459.01

1999

Note: The assumed tax rate is 28 percent and the assumed pre-tax rate o f return is 8 percent.

In order to provide relief to "old capital" most proposals for a personal
consumption tax provide transition relief for pre-effective date assets in the form o f
deductions for pre-effective date basis. Before explaining the particular basis
deduction rules under the Nunn-Domenici plan, two points are worth noting.
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First, the entire reason for providing such relief is to provide equity between
old and new savers. It provides no benefits to the economy. (In fact, by requiring
higher tax rates in a revenue-neutral setting it is detrimental to growth.) It is true that
old saving would be unduly penalized without transition rules but providing relief to
existing assets does little to encourage new investment and economic growth.
Second, the problem o f overtaxation o f existing assets is prevalent under all
consumption taxes. Under a retail sales tax or a VAT, relief in the form o f basis
adjustment is not practical. (Remember, under these options all tax collections are
from businesses, and individuals do not even file returns.) Thus, under other types
of consumption taxes, the additional burden on taxpayers who have already saved is
ignored or relief is directed toward the elderly (for example, by exempting
prescription drugs).
Under the Nunn-Domenici plan, there are two methods for recovering pre
effective date basis. The first is available only to investors with no more than $50,000
of pre-effective date basis. These taxpayers will be eligible to ratably include basis
over the first three years the consumption tax is in effect. This is referred to as the
transition basis deduction.
This option is not realistic for all taxpayers because o f the severe revenue
losses that would result. (Existing aggregate basis in the economy is probably greater
than an entire year's taxable income.) Thus, under the Nunn-Domenici proposal,
savers would only be allowed to deduct basis when there are net withdrawals to
savings. The practical effect of this rule is that many who must use their savings will
get some tax relief.131
131The statutory language is difficult to follow. In each year in which there is a sale of a pre-effective date asset,
"withdrawals" (which are deducted from net deductible saving) are reduced by basis and net deductible saving is
also reduced by basis. The net result of this is that pre-effective basis does not generally figure into any one year's
deduction for saving, as shown in the following formula:
Net Saving = Additions - ( Proceeds - Basis ) - Basis - Borrowing
For example, if a taxpayer deposits $100 in a bank account, borrows $50, and sells an asset for $30 with a basis
o f $20, the taxpayer's net deduction for saving is $20 = $100 - ($30-$20) - $20 - $50).
It is only when saving (which is generally deductible) turns negative (and therefore potentially taxable) that
pre-effective date basis can be helpful to the taxpayer. Pre-effective date basis is included in the "general basis
account." This account may be used to reduce or eliminate otherwise taxable withdrawals:
Net Taxable Withdrawal = Net Negative Saving - General Basis Account
Returning to the prior example, except that the taxpayer only makes a deposit of $10 (instead o f $100), net negative
saving is $40. This taxable amount may be reduced by the $20 of basis so that there is $20 of net taxable
withdrawal.
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C.

The Business Tax
1. In General

The Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is a subtraction method VAT levied at an
11-percent rate. As is common to all subtraction method VAT proposals, exports are
excluded from gross receipts and imports are subject to a duty at a rate equal to the
tax rate. The tax is territorial so there is no taxation o f foreign subsidiaries. All
businesses, not just corporations, must pay the tax. Wages and interest are not
deductible, but capital may be expensed.
There are two important features of the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax that are
not necessarily part o f a standard subtraction method VAT. First, there is the
treatment o f state and local taxes. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, all taxes paid
by businesses to state and local governments are deductible. Second, there is the
credit against the business tax for the employer portion o f payroll taxes.
Many o f the key features o f the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax can be
illustrated with the following example:
Table 11.5
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax
and the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax
Current
Corporate
Income Tax
Business Receipts—Domestic
Business Receipts—Exports
Interest Income
Total Gross
Receipts
Business Purchases
Wages
Interest Cost
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90
10
5

NunnDomenici
Business
Tax
90

105

90

55
25
10

55
-

Depreciation
Capital Spending

10
-

Total Deductions

100

Tax Base

15
70
20

5

Tax @ 3 5 % , 11%

1.75

Wages Below Wage Cap
Payroll Tax Credit
Net Tax

0

2.2
20
1.60

1.75

0.60

2. The Payroll Tax Credit
The payroll tax credit deserves careful attention for two reasons. First, it is
im portant to understand how it works in order to gauge the tax’s overall impact on
wage costs. As noted, wages are not deductible under the general 11-percent tax.
However, this is substantially offset by the availability o f a tax credit for the employer
portion o f the payroll tax. The employer portion o f the payroll tax is 7.65 percent up
to a per employee annual ceiling ($61,200 in 1995, indexed to wage growth) and an
additional 1.45 percent tax on all wages without limit. As illustrated in the following
table, the net burden o f the tax on labor is larger for firms that pay high salaries.

Table 11.6
The Differential Benefit of the Payroll Credit
on Low-Wage and High-Wage Firms
Total payroll
Average salary
# of employees
Tax at 6.2 % , per
employee
Tax at 1.45% per employee
Total tax per employee

1,000,000
50,000
20
3,100

1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
75,000
100,000 200,000
5
13
10
3,794
3,794
3,794

725
3,825

1,088
4,882

1,450
5,244

2,900
6,694

76,500

63,446

52,440

33,470

110,000

110,000

110,000

110,000

Net increase in wage cost
(VAT less payroll credit)

33,500

46,554

57,560

76,530

Percentage increase

3.35%

4.66%

5.76%

7.65%

Total payroll tax credit
(# of employees times per
employee tax)
VAT cost @ 11%
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The second issue is the impact o f the payroll tax credit on the international
competitiveness o f domestically produced goods. The ability to credit the entire
employer portion o f the payroll tax against the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is
equivalent to repealing the employer portion o f the payroll tax and using the business
tax to restore the lost revenues. Under the rules of the General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) border adjustments are permitted for "indirect” sales and valueadded taxes but are not allowed for "direct" taxes on wages and profits. By replacing
payroll tax revenue with VAT revenues, the Nunn-Domenici proposal effectively
replaces a non-border-adjustable tax with a border adjustable tax. This will be true
to the extent the burden o f payroll taxes is passed forward to consumers in higher
prices (and not backward to employees in lower after-tax wages). In general,
economists believe that the burden of wage taxes is bom by labor in the form o f lower
after-tax wages.
Because the payroll tax is not repealed outright, however, some commentators
strongly contend that the payroll tax credit violates GATT rules on border
adjustability.132
3. Amortization o f Pre-Effective Date Basis and Other Transition Rules
The Nunn-Domenici Business Tax provides a large incentive for capital
formation by allowing all purchases o f new capital to be expensed. If, however, no
depreciation deductions are allowed for the remaining basis o f existing capital, this
capital will be subject to a tax penalty. To prevent the imposition o f an undue burden
on existing capital, the Nunn-Domenici proposal allows a "transition basis deduction"
for the amortization of remaining basis on the effective date for any assets placed into
service before the effective date. The amount o f the deduction is determined
according to the following schedule:

Table 11.7
Transition Basis Recovery Periods
Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan

Category I basis

Remaining
Am ortization On
Effective Date
U nder C u rren t Law
Less than 15 yrs.

Am ortization
Period U nder
Nunn-Domenici
10 years

Category II basis

More than 15 yrs.

30 years

Category III basis

Not depreciable

40 years

Type of P roperty

132See, McLure (1987), pp. 86-88.
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In addition, unrecovered inventory costs would be deducted ratably over three years.
Carryforwards o f net operating losses, alternative minimum tax credit, and
other business credits—including the R&E tax credit-generated under the existing
income tax could not be carried forward to reduce liability under the new Business
Tax. This will impose a particularly large burden on start-up firms.
D.

Conclusion

The Nunn-Domenici proposal is not as simple as the Flat Tax nor is it as
sweeping in its elimination of tax preferences. The argument can be made, however,
the plan contains the most important elements o f consumption taxation but at the
same time makes realistic accommodations that may be necessary to ensure sufficient
political support for enactment. The following table summarizes some o f the key
differences between current law and the two leading consumption tax alternatives:
Table 11.8
Summary Comparison of Current Law,
The Nunn-Domenici Proposal, and the Flat Tax
Biased Against
C apital
Form ation?
C u rren t
Law

Simpler Than
C u rren t L aw ?

Yes, but
numerous special
rules provide
relief.

D istribution of
T ax B urden

B order Tax
A djustm ents?

Progressive.
No.

NunnDomenici

No.

In some matters,
Yes. In some
matters, No.

Approximately
as progressive as
current law.

Flat Tax

No.

Yes.

Less progressive
than current law.

Yes.

No.

The following two chapters provide much more detailed, numerical comparisons of
the Nunn-Domenici proposal and the Flat Tax.
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Chapter 12
Impact of Consumption Taxes on Various Business Sectors

Summary
•
A bout two thirds o f total value added in the economy is employee
compensation. Therefore, an ordinary VAT primarily is a tax on wages.
•
The business components o f the Flat Tax and the Nunn-Domenici proposal are
similar to value-added taxes except that the Flat Tax allows a deduction fo r wages
and the Nunn-Domenici proposal provides a tax credit fo r wages. Although this
relief is substantial, these proposals in general still favor capital-intensive relative
to labor-intensive industries.
•
The exclusion o f exports from gross receipts provides large tax benefits to
those firm s with exports. For a typical manufacturing exporter, the availability o f
border tax adjustments under the Nunn-Domenici proposal can easily cut a
business's tax bill in half. In contrast, the Flat Tax does not have border tax
adjustments.
The primary objective o f the study is to provide insight to businesses and
policymakers about the impacts o f consumption taxes. Along these lines, this chapter
uses real data to estimate the effects o f real proposals on various sectors o f the
economy. This is tricky business because proposals are always changing. Also, data
are incomplete. Economic impacts are complex and uncertain.
Moreover, generalizations can be misleading: any conclusion derived from the
industry calculations should not necessarily be interpreted as applicable to all
businesses within an industry. The effects o f new consumption tax proposals will
often depend on each business’ unique circumstances. For example, a firm with high
profits might prefer a consumption tax to the current corporate income tax, but this
firm ’s highly leveraged competitor might prefer current law. A third com petitoreven if it is paying relatively little corporate income tax—might prefer a borderadjustable consumption tax if it is able to entirely eliminate its tax liability (or even
generate refunds) by exporting a small fraction o f its total sales.
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Chapter 9 developed concepts to help readers think about consumption taxes.
Chapters 10 and 11 provided an overview of the two proposals currently receiving the
most attention on Capitol Hill. This chapter builds on all this information and
combines it with information from Commerce Department economic data on value
added in different industry segments.
A.

Overview o f the Data: The Importance o f Wages

Official statistics published by the Commerce Department provide an excellent
starting point for evaluating and comparing consumption tax proposals. From these
statistics, value added can be computed as the sum of total employee compensation
(including wages and fringe benefits), corporate profits, net interest paid, net non
income taxes paid by business and net income received by owners o f noncorporate
business.133 (It is not possible to differentiate between "wages” and "profits" that
owners o f closely held businesses pay to themselves, so no distinction is made
between the two in official statistics.) These components are shown in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1
Total Private Sector Value Added,
Commerce Department Data, 1993
(Billions of dollars)

Wages
Fringe Benefits
Corporate Profits
Net Interest
Payments to Owners
o f Noncorporate Business
Net Indirect Business Taxes

$2,517
$ 498
$ 391
$ 460

51.2%
10.1%
7.9%
9.4%

$ 520
$ 529

10.6%
10.8%

Total

$4,915

100%

This small table makes a big point. Employee compensation (wages plus
fringe benefits) is at least 60 percent o f all private-sector value added.

133Th is is the addition method o f calculating value added. Most proposals for value-added taxation use the
subtraction m ethod (or some variant o f the concept). See the beginning o f Chapter 3 for a comparison.
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Considering that some significant portion o f payments to owners o f noncorporate
business is also wages, it is reasonable to assume that about two-thirds o f all privatesector value added are payments for labor services. Thus, in a "plain vanilla" valueadded tax, employee compensation is the dominant factor determining business tax
liability.
Table 12.2 shows the ratio of employee compensation to total value added for
13 major industry groups. The main point o f this table is that not only is employee
compensation an important component o f value added for the economy as a whole,
it is also important for most major industry groups. Only for three o f the 13
industries-- agriculture, utilities, and real estate-- is the ratio o f employee compensation
to total value added less than 50 percent. (Except for utilities, these ratios are low
because much o f the return to labor is in the form o f payments to owners of
noncorporate business.) Even for such industries that are commonly considered
"capital-intensive"--i.e., manufacturing, mining, and construction—wages and fringe
benefits are still the largest component o f value added.
Table 12.2
Employee Compensation as Percentage of
Total Value Added, by Industry, 1993

(1) AGRICULTURE

35%

(2) MINING

62%

(3) CONSTRUCTION

72%

(4) MANUFACTURING-DURABLES

86%

(5) MANUFACTURING-NONDUR

66%

(6) TRANSPORTATION

76%

(7) COMMUNICATION

53%

(8) UTILITIES

38%

(9) WHOLESALE TRADE

64%

(10) RETAIL TRADE

63%

(11) FINANCE

62%

(12) REAL ESTATE

7%

(13) SERVICES

75%

TOTAL PRIVATE

61%

Source: U.S. Department o f Commerce. See Appendix for details.
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Given these facts, it is not surprising (from a political perspective), that the two
leading consumption tax proposals provide substantial relief for the wage component
o f the consumption tax. The Nunn-Domenici proposal provides a payroll tax credit
for the employer portion o f payroll taxes (7.65% o f wages below the $61,200 and
1.45 percent for all wages above that amount). The Armey Flat Tax exempts wages
entirely from the business tax base.
B.

Calculating the Tax Base fo r the Leading Proposals
1. Adjustments to the Data

Although the Commerce Department data measure value added, several
adjustments must be made to get a reasonable approximation of the aggregate tax base
under alternative proposals. Depending on the proposal, adjustments must be made
for the following items:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

expensing
exports
imports
deductible business taxes

And, although not conceptually related to value added, the following calculations are
critically important to determining the impact of some consumption tax proposals:
(5)
(6)

transition depreciation
the payroll tax credit

The details of how these adjustments are made are presented in Appendix 12B
following this chapter.
2. Using the Data to Calculate Aggregate Tax Liability
Table 12.3 shows the results o f all o f these adjustments, and uses them to
calculate the tax liability for the economy as a whole for (a) a five-percent broadbased VAT, (b) the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax, and (c) the Armey Flat Tax. The
latter two are chosen because they are the two proposals currently receiving the most
attention on Capitol Hill. Although not currently in favor, an ordinary VAT serves
as a useful benchmark for comparison. A broad based 5-percent VAT is routinely
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included in the Congressional Budget Office's annual catalogue o f revenue-raising
proposals.134 Five percent is the rate that is approximately revenue neutral to current
corporate income tax.
Table 12.3
A djusting from Value Added in the 1993 Commerce D epartm ent D ata
to the Business Tax Base U nder T hree Leading Proposals
(billions of dollars)

5% VAT 11% N-D 17% F lat
USA Tax
Tax
4915

1993 Value added (in
Commerce Dept. Data)
Adjustments
Wages
Benefit o f Expensing
Benefit o f Export Exemption
Inclusion o f Imports
Benefit o f Excise Tax
Deduction
Total Adjustments
Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax

4915

4915

-2517
-205

-205
-457
538
-258

-205
-457
538
-258

382

382

2980

4533
5%
227

4533
11%
499

1935
17%
329

-258

-177

Payroll Credit
Net Tax (w/o Transition
Depreciation)
Note: Maximum Transition
Depreciation
Note: Tax Benefit o f
Transition Depreciation
Net Tax (with Transition
Depreciation)

134See, for example, Congressional Budget Office (1995).
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227

322

329

580

580

580

29

64

99

198

258

230

a. Five-Percent Value-Added Tax
In order to calculate the aggregate amount of tax collected under a "plain
vanilla" VAT, four adjustments must be made to the Commerce Department measure
o f value added. First, when expensing is allowed instead of depreciation, value added
is reduced by the excess o f current capital expenditures over current depreciation.
Next, because VATs usually operate under the destination principle,135 the tax base
must be reduced by the amount o f exports and increased by the amount o f imports.
Because the United States routinely runs trade deficits, the net effect o f implementing
the destination principle is to enlarge the tax base. Finally, value added in the
Commerce Department data includes sales and excise taxes, but these taxes are often
deductible in value-added taxes. Thus, the tax base o f a broad-based "plain vanilla"
value-added tax is estimated to be approximately $4.5 trillion in 1993.
b. Nunn-Domenici Business Tax
As noted previously, the Nunn-Domenici Business Tax is similar to an
ordinary broad-based value-added tax. Accordingly, the same adjustments are made
to the Commerce Department data to arrive at the Nunn-Domenici tax base, and the
Nunn-Domenici tax base is also approximately $4.5 trillion. The big difference
between the Nunn-Domenici proposal and an ordinary VAT is the availability o f the
payroll tax credit, equal to 7.65 percent o f most wages. By what percentage this
reduces the overall take o f a VAT depends on the tax rate. For the Nunn-Domenici
proposal with a rate o f 11 percent, the amount o f revenue raised is reduced from $499
billion to $322 billion, a 35-percent reduction.
c. The Armey Business Flat Tax
The Armey Flat Tax has two important differences from the Nunn-Domenici
proposal. First, it does not have border tax adjustments. Although this will make an
enormous difference to individual firms (as discussed below), it only results in a net
increase o f approximately 2 percent on the overall tax base.136 The second difference
is o f such importance it should probably be the defining characteristic o f the Flat Tax.

135See Chapter 7 for more explanation.
136In Table 12.3, the net increase in the tax base due to border adjustments is $119 billion. The total tax base
is $4,533 billion.
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Although there are no payroll tax credits under the Flat Tax, wages are entirely
deductible. This reduces the tax base to approximately one-half o f what it otherwise
might be.
The business portion o f the Armey Flat Tax has a narrower base than the
Nunn-Domenici proposal. The Flat Tax, however, has a higher tax rate (i.e., 17
percent) and no payroll credit. It is striking that these rough calculations show the
two taxes raising approximately the same revenue.
d. Transition R elief Under the Proposals
As noted in Chapter 9, transition relief is a large issue. Table 12.3 underscores
its importance. For the regular VAT, the calculations show transition relief reducing
total taxes by approximately one-eighth at the beginning o f the transition. For the
Nunn-Domenici proposal, the reduction in tax revenue is approximately one-seventh.
For the Flat Tax, the reduction in tax revenue is approximately one-third. (To offset
this reduction in revenue, the Nunn-Domenici proposal has higher individual tax rates
during its first four years o f existence. The Armey plan would impose a tax rate of
20 percent on individual and businesses during its first two years.)
Transition relief could be larger than shown in these calculations if, for
example, inventories can be written off (as proposed under Nunn-Domenici); if
credits (such as the research credit or the alternative minimum tax credit) could be
carried forward and credited against the new tax; or if operating losses could be
carried forward and deducted against the new tax. Transition relief, however, could
be smaller if statutory rules simply reduce the amount o f existing capital that may be
deducted. In all cases, to the extent there is any transition relief, its importance
diminishes over time.
C.

Comparison to the Corporate Income Tax
1. Estimates o f Burden on Corporations

There is interest not only in the differences between various proposals, but also
in the differences between proposals and current law. The initial focus here will be
on comparing the business components of proposed consumption taxes to the current
corporate income tax. (The following chapter will discuss noncorporate business.)
The data are not perfectly suited to this task, so some further assumptions and
calculations must be made. In Commerce Department data, the corporate and non
corporate portions o f value added are not always separately stated. While corporate
profits and corporate depreciation are separate, there is no distinction made, for
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example, between interest and wages paid by corporations and interest and wages
paid by non-corporate businesses. Therefore, as described in the appendix to this
chapter, some educated guesses have been made. (Again, none o f these calculations
should be taken as precise, because they are no more than good-faith estimates given
the available data.)
Table 12.4 presents the estimated tax liability incurred by all corporations
under (a) the corporation income tax, (b) a five-percent VAT, (c) the Nunn-Domenici
Business Tax, and (d) the Armey Business Flat Tax. Under the corporate income tax
only corporate profits are subject to tax.
Table 12.4
Estim ated C orporate Tax Liability U nder C u rren t Law and
U nder A lternative Consumption Tax Proposals
(1993 data, dollar amounts in billions)

Wages
Fringe Benefits
Interest
Profit
Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing
Imports Less Exports

C u rren t
Law
0
0
0
391
0
0
0

Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
Tax Benefit o f Transition
Depreciation
Tax W ith Transition

5%
Nunn- A rm ey
VAT
Domenici Flat Tax
2011
2011
0
409
409
409
131
131
131
391
391
391
188
188
188
-139
-139
-139
69
69
69

391
35%

3060
5%

1049
17%

153
0

3060
11%
337
141

137
0
137137
0
0

153
394
20

196
394
43

178
394
67

137

133

153

111

178
0

137In 1993 the corporate income tax actually raised $117.5 billion. The lower actual figure is not surprising
given the more accelerated depreciation allowed for tax purposes and the availability o f tax credits. 1995 Budget,
Historical tables, p. 22.
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The calculations show that if all o f these tax proposals were fully effective
(i.e., no transition) in 1993, they would raise revenues in the same general order o f
magnitude—between $153 billion and $178 billion. The calculations show that a 5percent VAT raises a little more than would be needed to replace the revenues lost
from repeal o f the corporate tax.138 The Nunn-Domenici tax has a higher rate than
the regular VAT (11 percent versus five percent), but it also has a generous payroll
credit. The calculations indicate that for the corporate sector the benefit o f the credit
does not compensate for the higher rate: the 11-percent Nunn-Domenici tax imposes
a net higher burden than a five-percent VAT. The Armey proposal does not have a
payroll credit, but a full deduction for wages, which is a greater benefit than the
Nunn-Domenici credit. To compensate for this lost revenue, the Armey proposal
must have a higher tax rate than the Nunn-Domenici proposal.139
As noted above, transition rules have the potential to provide substantial
temporary relief under all the alternatives. The proportionate benefit o f transition
relief is related to the tax rate. Thus, transition rules under the Armey plan provide
the greatest percentage reduction in tax.
2. Key Factors Determining Tax Liability
From Table 12.4 above (as well as Tables 12.A1 through 12.A11 which
follow), a pattern begins to emerge about business consumption taxes. The four most
important factors for determining overall liability are:
(1)

The amount o f each firm's wages and the treatment o f wages under the
alternative proposal. For almost all businesses, wage payments are the
largest component o f the tax base, but treatment o f wages can be vastly
different (i.e., included in base, deductible, or creditable) under
alternative proposals.

(2)

Transition rules. Transition relief can have an enormous impact on tax
liabilities. This revenue loss may or may not be offset by temporarily
higher tax rates. Transition relief may come in a variety o f forms, and
it is possible for it to be entirely omitted from the plans.

138This relationship is consistent with the tabulations presented in Congressional Budget Office (1995).
According to the CBO, a 4.3 percent V AT would be needed to raise as much revenue as the corporation tax.
The tables presented here are consistent with a 4.5 percent revenue neutral rate.
139A recent empirical study by Price Waterhouse also indicates that both the Nunn-Domenici proposal and
a 17% Flat Tax generate more revenue from corporations than does the current corporation tax. See, Merrill,
Wertz, and Shah (1995), p. 743, Exhibit 2. The calculations in the Price Waterhouse study are based on 1992
Statistics o f Income data for nonfinancial corporations, while the calculations presented in this study are based
on 1993 Commerce Department data for all corporations.
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(3)

Tax rates. The range o f possible rates for different reasonable
proposals is enormous (as was stressed at the end o f Chapter 9).
Sometimes the simple impact o f differences in tax rates is neglected
because so much effort must be devoted to understanding the
differences in the tax base.

(4)

Exports and imports. It was noted above that in the aggregate the
impact o f border tax adjustments on the tax base is relatively small—
about two percent o f the total consumption tax burden. Underlying
these aggregate figures, however, there lies a wide degree o f variation.
For example, it is not uncommon for a firm's exports to exceed 10
percent o f its sales.140 For many firms, even with this low exports-tosale ratio, the deductibility o f exports can be a dominant factor in
determining tax liability. In many cases, tax liability can be
eliminated.141

3. Discussion o f Exports and Imports
a. Exports
The example in Table 12.5, based on actual data142 for manufacturers, demonstrates
the importance of border adjustments for firms that export.

140See, Farnham (1987).
141The importance o f exports was also stressed in the Price Waterhouse study of corporate tax liability. “The
single most important factor in determining whether industries would have paid more or less under the USA
proposal is net exports: industries with relatively high net exports per dollar o f gross receipts pay less tax.” Merrill,
Wertz, and Shah (1995), p. 744.
142The details are explained in the Appendix to this chapter.
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Table 12.5
The Impact of the Deduction for Exports
on the "Typical" Exporting Manufacturer
5%
VAT

NunnDomenici

100.0
10.0
64.0

100.0
10.0
64.0

Equals Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax

26.0
5%
1.3

26.0
11%
2.9

Wages
Wage Credit

27.0
0.0

27.0
1.9

1.3

1.0

1.8

2.1

28%

53%

Total Sales
Less Exports
Less Business
Purchases

Net Tax
Note: N et Tax
without Deduction for
Exports
Note: % Reduction in
Tax Due to Export
Deduction

For the "typical” manufacturer, the exclusion of exports from the tax base reduces the
tax burden of a plain vanilla VAT by 28 percent. For the Nunn-Domenici proposal,
the exclusion of exports from gross receipts reduces the tax burden by 53 percent.
The Armey proposal does not provide any such relief for exports. Thus, in general it
seems likely that exporters will favor the Nunn-Domenici proposal (and other
consumption taxes with border tax adjustments) over the Armey Flat Tax.143

143Under the current income tax, exporters can benefit from either o f two provisions: (1) the Foreign Sales
Corporation (commonly known as "FSC") rules and the favorable "title-passage" export sourcing rules. The order
o f magnitude o f benefits from these rules is much smaller than that which would be provided with border tax
adjustments. Export benefits under current law exempt a certain portion o f income from exports from tax. Border
tax adjustments exempt the entire amount o f gross receipts from exports from tax.
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b. Imports
Although the U.S. economy typically imports more than it exports, the impact
o f import duties has not been included in the industry-by-industry calculations
presented in this chapter. This is not because they are unimportant. As noted in the
appendix to this chapter, U.S. imports were $538 billion in 1993. From Table 12.4,
it can be seen that this amount accounts for about one-sixth o f the revenue collected
under a regular VAT and about one-quarter of the revenue collected under the NunnDomenici proposal.
The reason for the exclusion o f imports is the particular difficulty they pose
in presentation. If—as is assumed by economists—the burden o f consumption taxes
is passed forward in price, businesses purchasing domestically-produced inputs will
be subject to the same rise in costs as importers. For example, a border-adjustable 10percent VAT will raise import prices and domestic prices by 10 percent. In this case,
there is no special burden borne by importers. If import duties were included in the
tables, they would result in a greater tax liability on importers even though their
economic burden is no different than that faced by other domestic firms.
Suppose instead, for the sake of argument, that a border-adjustable VAT raised
import prices by 10 percent and domestic prices by six percent. If the firm is an
importer and pays the import duty, including these duties in the calculation o f liability
would overstate the relative burden borne by the business. That firm would be worse
off than the firm with purely domestic sources o f supply, but only by four percent
(and not the ten percent that would be shown in calculations o f pure tax liability).
In addition, a firm that indirectly imports (e.g., a retailer supplied by an
importing wholesaler) should not necessarily expect to bear no burden as a result of
an import duty (when in fact its import costs may have risen by the full amount o f the
tax). The bottom line is that import duties can place a significant direct or indirect
burden on a business. How different this burden is compared to non-importing firms
is not clear. And no one calculation will do justice to the variety o f ways the tax may
impact importing sectors. Accordingly, businesses that rely on imports as sources of
supply should carefully study the possible impact o f import duties on their costs.
D.

Impact on Various Corporate Sectors

The previous section used aggregate corporate data to analyze how
consumption tax proposals might affect a "typical" firm in the economy. In this
section, the current income tax is compared to consumption tax proposals for a
“typical” firm in a variety of business sectors. O f the thirteen components o f the total
private sector analyzed, two industries—agriculture and real estate—were dropped
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from the analysis because o f the small proportion of business activities undertaken by
corporations in those sectors. The estimated proportion o f corporate business in each
sector is shown in Table 12.6.144

Table 12.6
Estimated Proportion of Corporate Business
in Each Major Business Sector
Industry

C orporate
Percentage
97%
94%

(1) Manufacturing-Durables
(2) ManufacturingNondurables
(3) Mining
(4) Construction
(5) Transportation
(6) Communication
(7) Utilities
(8) Wholesale Trade
(9) Retail Trade
(10) Finance
(11) Services
(12) Agriculture
(13) Real Estate

86%
68%
86%
88%
92%
97%
83%
96%
63%
20%
7%

Total Private Sector

68%

Source: U.S. Department o f Commerce. See Appendix.

Tables 12.A1 through 12.A11 (in the Appendix to this Chapter) present
estimates of tax liability under the current law and three consumption tax alternatives.
The calculations are made for four different sets o f assumptions, as shown in the
following table:

144The Appendix to this Chapter explains how the components o f value added were allocated between the
corporate and noncorporate sectors o f each industry group.
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Table 12.7
Alternative Assumptions Used in Industry Tables
Assumptions
Used in Tables

Legislation Transition
Relief

Firms Export Position

#1

None

No Exports

#2

Maximum Relief

No Exports

#3

None

"Typical" Exporter

#4

Maximum Relief

"Typical" Exporter

These tables provide a great deal o f information, and at first it is difficult to discern
any patterns. Some industries appear to be winners, and some are losers. Patterns do
emerge, however, after careful inspection.
7. No Transition, No Exports
Focusing first on the case o f no transition and no exports (assumption #1),
industries with percentages o f employee compensation (wages and fringe benefits)
that are low relative to other industries do better under the alternatives. This makes
sense because consumption tax alternatives tax wages while the current corporate tax
does not. Also, industries with relatively high levels o f profit seem to do better under
the alternatives. Again, this makes sense because the corporate income tax is a tax
exclusively on profits. Under the alternatives, profits are only a small component o f
the tax base.
To highlight this point, the ratio o f profit to employee compensation was
calculated for each industry, and then the industries were sorted by this statistic. The
estimated ratio o f profit to employee compensation for each of the 11 major corporate
sectors is shown in Table 12.8.
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Table 12.8
R atio of Profit to Total Employee Compensation
F or M ajor C orporate Sectors, 1993
Industry
Utilities
Communications
Finance
ManufacturingNondurables
Wholesale
Retail
Mining
Manufacturing-Durables
Transportation
Services
Construction

Profit Divided by
Compensation
64%
48%
42%
23%
16%
12%
10%
8%
7%
6%
6%

When tax liabilities are sorted by this ratio a clear pattern emerges: In general, the
higher the ratio o f profi t-to-employee compensation, the more attractive are
consumption tax proposals relative to current law. In other words, industries with
relatively high profits would prefer a consumption tax to an income tax. This can be
directly observed in Chart 12.1 which appears at the end o f this chapter.
Among industries, utilities, communications, and finance pay less tax under all three
alternatives because of their relatively high level of profits and relatively low level of
wages. Other industries fare worse under the alternatives (compared to current law)
because o f low profitability and/or their greater labor intensity.
2. Peak Transition, No Exports
Whether or not—and in what form --transition relief will be part o f consumption
tax alternatives is an open issue. The calculations in this study show that transition
relief has the potential during the transition period to be important to many firms in
a variety of industries. In Chart 12.2, transition benefits are assumed to be available
under all three consumption tax alternatives. Two observations can be made. First,
o f the three consumption alternatives, the relative attractiveness o f the Flat Tax
improves most due to transition relief. This is because transition depreciation
deductions are more valuable under the proposal's 17-percent rate than under the
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lower rates o f the other alternatives (i.e., 11- and five-percent). Second, transition
relief is more beneficial to the more capital-intensive industries, like manufacturing
and mining, as shown in Chart 12.2 which appears at the end o f this chapter.
3. No Transition, "Typical" Exporter
Border tax adjustments would be available under a typical VAT and under the
Nunn-Domenici proposal. They are not available under the Flat Tax or under current
law. Chart 12.3, which appears at the end o f this chapter, shows that if a firm in any
o f these sectors exports as much as a "typical" manufacturer, comparisons o f the
alternatives change dramatically. The Nunn-Domenici proposal becomes the best
alternative for nine o f the 11 corporate sectors.
4. Overview o f Results and Caveats
In the long run (i.e., after any transition period), a key factor for determining
the relative position before and after imposition of a replacement consumption tax is
the ratio of profit to total employee compensation. High-profit/low-wage firms will
find alternatives to current law attractive. Transition rules can provide significant
relief if the firm is capital intensive. Furthermore, transition deductions will be more
valuable as the tax rate climbs. Finally, the availability o f border tax adjustments is
extremely important to exporters.
It m ust be stressed that these calculations are only approximations o f what
particular firms in each industry might experience. All o f the calculations assume no
tax preferences. Clearly this is not true under current law, and it is yet to be seen how
important tax preferences will be under the proposed reforms. Another issue is tax
rates. The tax rates used follow the current legislative drafts, but rates are highly
susceptible to change--e.g., to pay for additional preferences, to pay for transition
relief, or to raise additional revenue for deficit reduction.
The data used are based on 1993 data that may no longer be relevant for 1996
or later years. (Cycles and trends in profitability make profit figures particularly
suspect.) For each industry, the corporate components o f wages, fringe benefits, and
interest had to be estimated. How transition relief and "typical" exporters are
characterized are only good estimates. Transition relief under actual proposals and
export intensity o f particular firms are both likely to vary widely.
For this reason it is important for individual firms (and their advisors) to take
stock o f their (and their client's) own circumstances in assessing the impact of
consumption taxes. Toward this end, the worksheets o f the following section should
provide some useful guidance.
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E.

Worksheets fo r Individual Firm Analysis

The calculations presented thus far hopefully have helped to take abstract
discussions o f consumption taxes and turn them into reality. To further bring home
the reality of these taxes, the following recently published worksheets allow tax and
accounting professionals to determine consumption liabilities for their own and their
clients’ businesses.145,146
Under the Armey plan (see Table 12.9), businesses include all receipts from
domestic business-including exports—in gross active income. Wages are deductible,
but fringe benefits are not. Capital purchases are expensed. Interest income is not
includable and interest expense is not deductible. There are no deductions for
property or state income taxes. There are no tax credits. The tax rate is 17 percent,
and payroll taxes are unaffected by the tax.
Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal (see Table 12.10), exports are excluded
from the tax base and imports are subject to tax at the border. The rate o f tax and rate
of import duty are both 11 percent. As under the Armey plan, capital purchases are
expensed. As under the Armey plan, interest expense, fringe benefits, and property
and state income taxes are not deductible. Wages are not deductible, but the
employer portion o f the payroll tax is creditable against the tax.

145The worksheets were developed by Arthur Andersen and were recently reprinted in Tax Notes Magazine.
See Bernstein, Fogarsi, and Gordon (1995).
146The calculations look at the “big picture”. They do not examine all gradations and industries. Some
generalizations about industries may be misleading because of significant differences in structure within the
industry.
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Table 12.9
ARMEY FLAT TAX PLAN
Business Tax Worksheet
Gross Active Income:
Gross Receipts from Sales of Goods and Services
Proceeds from Sales o f Business Assets
TOTAL INCOME
Deductions:
Compensation
Contributions to Qualified Retirement Plans
Capital Equipment
Inventory Items
Real Estate
Other Business Property
Supplies
Services
Travel and Entertainment
Excise Taxes
Transition Deductions
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS

(

NET RECEIPTS
x .1 7

Business Tax Rate (17%)
TOTAL TAX LIABILITY
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)

Table 12.10
NUNN-DOMENICI USA PLAN
Business Tax Worksheet
Receipts:
Gross Receipts from Domestic Sales o f Goods and
Services
__________
Proceeds from Sales o f Business Assets
TOTAL RECEIPTS
Business Purchases:
Capital Equipment

__________
___________
__________

Inventory Items

__________

Real Estate

__________

Other Business Property

__________

Rent

__________

Supplies

__________

Services

__________

Bad debts

__________

Travel and Entertainment

__________

Excise Taxes
Transition Deductions

__________
___________

TOTAL PURCHASES

( _________)_

GROSS PROFIT (not less than zero)

___________

Business Tax Rate (11%)

x .11

Tax liability

___________

Payroll tax credit

(__________

TOTAL BUSINESS TAX DUE (a)

___________

Imports
Total cost o f imported products & services purchased

___________

Import Tax (11%)

x .11

TOTAL IMPORT TAX DUE (b)

___________

TOTAL TAX LIABILITY

(a)+(b)
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Appendix 12A
Computation of Corporate Tax Liability for 11 Industry
Groups Under Current Law and Three Major Alternatives
The following calculations are the basis for Charts 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 in the
text. Calculations are made for the four sets of assumptions shown in Table 12.7. “#1
Net Tax” assumes no exports and no transition relief. “#2 Tax with Transition”
equals Net Tax minus the product o f the tax rate and Maximum Transition
Depreciation. “#3 Tax for Exporter” equals Net Tax times the product o f the tax rate
times “Exports.” “#4 Tax for Exporter with Transition” equal “#3 Tax for Exporter”
minus the product o f the tax rate times Maximum Transition Depreciation. Further,
details about the underlying data are found in Appendix 12.B. As noted in the text,
many assumptions have been made to produce these tables. The information in the
two appendices will allow industrious readers who are uncomfortable with the
assumptions made to substitute their own.

Table 12.A1
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and Consumption Tax
Alternatives: MANUFACTURING-DURABLES
Current
Law

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

A rm ey
Flat Tax

Wages

0.0

344.4

344.4

0.0

Fringe Benefits

0.0
0.0

88.5
6.4

88.5

Interest

88.5
6.4

36.3

36.3

36.3

36.3

Nondeductible Taxes

0.0

10.6

10.6

10.6

Benefit o f Expensing

0.0

-24.6

-24.6

-24.6

Total Tax Base

36.3

461.7

461.7

117.3

Tax Rate

35%
12.7

5%

11%
50.8

17%
19.9

24.2

0.0

26.6

19.9

0.0

23.1
69.4

69.4

69.4

0.0

166.2

166.2

0.0

12.7

19.6

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

12.7

18.9
8.3

8.1

14.8

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

12.7

11.3

0.7

Profit

Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
#1 Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"
# 2 Tax with Transition

0.0
12.7
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23.1
0.0

6.4

8.1
8.1

Table 12.A2
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and Consumption Tax
Alternatives: MANUFACTURING-NONDURABLES
Current
Law

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

Armey
Flat Tax

224.2
54.7

224.2
54.7

0.0
54.7

Profit
Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing

63.0
0.0

30.5
63.0
25.9

30.5
63.0

30.5
63.0
25.9

0.0

-19.6

25.9
-19.6

-19.6

Total Tax Base

63.0

378.7

378.7

154.5

Tax Rate

35%

5%

11%

17%

Gross Tax
Payroll Credit

22.0
0.0

18.9
0.0

41.7
15.8

26.3
0.0

#1 Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"

22.0
0.0
0.0

18.9
55.3
136.3

25.9
55.3
136.3

26.3
55.3
0.0

# 2 Tax with Transition

22.0

16.2

19.8

16.9

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

22.0

12.1

16.9

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

22.0

9.4

10.9
4.8

0.0
0.0
0.0

Wages
Fringe Benefits
Interest

16.9

Table 12.A3
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Current
Law

5%
VAT

NunnDomenici

Armey
Flat Tax

Wages

0.00

22.27

22.27

0.00

Fringe Benefits

0.00

5.36

5.36

5.36

Interest

0.00

1.71

1.71

1.71

Profit

2.86

2.86

2.86

2.86

Nondeductible Taxes

0.00
0.00

4.77
-10.28

4.77

Benefit o f Expensing

4.77
-10.28

Total Tax Base

2.86

Tax Rate

35%
1.00

26.69
5%

-10.28

0.00

0.00

26.69
11%
2.94
1.57

#1 Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"
2 Tax with Transition

1.00
0.00
0.00

1.33
29.07
9.61

1.37
29.07
9.61

0.75
29.07
0.00

1.00

-0.12

-1.83

-4.19

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

1.00

0.85

0.31

-4.19

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

1.00

-0.60

-2.88

-4.19

Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
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1.33

4.43
17%
0.75
0.00

Table 12.A4
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax
and Consumption Tax Alternatives: CONSTRUCTION
C u rren t
Law

5%
VAT
89.66

Wages
Fringe Benefits
Interest
Profit

0.00
0.00
0.00
6.54

Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing

0.00

17.97
0.68
6.54
2.20

0.00

Total Tax Base

NunnDomenici

A rm ey
Flat T ax

89.66
17.97
0.68
6.54

0.00
17.97
0.68
6.54

2.20

2.20

-2.67

-2.67

-2.67

6.54

114.36

114.36

24.71

Tax Rate
Gross Tax

35%
2.29

5%
5.72

11%
12.58

17%
4.20

Payroll Credit

0.00

0.00

6.30

0.00

#1 Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation

2.29
0.00

5.72
7.55

6.28

4.20

"Exports'*
# 2 Tax with Transition
# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

0.00
2.29
2.29
2.29

41.17
5.34
3.66

7.55
41.17
5.45
1.75
0.92

7.55
0.00
2.92
2.92
2.92

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

3.28

Table 12.A5
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: TRANSPORTATION
C urrent
Law

5%
VAT

NunnDomenici

A rm ey
F lat Tax
0.00

0.00
0.00

95.03
22.35

95.03
22.35

0.00

9.24

9.24

22.35
9.24

7.88

7.88

7.88

7.88

Nondeductible Taxes

0.00

5.07

5.07

5.07

Benefit o f Expensing

0.00

-7.81

-7.81

-7.81

Total Tax Base

7.88

131.76

131.76

36.73

Tax Rate
Gross Tax

35%
2.76

5%
6.59

11%
14.49

6.24

Payroll Credit

0.00

0.00

6.68

0.00

#1 Net T ax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"
# 2 Tax with Transition

2.76
0.00
0.00
2.76

6.59
22.08
47.43
5.48

7.81
22.08
47.43
5.38

6.24
22.08
0.00
2.49

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

2.76

4.22

2.60

2.49

2.76

3.11

0.17

2.49

Wages
Fringe Benefits
Interest
Profit
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17%

Table 12.A6
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: COMMUNICATION
C urrent
Law
Wages

0.00

Fringe Benefits
Interest

0.00
0.00

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

Arm ey
Flat Tax

45.45

45.45

0.00

12.92

12.92
11.31

28.02
0.00

11.31
28.02
7.69

28.02
7.69

12.92
11.31
28.02
7.69

0.00

-12.69

-12.69

-12.69

28.02

92.69

92.69

47.24

35%

5%

11%

17%

9.81

4.63

10.20

8.03

Payroll Credit

0.00

0.00

3.19

0.00

#1 Net T ax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"

9.81
0.00
0.00
9.81

4.63
35.88
33.37

7.00
35.88
33.37

8.03
35.88
0.00

2.84

3.05

1.93

9.81
9.81

2.97
1.17

3.33

1.93
1.93

Profit
Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing
Total Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax

# 2 Tax with Transition
# 3 Tax for "Exporter"
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

-0.62

Table 12.A7
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: UTILITIES
C u rren t
Law

5%
VAT

NunnDomenici

Arm ey
F lat Tax

Wages

0.00

38.52

38.52

0.00

Fringe Benefits
Interest
Profit

0.00
0.00

9.85
21.05
30.93

9.85
21.05
30.93

9.85
21.05

12.92

12.92

30.93
12.92

0.00

-12.57

-12.57

-12.57

30.93

100.71

100.71

35%
10.83

5%
5.04

11%
11.08

62.19
17%

0.00

0.00

2.71

0.00

Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"

10.83
0.00
0.00

5.04
35.54
36.26

8.37
35.54
36.26

10.57
35.54
0.00

# 2 Tax with Transition
# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

10.83

3.26

4.46

10.83

3.22

4.38

4.53
4.53

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

10.83

1.45

0.47

4.53

Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing
Total Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
#1 Net Tax

30.93
0.00
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10.57

Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: WHOLESALE TRADE
Current
Law

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

Armey
Flat Tax

Wages

0.00

199.30

199.30

0.00

Fringe Benefits

0.00

36.89

36.89

36.89

Interest

0.00

6.28

6.28

6.28

38.35

38.35
38.66

38.35

38.35
38.66

Profit
Nondeductible Taxes

0.00
0.00

-9.61

38.66
-9.61

38.35

309.87

309.87

110.57

Tax Rate

35%

5%

11%

17%

Gross Tax

13.42

15.49

34.09

18.80

0.00

0.00

14.01

0.00

13.42

15.49

20.07

18.80

0.00

27.19

27.19

27.19

Benefit o f Expensing
Total Tax Base

Payroll Credit
#1 N et Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation

-9.61

0.00

111.55

111.55

0.00

# 2 Tax with Transition

13.42

14.13

17.08

14.17

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

13.42

9.92

7.80

14.17

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

13.42

8.56

4.81

14.17

"Exports"

Table 12.A9
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: RETAIL TRADE
Current
Law

NunnDomenici

Armey
Flat Tax

245.1

0.0

Fringe Benefits

0.0

245.1
42.6

42.6

42.6

Interest

0.0

10.4

10.4

10.4

35.3

35.3

35.3

35.3

Nondeductible Taxes

0.0

46.6

46.6

46.6

Benefit o f Expensing

0.0

-10.1

-10.1

-10.1

Total Tax Base

35.3

369.9

Tax Rate

35%
12.4

5%
18.5

369.9
11%
40.7

124.8
17%
21.2

0.0

0.0

17.2

0.0

12.4

18.5

23.5

21.2

0.0

28.6

28.6

28.6

"Exports"
# 2 Tax with Transition
# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

0.0
12.4
12.4

133.2
17.1
11.8

133.2
20.3
8.8

0.0
16.3
16.3

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

12.4

10.4

5.7

16.3

Wages

Profit

Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
#1 Net Tax
Maximum Transition Depreciation

0.0

5%
VAT
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Table 12.A10
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: FINANCE
C u rren t
Law
Wages
Fringe Benefits
Interest
Profit
Nondeductible Taxes
Benefit o f Expensing
Total Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
#1 Net T ax

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

Arm ey
Flat Tax

0.0

213.8

213.8

0.0
0.0

38.4
-0.7

38.4
-0.7

0.0
38.4
-0.7

106.9

106.9

106.9

106.9

0.0
0.0

19.2
-11.4

19.2
-11.4

19.2
-11.4

106.9
35%
37.4
0.0

366.2
5%
18.3
0.0

366.2
11%
40.3
15.0

152.3
17%
25.9
0.0

37.4

18.3

25.2

25.9

Maximum Transition Depreciation

0.0

32.3

32.3

32.3

"Exports”
# 2 Tax with Transition

0.0

131.8

131.8

0.0

37.4

16.7

21.7

20.4

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"
# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

37.4
37.4

11.7
10.1

10.7
7.2

20.4
20.4

Table 12.A11
Comparison of the Corporate Income Tax and
Consumption Tax Alternatives: SERVICES
C u rren t
Law

NunnDomenici

5%
VAT

Arm ey
F lat Tax

485.6

485.6

0.0

Fringe Benefits

0.0
0.0

78.6

78.6

78.6

Interest

0.0

11.0

11.0

11.0

Wages

36.6

36.6

36.6

36.6

Nondeductible Taxes

0.0

10.8

10.8

Benefit o f Expensing

0.0

-13.9

10.8
-13.9

Profit

-13.9

Total Tax Base
Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Payroll Credit

36.6

608.7

608.7

35%
12.8
0.0

5%
30.4

11%
67.0
34.1

123.1
17%
20.9
0.0

#1 Net T ax
Maximum Transition Depreciation
"Exports"
# 2 Tax with Transition

12.8
0.0
0.0
12.8

30.4
39.2
219.1
28.5

32.8
39.2
219.1

20.9
39.2
0.0

28.5

14.3

# 3 Tax for "Exporter"

12.8

19.5

8.7

14.3

# 4 Tax for Exporter with Transition

12.8

17.5

4.4

14.3
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Appendix 12B
Additional Notes About Data
The data used in this chapter are unpublished 1993 data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis of the Commerce Department. Value added for each industry was
calculated by subtracting depreciation from gross domestic product. The data were
provided by the Bureau o f Economic Analysis on a diskette labeled, "Gross Product
by Industry, 1947-93," USDOC, BEA, NIWD (BE-51)," Washington DC 20230,
Release Date May 1995.
A.

Aggregate Tax Liability

The adjustments to the Commerce Department data shown in Table 12.3 were
calculated as follows:
(1)

Expensing. The Commerce Department calculates value added by
depreciating capital equipment (the "income method"). Most valueadded taxes calculate the tax base by expensing capital purchases (the
"consumption method").147 In 1993, the Commerce Department data
show that gross private domestic investment ($882.0 billion) exceed
depreciation ($669.1 billion) by 31.8 percent.148 As the first step
toward adjusting Commerce Department value added to a VAT tax
base, depreciation is multiplied by 1.318 and subtracted from
Commerce Department value added.

(2)

Exports and Imports. Total U.S. exports in 1993 were $456.9 billion.
On that year total U.S. imports were $538.0 billion. In the data
analyses of this chapter, exports and imports were allocated across
industries in proportion to their value added, and then between
corporate and noncorporate components o f each industry by the
proportion o f depreciation in the corporate and noncorporate
component o f each industry.

(3)

Indirect business taxes. Indirect business taxes are composed primarily
o f excise taxes and property taxes. Under the Armey and the NunnDomenici plans, excise taxes are deductible but property taxes are not.
In 1993, total state and local excise taxes equaled $212.4 billion and
Federal excise taxes equaled $45.6 billion.
In the aggregate
calculations, this amount is subtracted from the value-added tax base.

147See the Appendix to Chapter 3 for further explanation.
l48U.S. President, Executive Office o f the President, Economic Report o f the President 1995, p. 294.
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Across industries, this amount is allocated in proportion to indirect
business taxes. (In the aggregate, excise taxes were 49 percent o f total
indirect business taxes in 1993.)

B.

(4)

Transition Depreciation. Whether or not transition relief will be
granted is a controversial issue. As an illustration o f the potential
impact o f these provisions, the calculations include a downward
adjustment o f the tax base equal to 90 percent o f depreciation
allowance in 1993. This is meant to be a proxy for the amount of
transition depreciation that would be allowed in the first year after the
effective date. O f course in later years (or if transition relief was not
complete), the amount would be less. In the aggregate, total private
sector depreciation in 1993 was $644 billion, 13.1 percent o f value
added.

(5)

Payroll credit. A critical component o f the Nunn-Domenici proposal
is the payroll credit. The payroll credit is 7.65 percent o f wages paid
to each individual up to $61,200 (in 1995) and 1.45 percent for all
amounts above $61,200. In this analysis it is assumed that 90 percent
o f all wages generate the 7.65 percent tax credit. Thus, the average
effective rate o f credit is 7.03 percent.

Allocations Between Corporate and Noncorporate Businesses

Corporate profits and payments to owners o f noncorporate business were
allocated 100 percent to the corporate and noncorporate sectors respectively. Other
components o f value added—wages, fringe benefits, net interest, rent, and business
taxes—were allocated in proportion to the amount o f corporate and noncorporate
depreciation in each sector. The ratio o f corporate to total depreciation in each
industry is shown in Table 12.6 and is used in Tables 12A. 1 through 12A. 11.
C.

Estimate o f the “Typical” Exporter

The "typical" exporter for each industry is calculated in the following manner.
Based on the observation that large exporters typically export between five and fifteen
percent o f their sales,149it is assumed that a "typical" exporter has exports equal to 10
percent o f sales. Total sales by manufacturers in 1993 was $3,015 billion.150 Total
value added (as measured under a regular VAT tax base) for the manufacturing sector

149Fortune (1987), p.80.
150Economic Report of the President (1995), p. 382.

151

is $840 billion.151 Thus, the ratio of value added to sales is approximately 28 percent
and the ratio of exports to value added is approximately 36 percent. These estimates
are used in Table 12.5 and Tables 12A.1 through 12A.11.

151See Tables 12.9a and Table 12.9b o f this chapter.
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Construction

Services

Transportation

Manufacturing-Durables

Mining

Retail

Wholesale

Manufacturing-Nondurables

Finance

Communications

Utilities

CHART 12.1 PERCENT INCREASE (OR DECREASE) IN TAX LIABILITY UNDER THREE
ALTERNATIVES: NO EXPORTS, NO TRANSITION
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Not Shown: Mining 282% decrease under Nunn-Domenici and 518% decrease under Flat Tax

CHART 12.2 PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN TAX LIABILITY UNDER THREE ALTERNATIVES:
NO EXPORTS, WITH TRANSITION
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CHART 12.3

PERCENT INCREASE IN TAX LIABILITY UNDER THREE ALTERNATIVES:
"TYPICAL EXPORTER", NO TRANSITION

Chapter 13
The Impact of Consumption Taxes
on Individuals and on Noncorporate Businesses

Summary
•
Under current law, the individual tax burden per dollar o f income is largest
fo r upper-income households.
•
Relative to current law, the Nunn-Domenici proposal appears to provide tax
relief to the lowest and highest income classes, and a modest tax increase to middleincome taxpayers.
•
The individual component o f the Flat Tax appears to provide tax relief for
nearly all individual taxpayers. It is likely, therefore, that with a 17-percent rate, the
Flat Tax raises significantly less revenue than the current individual income tax.
•
Under the Flat Tax, the individual tax burden per dollar o f income is largest
fo r middle-income taxpayers. Higher-income households enjoy substantial relief
under the tax because capital income is exempt.
•
Both the Nunn-Domenici proposal and the Flat Tax impose new tax burdens
on noncorporate business. For a "typical” small business, the Nunn-Domenici
proposal imposes a greater business burden than the Flat Tax.
•
For owners o f unincorporated businesses, the combined individual and
business tax burden under the Flat Tax appears to be less than the burden under
current law. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, the combined burden appears to
be greater than current law except in the case o f low-income business owners
(particularly when business income is only a small component o f totalfam ily income).
In contrast, high-income owners o f unincorporated businesses generally appear to
pay a much greater amount o f taxes under the Nunn-Domenici proposal than under
current law.
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The focus o f this study so far has been on business taxes. In this chapter
attention is shifted to individual taxes. Part A compares the individual tax burden
under (1) current law, (2) the Flat Tax, and (3) the Nunn-Domenici tax. Part B
examines the combined individual and business tax burdens o f the owners o f
noncorporate business under these same three alternatives. To acquaint readers with
the details o f each alternative, numerous examples are presented. In all cases, care
has been taken to present examples that are realistic. This is achieved by basing the
calculations on the extensive data collected by the IRS from individual and business
tax returns.
A.

The Impact o f Consumption Taxes on Individuals
1. Background

Before delving into the calculations, it is useful to review some basic facts
about the current individual income tax. In 1993 (the latest year for which
comprehensive data are available), $632 billion o f federal individual income tax
revenue was collected, and more than 115 million individual income tax returns were
filed. As shown in Chart 13.1, which appears at the end o f this chapter, more than
half o f these returns showed adjusted gross income (AGI) o f less than $30,000. These
returns accounted for only about 10 percent o f total individual income tax collected.
In contrast, more than one third o f total individual income tax revenue is collected
from the four percent of tax returns with adjusted gross income in excess o f $100,000.
It is also worth noting that only 29 percent o f all individual tax filings included
itemized deductions.152
2. Preview o f Calculations
The factual basis for the calculations presented in this chapter are the data
collected by the Statistics o f Income (SOI) Division o f the IRS. Because o f the likely
lag in enactment o f any major consumption tax proposal, all data were adjusted to
levels that would prevail in the year 2000 based on currently available Congressional
Budget Office estimates o f inflation. Data for each income class (e.g., those returns
with adjusted gross income between $10,000 and $25,000) were then averaged and

152The 1993 individual income tax return data that serve as the basis o f the comments in this paragraph, as
well as the basis for individual tax return calculations in the following tables are shown in Table 13A.1 in the
Appendix to this chapter.

157

adjusted so AGI classifications were round numbers. The resulting data used in the
calculations are intended to be reasonable approximations o f what tax returns for a
given amount o f AGI might be in the year 2000. It is extremely important to
remember, however, that there can be substantial variance within each income
category. For example, some high-income individuals who are renters will have no
mortgage deductions even though the average mortgage deduction in their income
category may be quite large.
In addition to adjusting the data, computer models were developed for each of
the three alternatives examined. For current law, it was assumed that 1993 law would
prevail in the year 2000. Current law and the two consumption tax alternatives have
numerous adjustments for inflation (e.g., for the standard deductions, exemption
amounts, and tax brackets). All of these adjustments were calculated for levels that
would prevail in the year 2000 given current projections about future inflation.
3. The Results o f the Calculations
a. The Current Individual Income Tax
Table 13.1 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under current law. Personal
exemptions and the standard deduction allow most low-income households to entirely
escape tax. Many low-income households with children receive refunds as a result
o f the earned income tax credit (EITC). As income increases, so do itemized
deductions, and therefore most taxpayers with adjusted gross income in excess of
$50,000 itemize deductions.153 In general, the larger amounts of itemized deductions
are on average not enough to offset the impact o f the progressive rate structure
enacted into law in 1993 (and to a lesser extent, the phase out o f itemized deductions
and personal exemptions enacted into law in 1990). On the whole, tax as a
percentage o f AGI rises as income rises, i.e., the current tax system is progressive.
b. The Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax
Table 13.2 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under the individual tax o f the NunnDomenici proposal. In addition to the earned income credit, the refundable payroll

153As shown in Table 13A.1, the three largest itemized deductions are deductions for state and local taxes,
deductions for mortgage interest, and deductions for charitable contributions.
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tax credit provides substantial tax relief to low-income working households. Under
the Nunn-Domenici proposal, personal exemption amounts are slightly lower than
current law (but they do not phase-out for high-bracket taxpayers as under current
law). On the other hand, the family allowance (which can be considered the
equivalent to the standard deduction under current law) is slightly larger than the
standard deduction available under current law. Moreover, unlike the itemized
deduction, the family allowance is available to all taxpayers (and, therefore, low
income taxpayers will get some benefits from itemized deductions).
Unlike current law, where the top 39.6-percent bracket is not imposed until
taxable income reaches $250,000, the Nunn-Domenici proposal imposes its top 40percent rate on middle-income households. As a general rule, most saving is done by
the wealthiest individuals, and low-income households in general do little or no
saving. The great benefit to high-income households is the deduction for new saving.
But this benefit varies widely because the rate o f saving among high-income
households can vary greatly.
In general, the Nunn-Domenici proposal seems to place tax burdens on middleincome taxpayers that are comparable to current law and provides some relief to lowand high-income taxpayers.
c. The Individual Flat Tax
Table 13.3 presents calculations depicting the tax burden for a couple with two
children and a single individual in the year 2000 under the individual component of
the Flat Tax. Perhaps the most prominent feature of the individual Flat Tax is the size
of the personal allowances. They are far larger than the combined standard deduction
and personal exemptions available under current law or the Nunn-Domenici proposal.
For a family o f four, these allowances are estimated to sum to $35,250 by the year
2000. These large personal allowances permit lower-income taxpayers to escape tax
in far greater numbers than current law. Moreover, unlike current law, taxpayers may
claim refunds for negative tax (i.e., for an amount equal to the tax rate times any
excess o f deductions over adjusted gross income). To some extent, this offsets the
impact o f the repeal o f the earned income tax credit under the proposal.
The Flat Tax has a single low rate that provides a significant advantage to
high-income taxpayers relative to current law and relative to the Nunn-Domenici
proposal. Moreover, because high-income taxpayers receive a far greater fraction o f
their income from capital than low-income taxpayers, high-income taxpayers enjoy
significant tax relief under the Flat Tax despite the complete elimination of itemized
deductions.
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d. Comparison o f the Alternatives
The three alternatives can be compared at a glance with the summary presented
in Chart 13.2, which appears at the end o f this chapter. This graph shows tax as a
percent o f AGI for married couples with two children for different income levels.
With regard to overall amount of tax paid, the most striking feature o f the diagram is
the significantly lower amounts o f individual tax collected under the Flat Tax
compared to current law. It is likely that the Flat Tax's 17-percent rate would have
to be increased substantially to raise as much revenue as the current individual income
tax.
With regard to the distribution of the tax burden, both the current individual
income tax and the individual Nunn-Domenici tax appear to maintain progressivity
through all income levels. Compared to current law, the Nunn-Domenici proposal
provides more relief for the poor—primarily through the refundable payroll credit—
and more relief for the wealthy—primarily through the deduction for savings. The
individual component o f the Flat Tax provides substantial relief to the poor—despite
the repeal of the E IT C --b y allowing refunds when taxable compensation is negative.
The highest income categories actually may have lower effective tax rates than uppermiddle income taxpayers because income from capital is exempt from tax.
B.

The Impact o f Consumption Taxes on Noncorporate Businesses
1. Background

In the prior chapter, business taxes were analyzed by comparing the business
consumption taxes to the corporate income tax. The focus there was purely on entitylevel taxes. In this section, the impacts o f consumption taxes on noncorporate
business are analyzed by comparing current law to the combined impact o f individual
and business-level taxes under the proposed alternatives.
The Statistics o f Income (SOI) Division of the Internal Revenue Service
collects and publishes extensive amounts of data on sole proprietorships and
partnerships.154 The data were carefully inspected to identify some realistic and
representative examples o f noncorporate business.

154The underlying partnership and sole proprietorship data are presented in more detail in the appendix to this
chapter in Tables 13A.2 and 13A.3.
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Chart 13.3 shows that partnership income is heavily concentrated among those
businesses providing highly skilled professional services—such as lawyers (36 percent
o f total partnership income), physicians (9 percent), and accountants (8 percent).
Chart 13.4 shows that partners in these professions on average generate far greater
income from their partnerships than do other partners in other lines o f business. Chart
13.5 shows that partnership and S corporation income is highly concentrated in the
upper-income brackets.155
In contrast to the case o f partnerships, sole proprietorship income is more
evenly spread throughout different types o f business. This is shown in Chart 13.6.
This is because sole proprietorship data are dominated by numerous small businesses
generating relatively low levels o f income. Chart 13.7 shows that as in the case o f
partnerships the highly skilled professionals still generate higher than average returns.
Chart 13.8 indicates that sole proprietorship income is spread much more uniformly
across income classes than partnership income.156
2. Case Studies o f Noncorporate Business
W ith these data as points o f reference, case studies o f four noncorporate
businesses and their owners were constructed and analyzed. The data and the results
o f the calculations are described below.
a. Case 1. M om and Pop Retail Store
Although not important in terms o f income generated, truly small businesses
are quite numerous in the Unites States. In 1992, there were 2.8 million sole
proprietorships in retail and wholesale trade. The average income generated by each
o f these businesses was just under $5,000. In the first case study (Table 13.4), a
family of four has total adjusted gross income o f $21,000 in the year 2000 o f which
$20,000 is from their small business. They have two part-time employees whom they
pay $12,500 each.
Under current law, this family takes the standard deduction. This deduction,
along with four personal exemptions, nearly eliminate their entire income tax liability.
There is no entity-level business tax.

155The data source for this chart is Michael E. Weber, "Individual Income Tax returns, 1993: Early Tax
Estimates," Statistics o f Income Bulletin, Internal Revenue Service, Fall 1994, Washington D.C.
156The data source for this chart is the same as for Chart 13.5. See footnote 3.
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Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, the family benefits relative to current law
because they can deduct their mortgage interest payments and charitable
contributions, and their small addition to saving. This approximately offsets the
personal exemption deductions that are somewhat smaller than current law. The
biggest difference, however, between the Nunn-Domenici Individual Tax and the
current individual income tax is the availability of the refundable payroll credit under
the new system, which provides a substantial benefit to this family. These benefits
on the individual side, however, are more than offset on the business side. While the
business pays no income tax under current law, there is an 11-percent tax on the small
business's value-added (primarily wages to employees and payments to the owner).
Despite the availability o f the payroll credit, this results in a significant new tax
burden on the family business, and a much greater total burden on its proprietors.
Under the Flat Tax, the family has a significant negative tax liability because
o f the large family and dependency deductions allowed. Because negative tax
liability is refundable under the proposal, this results in a large refund to the family.
This large refund offsets the business tax burden and leaves the family with a
somewhat smaller total tax burden than current law. (The business tax burden is
significantly less than under the Nunn-Domenici proposal because salaries and
payments to owners are deductible under the Flat Tax.)
Overall, for this family with a small business, both consumption tax
alternatives provide substantial individual tax relief relative to current law. In the
case o f Nunn-Domenici, this benefit is overwhelmed by a large new business tax
burden. In the case o f the Flat Tax, the new business tax burden is almost entirely
negated by individual tax benefit.
b. Case 2. Two-Earner Couple with One Earner
Owning Small Business
In the second case study (Table 13.5), a family o f four has two breadwinners.
One is an employee with an annual salary o f $33,000, and the second has a small
business clearing $15,000. Thus, unlike the first case study, a much smaller portion
o f family income is business income. The business pays about $11,000 in wages to
its single employee.
As in the first case, with regard to the individual tax, the family does better
than under current law. In the case of the Nunn-Domenici proposal, this is due to the
availability o f the family allowance and personal deductions in addition to itemized
deductions and the deduction for new saving. In the case o f the Flat Tax, this is due
to the generous family and dependency deductions.
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Also, as in the first case, the benefits under the individual consumption tax
alternatives are countered by a higher business tax. In this case, however, business
income and business taxes are not as dominant in the family finances, and under both
plans the family has a reduced tax burden relative to current law.
c. Case 3. Sole Practitioner Physician
In the third case study (Table 13.6), a family o f four has $145,000 o f income
in the year 2000 from two sources. $120,000 is generated by one spouse with a
medical practice, and the remainder is income from investments. Part o f the medical
practice expenses are $22,000 o f salary to its sole employee.
Under current law, the $14,500 o f itemized deductions is used instead o f the
standard deduction. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, tax rates are generally
higher, but the family benefits from the availability of a family allowance and a
deduction for additional saving. The net result is that this family pays virtually the
same individual tax under current law and the Nunn-Domenici proposal. Under the
Flat Tax, despite the denial o f itemized deductions, the family is far better off than
under current law because o f family and dependency deductions and because o f the
lower tax rate imposed.
The Nunn-Domenici business tax provides a large new tax burden for the
medical practice and overall leaves the family with a larger tax burden than under
current law. The business component o f the Flat Tax also provides a new burden, but
it is small relative to that under Nunn-Domenici and insufficient to completely offset
the individual benefits under the Flat Tax.
d. Case 4. Partner at Law Firm
This fourth case (Table 13.7) is in many ways similar to the prior case except
income levels are higher. The family o f four generates $230,000 o f income—most o f
it from one parent's share o f law partnership profits. If the law partnership's salaries
to employees were allocated in proportion to partners' income, this partner's share
would be about $150,000.
Under current law, this family itemizes deductions. Under Nunn-Domenici,
the family gets a family allowance and savings deduction in addition to itemized
deductions, but these benefits do not offset the burdens of higher rates. The family
pays significantly more individual tax than under current law. The family pays less
individual tax under the Flat Tax than under current law, primarily due to the lower
rates available under the new plan.

163

Consideration of business taxes make the Nunn-Domenici proposal even less
attractive. Not only does the Nunn-Domenici individual tax impose a greater burden
than current law, but in addition a substantial new business tax is incurred. The
business tax disallows deductions for employment costs, so salaries and benefits o f
hired labor as well as o f the partners are all taxed. The net result is that under the
Nunn-Domenici proposal the total individual and business tax burden for this family
increases by nearly 80 percent relative to current law. The Flat Tax imposes a much
smaller business tax burden, and (as in the case of the physician's family, above), this
new business burden does not completely offset the benefits enjoyed (relative to
current law) under the individual tax. Thus, for these professionals the burden o f the
Flat Tax is less than that o f current law.
C.

A Note About the Taxation o f Estates, Trusts, and Gifts

Under current law, bequests at death are taxed under a separate federal estate
tax. A federal gift tax is imposed on lifetime transfers. Also, income generated by
trusts and estates are subject to income tax after reflecting a flow-through deduction
for distributions to beneficiaries.
The administration o f estate and gift taxes is separable from the administration
o f consumption taxes. Thus, a new retail sales tax, value-added tax, or individual
consumption tax could be implemented with or without existing estate and gift
taxes.157 The proposed Flat Tax eliminates these transfer taxes while the NunnDomenici tax system retains estate and gift taxes and provides for carryover basis at
death. As a matter o f policy, some might argue that estate and gift taxes are more
important than ever if a consumption tax replaces the income tax because estate and
gift taxes are highly progressive taxes that would be necessary to offset the
regressivity o f consumption taxes. On the other hand, others argue that estate and gift
taxes—like income taxes—penalize the accumulation o f saving and wealth that is
necessary for capital formation. Thus, Rep. Archer has suggested that estate and gift
taxes be eliminated under a National Sales tax, but has not done so by proposed
legislation to-date.
With regard to the income from trusts and estates, it seems likely that under
any retail sales tax or value-added tax (which are only collected from businesses)
their gross receipts would be exempt from tax unless these receipts were business
receipts (i.e., these receipts were generated by business transactions where the
business's legal entity is the trust itself and did not flow through a taxable business

157Bequests and inheritance could be brought into the system through accessions.
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entity). However, it does seem that trusts could be considered taxable businesses if
they engage in an active trade or business. Under the Flat Tax, individuals do not pay
tax on gifts, inheritances, or income from trusts.
Without specific legislative markup language or commentary, it is assumed that
the current system for taxing fiduciaries and beneficiaries would continue under a flat
tax. However since most receipts and disbursements, especially distributions to
beneficiaries, reflect investment activities (dividends interest, gains and losses on
sales o f investment assets, passive income and loss from partnerhips/S corporation
and similar investment entities like REITs, RICs, etc.) most fiduciary activities would
not be subject to a flat tax at either the fiduciary or beneficiary level.
U nder the Nunn-Domenici proposal, an entirely new set o f rules have been
developed to govern the tax treatment o f distributions to beneficiaries. In general,
under these rules, the trust is treated as a flow through entity. Principles similar to
those governing the operation o f the unlimited saving allowance seem to be in
operation, i.e., assets in trust on the date of enactment have basis, but distribution of
the entire proceeds o f post-enactment trust assets, which have no basis, may be
subject to tax upon distribution.
How this concept will interrelate with state law and governing instruments that
utilize fiduciary accounting income concepts is very problematic.
D.

Conclusion

The data presented in this chapter show that consumption tax alternatives will
substantially redistribute the tax burden. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal,
individual taxes will be less for low-income households primarily because o f a
deductible payroll tax credit. High-income households will pay less primarily
because o f the deduction for new saving.
Under the Flat Tax, all individual taxpayers appear to pay less. This is
particularly true for low-income households that could receive refunds for negative
tax liability—which would be commonplace under the proposal because o f the
generous family deduction and dependency deductions. It would also be particularly
true for high-income households that no longer face a progressive rate structure and
only pay tax on wage income.
Under current law, noncorporate businesses pay no entity level income tax as
they would under both consumption tax alternatives. For noncorporate businesses,
the business taxes proposed under both Nunn-Domenici and the Flat Tax would pose
substantial new tax burdens. The Nunn-Domenici tax is particularly harsh for
"typical" noncorporate businesses because these business are labor-intensive and
wages are not deductible under the tax (as they are under the Flat Tax).
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Itemized Deductions

$25,000

0.4%

$100

$0

$0

$0

$0

$840

$5,600

$11,800

$0

$7,600

$25,000

Personal Exemptions

$4,550

Standard Deduction

Adjusted Gross Income __________________ $10,000

B. SINGLE

T a x a s % o f AGI

($2,080)

$0

Tax at 36%

Total Tax (Less EITC)

$0
$0

Tax at 28%

Taxat31%

$0

$0

Itemized Deductions

Tax at 15%

$7,600

Standard Deduction

Adjusted Gross Income __________________ $10,000

A. FAMILY OF FOUR

Table 13.1
Individual Income Tax Burden for Various Income Classes
Under Current Law
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($9,145)

($2,783)
-27.8%

$18,711

$32,265

$27,768

$4,009

$488

$96,620

$150,304

$145,807

$4,009

$488

$391,719

$43,031

$10,200

$8,400

$600,000

$1,554

$2,305

$3,217

$10,265

$4,838

$18,175

$15,473

$2,411

$290

$55,001

$6,148

$25,689

$22,988

$2,411

$290

$73,787

$2,550
$10,011

$5,000

$100,000

$12,564
12.6%

$6,512

$39,243

$36,541

$2,411

$290

$107,671

$2,550
$14,347

$5,000

$150,000

$25,754
17.2%

$9,166

$157,282

$154,580

$2,411

$290

$402,769

$2,550
$43,031

$5,000

$600,000

$141,138
23.5%

-5.9%

T ax a s % o f AGI

3.0%

$751

14.1%

$7,048

17.8%

$13,337

19.5%

$19,541

21.8%

$32,731

24.7%

$148,116

158Taxable income equals adjusted gross income less personal exemptions, itemized deductions, and the deduction for net new saving (not shown on table).

($590)

Net Tax

$0__________ $0_________ $0_________ $0_________ $0_________ $0________ $0

$743

Less Payroll Credit

Less EITC

$152

Total Tax

$7,563

$0__________ $0

Tax at 40%

$290
$2,411

$290
$2,015

$0

$152

$35,226

Tax at 19%

Tax at 8%

$14,231

$1,906

Taxable Income

$5,000

$2,550
$2,550
$2,550
$2,550
$408______ $1,006_____ $3,466______ $6,889

$5,000

$75,000

$6 359
8.5%

Personal Exemptions
Itemized Deductions

$5,000

$50,000

$705
1.4%

$5,000

$25,000

($2,040)
-8.2%

Family Allowance

Adjusted Gross Income __________________ $10,000

B. SINGLE

Net Tax
Tax a s % o f AGI

$11,197

$14,214

$4,009

$488

$62,736

$14,347

$10,200

$8,400

$150,000

$743
$1,554
$3,217
$4,838
$6,148
$6,512
$9,166
$2,040_______ $740_________ $0_________ $0_________ $0_________ $0________ $0

$3,922

$0

Total Tax

$254

$4,009
$6,700

$3,434

$0

$0

$488

$43,951

$0__________$0_________ $0

$488

$24,175

Tax at 40%

$254

$3,181

Tax at 19%

$0

Less Payroll Credit
Less EITC

$8,400

$100,000

$10,011

$8,400

$75,000

$408______ $1,006_____ $3,466______ $6,889

$10,200

$8,400

$50,000

$10,200

$10,200

$8,400

$25,000

$10,200

$8,400
$10,200

Tax at 8%

Taxable Income

Itemized Deductions

Personal Exemptions

Family Allowance

Adjusted Gross Income __________________ $10,000

A. FAMILY OF FOUR

Table 13.2
Individual Tax Burden for Various Income Classes
_______ Under the Nunn-Domenici Plan158_______
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159Taxable compensation equals wages less the personal allowance and the dependents allowance.

Table 13.3
Individual Income Tax Burden for Various Income Classes
Under the Flat Tax159

Table 13.4
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law,
Nunn-Domenici, and the Flat Tax — Case 1: Mom and Pop Retail Store160
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LAW
Income from Noncorporate Business

Total Gross Income
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance

$20,000

$20,000

$0

$0

$0

$1,000

$1,000

$0

$21,000
$7,600

$21,000

$20,000
$24,250

$8,400

$11,800

$10,200

$11,300

$0
$0
$0

$200
$800
$500

$0
$0
$0

$1,600

$900

($15,550)

$240

$72

($2,643)

$0

$1,530

Charitable Deduction
Mortgage Deduction
Deduction for Net Saving
Tax Base
Tax

2

4

4

Personal/Dependency Deduction-Number
Personal/Dependency Deduction-- A m ount

TAX

$20,000

Other Wage Income
Other Capital Income

FLAT

NUNNDOMENICI

Payroll Credit
Net Tax

$240

($1,458)

$0
($2,643)

BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT

NUNN-

LAW

DOMENICI

FLAT
TAX

Wages to Employees

$25,000

$0

Fringe Benefits
Interest
Income to Owner

$9,000
$4,750
$20,000

$9,000
$4,750
$0

Tax Base

$58,750

$13,750

11%

17%

Gross Tax

$6,463

$2,338

Payroll Credit

$1,750

$0

$4,713

$2,338

Tax Rate

- none-

Net Tax
TO TA L INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX

$240

$3,255

160The cash flow to the individual owner will be affected where money from the business is not available to pass
through.
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($306)

Table 13.5
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under
Current Law, Nunn-Domenici, and the Flat Tax —
Case 2: Two Earner Couple, One Owning a Small Business
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT
LAW

NUNN-

FLAT

DOMENICI

TAX

Income from Noncorporate Business

$15,000

$15,000

$15,000

Other Wage Income
Other Capital Income

$33,000
$2,000

$33,000
$ 2 ,000

$33,000
$0

Total Gross Income
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance

$50,000
$7,600

$50,000
$8,400

$48,000
$24,250

4

Personal/Dependency Deduction—Number

2

4

$11,800

$10,200

$11,300

Charitable Deduction

$0

$700

$0

Mortgage Deduction
Deduction for Net Saving

$0

$2,700

$0

$0

$ 3 ,000

$0

$30,600
$4,590

$25,000
$4,079

$12,450
$2,117

$0

$3,672

$0

$4,590

$407

$2,117

Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount

Tax Base
Tax
Payroll Credit
Net Tax
BUSINESS TAX

CURRENT

NUNN-

FLAT

LAW

DOMENICI

TAX

Income to Owner

$15,000

$0
$5,190
$548
$0

Tax Base

$31,688

$5,738

$10,950

Wages to Employees

$5,190
$548

Fringe Benefits
Interest

Tax Rate
Gross Tax
Payroll Credit
Net Tax

—n o n e $4,590

TO TA L INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX
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11%

17%

$3,486

$975

$1,530

$0

$1,956

$975

$2,3 6 3

$3,092

Table 13.6
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law,
Nunn-D omenici, and the Flat Tax —Case 3: Sole Practitioner Physician
IN D IV ID U A L TA X

Income from Noncorporate Business
Other Wage Income
Other Capital Income
Total Gross Income
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance

CURRENT

NUNN-

FLAT

LAW *

DOMENICI

TAX

$120,000

$120,000

$120,000

$0

$0

$30,000

$30,000

$0
$0

$150,000
$0

$150,000
$8,400

$120,000
$24,250
2

4

4

Personal/Dependency Deduction-Number

$11,800

$10,200

$11,300

Charitable Deduction

$3,500

$3,500

$0

Mortgage Deduction

$11,000

$11,000

$0

$0

$20,000

$0

$112,961
$25,803

$96,900

$84,450

$32,377

$14,357

$0

$6,703

$0

$25,803

$25,674

$14,357

Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount

Deduction for Net Saving
Tax Base
Tax
Payroll Credit
Net Tax
BUSINESS TA X
CURRENT

NUNN-

FLAT

LAW

DOMENICI

TAX

Wages to Employees
Fringe Benefits

$21,600

$0

$28,320

$28,320

$432

Interest
Income to Owner

$120,000

$432
$0

Tax Base

$170,352

$28,752

11%

Tax Rate

17%
$4,888

Gross Tax

$18,739

Payroll Credit
Net Tax

$8,215
$10,524

$4,888

$36,198

$19,244

— none-

TOTAL INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX

$25,803

$0

*N o t shown are an $11,000 deduction fo r state and local income taxes and property taxes, and a $261
deduction disallowance fo r high income taxpayers.
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Table 13.7
Tax Burden for Owners of Unincorporated Businesses Under Current Law, NunnDomenici, and the Flat Tax —Case 4: Law Partner
INDIVIDUAL TAX
CURRENT

NUNNDOMENICI

LAW *
Income from Noncorporate Business

Total Gross Income
Standard Deduction/Family Allowance
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Number
Personal/Dependency Deduction—Amount
Charitable Deduction

$180,000

$180,000

$0

$0

$50,000

$0
$50,000

$230,000

$230,000

$180,000

Tax Base
Tax
Payroll Credit
Net Tax

$0
$24,250

$5,000

$8,400
4
$10,200
$5,000

$14,000
$0

$14,000
$30,000

$188,618

$162,400

$42,756

$58,577

$144,450
$24,557

$0

$7,573

$0

$42,756

$51,004

$24,557

$0
4
$11,800

Mortgage Deduction
Deduction for Net Saving

TAX

$180,000

Other Wage Income
Other Capital Income

FLAT

2
$11,300
$0
$0
$0

BUSINESS TAX
CURRENT
LAW
Wages to Employees
Fringe Benefits

NUNNDOMENICI

FLAT
TAX

$153,000

$0

$66,600

$66,600

Interest
Income to Owner

$1,530

$1,530

$180,000

$0

Tax Base

$401,130

$68,130

Tax Rate

11%

17%

Gross Tax

$44,124

$11,582

Payroll Credit
Net Tax

$18,283

$0

$25,841

$11,582

$76,845

$36,139

—n o n e $42,756

TO TA L INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS TAX

*Not shown are a $16,000 deduction for state and local income taxes and property taxes, a $2,757
reduction in personal exemptions for high income taxpayers, and a $2,661 reduction in itemized deductions
for high income taxpayers.
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245154

2880338
192215
28367
33482
32896
175377
27832
203920

Tax'ble Pen & Annuities

Un. Compensation

Itemizers- Returns

Taxes-Paid Returns

Taxes-Amount

Interest-Returns

Interest—Amount

10173

15301
15674

Earned Income Credit-Returns

Earned Income Credit-Amount

3279

5128

5591

4230

19452

3759

11517

4920

5078

9009

50468

496844

622374

28660

15<AGI<30

0

0

12313

8508

45106

8036

28946

9390

9499

6414

46661

690222

828312

21204

30<AGI<50

0

0

14901

8501

53169

8051

39861

9013

9065

3090

34075

621808

741080

12273

50<AGI<75

0

0

8394

3661

28170

3393

23829

3797

3815

767

14200

297636

365231

4278

0

0

9841

2812

29118

2529

29258

2911

2924

389

12780

289601

407329

3108

75<AGI<100 100<AGI<200

Source: Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue Service, Fall 1994, Washington, D.C.

12396

1428

68305

Contributions—Amount

1338

29973

Contributions-Returns

9247

1267

5649

1911

2144

8648

28590

261340

44527

3720662

115061

<15

Adjsuted Gross Income
Sal and Wages

# of Returns

All Individual
Returns

...................................A D J U S T E D G R O S S I N C O M E ........................

(All data are in thousands)

Table 13A.1
Individual Tax Return Data, 1993

15837

923

19659

796

36118

952

956

49

5441

239073

494946

1011

AGI>200

174

|Total

47173
17622
106675
282842
514827

9.3
7.4
10.6

1485

18755
31627
10132

22.3
11.1
4.3
5.6
4.4

135
658
9
24
11
209
440

Receipts

Avg. # o f
Partners

76588

3519
1985
2316
13577
6370
24282
24539

Payroll

9945

1126
510
580
1666
1207
1951
2906

Guaranteed
Partner
Payments

25091

6478
3674
60
292
155
7039
7393

Interest

38274

5263
-5585
4446
17991
4194
4236
7729

Net
Income

Source: Timothy D. Wheeler, "Partnership Returns, 1992," Statistics o f Income Bulletin, Internal
Revenue Service, Fall 1994, Washington D.C.

(Finance
|Real Estate
Physicians
|Law
(Accounting
|Other Services
Other Nonservice Businesses

Partner
ships

(All data except ratios and averages are in thousands)

Table 13A.2
Partnership Tax Return Data, 1992

2.26

$2,432

$1 16,390
$134,028
$86,358
$2,177
$2,361

0.88
-0.4 5
0.65,
0.85
1.81
6.19
3.55

Ratio o f
Employee
Payroll to
Income
$1,749
($766)

Avg.
Partner
Income

175
15495

(Total
$737,082

$66,928
$247,261
$15,939
$17,293
$47,3 39
$29,815
$19,524
$23,576
$7,158
$16,979
$115,536
$129,736

Receipts

$10,406

$653
$2,557
$251
$303
$504
$219
$334
$246
$121
$114
$2,254
$2,851

Interest

$71,155

$9,706
$17,452
$1,271
$372
$3,815
$3,063
$3,786
$2,824
$849
$574
$12,254
$15,188

Payroll

$153,960

$13,299
$13,937
$7,086
$7,097
$14,441
$16,759
$7,074
$11,184
$2,953
$9,418
$31,316
$19,39 7

Income

$9,936

$8,457
$4,915
$19,654
$10,565
$7,315
$87,039
$73,112
$39,808
$9,612
$15,203
$7,543
$7.975

Avg.
Income

0.46

0.73
1.25
0.18
0.05
0.26
0.18
0.54
0.25
0.29
0.06
0.39
0.78

Ratio of Employee
Payroll Income

Source: Michael Strudler and Marty Shiley, "Sole Proprietorship Returns, 1992,” Statistics of Income Bulletin, Internal
Revenue Service, Fall 1994, Washington D.C.

1573
2835
361
672
1974
193
97
281
307
619
4152
2432

Skilled Construction
Wholesale & Retail Trade
Insurance Agents
Real Estate Agents
Business Services
Physicians
Dentists
Lawyers
Accountants
Consultants
Other Services
Other Nonservice

Returns

(All data except ratios and averages are in thousands)

Table 13A.3
Sole Proprietorship Tax Return Data, 1992
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CHART 13.1 PERCENTAGE OF INCOME AND TAX RETURNS IN DIFFERENT INCOME
CLASSES, 1993
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CHART 13.2 COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL TAXES-FAMILY OF FOUR
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CHART 13.4 AVERAGE PARTNERSHIP INCOME ACROSS TYPES OF BUSINESS, 1992
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CHART 13.5 DISTRIBUTION OF PARTNERSHIP AND S CORPORATION INCOME ACROSS
INCOME CLASSES, 1992
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CHART 13.7 AVERAGE INCOME OF SOLE PROPRIETOR BY TYPE OF BUSINESS, 1992
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CHART 13.8 DISTRIBUTION OF SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP INCOME ACROSS INCOME
CLASSES, 1992

Chapter 14
Treatment of Housing and Other Consumer Durables
Under a Consumption Tax

Summary
•
In theory, the rental value o f homes should be subject to a consumption
tax, but formidable administrative and compliance problems block this approach.
A s an alternative to taxing rents, tax may be "prepaid" by taxing the purchase
price o f homes.
•
In most other countries with consumption taxes, new housing is taxed and
existing housing is exempt.
•
Under an individual consumption tax, housing receives preferential
treatment i f both mortgage interest is deductible and additions to mortgage debt
are not included in gross income.
A.

Introduction

The taxation of consumer durables under a consumption tax poses substantial
theoretical, administrative, and political problems. Appliances, furniture, tools,
computing equipment, and automobiles—when used for personal consum ption--are
all examples of consumer durables. Of course, the most important consumer durable
is housing. This chapter will focus on this "special case" o f housing, but most o f the
analysis applies to consumer durables in general.
There are basically two ways of taxing housing under a consumption tax. One
is to tax annual rental value. The other is to tax the purchase price. Economists
consider taxing annual rental values is the more theoretically pure approach. In
practice, however, taxing the purchase price of housing is more common.
There is the threshold issue o f whether housing should be taxed at all. In
particular, tax relief for housing is often under consideration because such relief can
help alleviate some of the inherent regressivity of a consumption tax. Moreover, the
deduction for mortgage interest is the most cherished o f middle-class tax preferences,
and there is no particular reason to expect the switch from an income tax to a
consumption tax will obviate the political need to maintain housing prices and the
happiness of homeowners.
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It is likely that housing will receive preferential treatment under any
consumption tax that has a realistic chance of being enacted. The relief can take a
variety o f forms, and it is likely that any relief granted will be uneven. As under the
income tax, the tax benefits for housing can depend on whether housing is debt- or
equity-financed and on whether housing is owner-occupied or for rent. In addition,
as with changes under an income tax, there is likely to be differential treatment for
housing built before and after the date a consumption tax becomes effective.
B.

Taxing Rent

By definition, a consumer durable provides services to consumers for more
than one year. Economists assert that the correct theoretical treatment of housing and
other consumer durables is straightforward: tax the consumption provided by these
durables as measured by their annual rental values.161 For rental housing, owners can
be taxed directly on the market rents charged to residents. For owner-occupied
housing, however, rental value must be imputed and then taxed. This poses major
valuation problems. The necessary imputations would present issues at least as
difficult as those surrounding the valuation o f property for local property taxation.
Valuation disputes would be particularly contentious when one considers the high
rates o f tax (e.g., 25 percent) being contemplated for a national consumption tax. In
addition, most homeowners would be unfamiliar with and hostile to the notion that
their homes generate "services" that should be taxed.
Even if valuation were not an issue, other administrative concerns make
taxation o f rent unattractive. Under a value-added or retail sales tax, almost all
revenues would be collected from businesses. Taxation of rents would necessitate the
collection o f tax from tens o f millions of households that would otherwise be exempt
from business tax. Compliance would appear to be a major problem not only for
owners who occupy their own homes but also for the numerous landlords who rent
only one or two dwellings.
If small residential property owners remain untaxed, it would be difficult
politically to only tax rents collected by large landlords (even though major
compliance or valuation issues would likely be more manageable). Singling out
rentals o f multi-family residential housing units would be perceived as unfair because
o f the high proportion of low-income families in this type o f housing.

161Consumption services should not be confused with depreciation, which is sometimes referred to as
"capital consumption." In an otherwise outstanding volume, the study by Tait (1988) seems to make this
mistake. In economic theory, rental value equals depreciation plus the carrying cost of capital. Tait makes the
claim that land should not be taxed because it is not consumed. This conclusion can be challenged because
land certainly does provide consumption services (as is evident by rental changes), even if it does not
depreciate.
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It seems reasonable to conclude that the taxation o f rents will not be the
primary mechanism for the treatment of housing under any realistic consumption tax.
The issues are summarized in the Table 14.1.

Table 14.1
Summary of the Problems with Taxing Rents
Imputation
Problem?

High
Administrative
Cost/ Low
Compliance?

Political
Problems?

Owner-Occupiers

YES

YES

YES

Small Landlords

NO

YES

YES

Large Landlords

NO

NO

YES

Type of Owner

C.

Taxing the Purchase Price

The alternative treatment of housing under a consumption tax is to include the
purchase price in the tax base. In fact, under certain circumstances the taxation o f
rent and the taxation of purchase price are economically equivalent. It is a basic tenet
of economics and appraisal that the purchase price of a home equals the present value
o f expected future rents. (This is illustrated in Table 14.2.) Thus, if tax rates are
equal over time, taxation o f the purchase price o f a home is equivalent to taxing all
the future rents.162 For this reason, tax imposed on the purchase price o f a home is
sometimes referred to as a ’’prepayment'’ o f tax.

Table 14.2
Example Showing Home Value is
Equivalent to the Present Value of Future Rents
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
(1) Value at Beginning o f Year

100.0

75.0

50.0

25.0

35.0

30.0
25.0

27.5
25.0

(2) Rent
(3) Depreciation

25.0

32.5
25.0

(4) N et Rental Income [(2) minus (3)]

10.0

7.5

5.0

2.5

(5) Value at End o f Year [(1) minus (3)]

75.0

50.0

25.0

0.0

100.0

Present Value o f Rents

Notes: Rate of return is 10 percent. Depreciation is straight-line. Rent equals owners income plus
depreciation.

162There are some additional technical issues about this equivalence that are not appropriate for this discussion.
The interested reader can consult Graetz (1979) for further details.
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While removing the need to impute rental values of owner occupied housing,
the prepayment approach opens up a Pandora's box o f new issues. For example,
imposing tax all in one year can create cash flow problems for home buyers (who are
often cash constrained even without a new tax). The major difficulty arises with
regard to the taxation o f existing housing. Equitable treatment o f existing and new
homes would necessitate that owners of existing houses be taxed on the value o f their
homes at the time o f enactment. Existing homes, however, cannot be taxed under this
method without severe administrative and political problems.
D.

Exemption fo r Existing Housing

Neither the rental-value nor purchase-price approaches provide good ways o f
taxing existing housing.163 For this reason, most industrialized countries with
consumption taxes do not tax existing homes, and it is unlikely the United States
would break new ground in this area. These countries only impose tax on new
homes—and improvements to existing homes— and leave existing housing exempt
from tax. Under this approach, all rental payments are exempt from tax.
Economists contend that exemption of existing housing would provide a
windfall to existing owners: prices o f existing houses would rise along with the new
housing subject to tax. Moreover, this favoritism does nothing to spur new housing
starts. These concerns have hardly deterred most other countries that have
implemented this system. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the taxation of
new housing.
E.

Taxation o f Newly Constructed Owner-Occupied Housing
1. Newly Constructed Owner-Occupied Housing

When a builder sells a newly constructed home to a final consumer, the
proceeds o f that sale should be included in the builder's taxable receipts. Under a
retail sales tax or a VAT, exclusion (or zero-rating) o f these proceeds would exempt
this housing from tax. Under any real-world consumption tax, the homeowner is
"outside o f the system."164 Thus, it is the treatment o f the seller, not the purchaser,

163One method of taxing existing housing would be to tax the market value of existing homes on the date
of enactment o f a consumption tax. As shall be shown in the next section, the market value of any home
should be equal to the present discounted value of future rentals. The other method would be to tax existing
housing on the first sale after the date of enactment. This would result in a lock-in effect as homeowners could
avoid tax as long as they did not sell. See, Conrad (1990).
164Thus, the purchaser effectively does not deduct his investment in housing nor does he include his rental
returns in gross receipts. Equivalently, the purchaser could be allowed to deduct his investment and include
his rents--a much more complex regime.
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which generally determines whether or not owner-occupied housing receives
preferential treatment. Most countries with a consumption tax require full inclusion
o f sales by builders. One notable exception is the United Kingdom, which allows
zero-rating on the sales o f new residential houses.
2. Newly Constructed Rental Housing
The taxation o f new rental housing is a bit more complex. One possibility
would be to treat owners o f rental housing like any other business: purchases o f
building (like other capital purchases) would be fully deductible and rents collected
from the lessee would be included in taxable receipts. The problem with this
approach, as noted above, is that taxation o f small landlords would impose large
compliance and administrative costs.
This has prompted most industrialized countries to entirely exempt owners o f
residential rental real estate from tax. In the case o f a retail sales tax, builders selling
homes are considered retailers (instead of building owners collecting rent). And in the
case o f a VAT, the last link in the chain subject to tax are sales to owners o f housing,
not the provision o f housing to renters. This creates the problem o f excluding from
tax any value added by owners (e.g., services—such as m aintenance-provided by
owners' employees).
F.

Mortgage Interest

Under a VAT or a retail sales tax, deductibility o f mortgage interest is not at
issue for individual taxpayers because only businesses pay taxes. Under general rules
of interest payments under a VAT, businesses that own residential real estate are not
allowed deductions (or credits, in the case of a credit invoice VAT) for interest costs.
Under an individual consumption tax system, the situation is more complex.
In order to understand the implications o f mortgage deductibility it is necessary to
review the general treatment o f indebtedness under the tax. Under an individual
consumption tax, net additions to saving are deductible. Under a standard individual
consumption tax, ( 1a) increases in indebtedness are included in the tax base (because
they present opportunities for increased consumption) and ( 1b) payment o f interest
and principal are deductible (because this is income that is not consumed).
Equivalent treatment o f debt can be achieved by (2a) not including increases in
indebtedness in the tax base and (2b) not allowing deductions o f interest and
principal.165

165As shown in the following example (that assumes a 10 percent rate of interest), the value o f a loan on its
beginning date equals the present discounted value of future interest and principal payments. Therefore, the
inclusion in taxable income of either the loan amount at the beginning of the loan or interest and principal are over
the life o f the loan economically equivalent.

188

Table 14.3
Treatment of Consumer Debt
Under a Personal Consumption Tax
New Indebtedness

Payments o f Interest and
Principal

Standard Approach

( 1a) Include

( 1b) Deduct

Equivalent Approach

(2a) Exclude

(2b) Do Not Deduct

Therefore, whether or not mortgage-financed housing is favorably treated under a
personal consumption tax does not hinge entirely on whether mortgage interest is
deductible,166 but depends as well on the treatment o f new debt and retirement of
existing debt. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, mortgage financed housing is
favored because new debt is not included in income and mortgage interest (but not
principal) is deductible.
G.

Existing Housing and Used Goods

Under a consumption tax, if the entire purchase price is taxed, the present
value o f all future rentals is taxed. This holds true even if the consumer durable is
sold. Therefore, if tax has been paid on the purchase price o f a new consumer
durable, sales o f used goods that had been subject to tax when new should not be
subject to tax on resale. Therefore, housing built after the effective date o f a
consumption tax and then resold should not be subject to tax. This should not create
major administrative problems. For other consumer durables, the recordkeeping and

Year 1
Principal at Beginning o f Year

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

100

75

50

25

Principal Payment

25

25

25

25

Interest Payment

10

7.5

5

2.5

Principal at End o f Year

75

50

25

0

Present Value o f Interest and Principal Payments
100

166In fact, if mortgage is deductible and principal is not, and mortgage indebtedness is included in income,
mortgage-financed debt would be a penalized form of investment.
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other compliance costs might be large in comparison to the amount o f tax collected.
Dealers in used goods would be required to keep records o f which used goods are
subject to tax.167
H.

Conclusion

It seems that if housing is not entirely exempt from a retail sales tax or a VAT,
only new housing would be subject to tax. For housing to receive preferential
treatment under the individual consumption tax, it is not sufficient for mortgage
interest to be exempt from tax; mortgage debt must be exempted from the general rule
that new indebtedness be included in income.

167It should be noted that a used good, originally purchased before the effective date and then sold after the
effective date and subject to tax, should not be taxed if it is resold again. Thus, if a consumption tax came into
effect, for example, in 1999, it would not be sufficient to merely know the vintage of an automobile (e.g.,
1996) to determine if that vehicle should be taxed on resale.
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Chapter 15
Taxation of Financial Institutions
Under a Consumption Tax

Summary
•
Because it is difficult to identify and value services provided by financial
institutions, no country with a consumption tax has been able to tax financial
services in a manner consistent with consumption tax principles.
•
Exemption o f financial institutions from consumption tax generally results
in overtaxation o f financial services provided to businesses and undertaxation o f
services provided to consumers.
Countries with consumption taxes have experienced significant difficulties in
finding an acceptable method o f taxing banks, insurance companies, and other
financial service companies. These difficulties have caused most countries to simply
leave financial services untaxed. This hands-off policy has, however, led to other
problems. The first part o f this section describes the problem o f taxing financial
intermediaries. The second part describes the problems that result when financial
services are untaxed. The third part discusses possible methods o f imposing tax on
financial services.
A.

Problems Under the Credit-Invoice M ethod VAT

There are three major difficulties under the credit-invoice method VAT with
respect to taxation o f financial intermediaries. The first is identifying the correct
amount o f tax for each financial intermediary. The second is identifying the correct
amount o f tax credit for each o f the intermediaries’ business customers. Because it
is likely that special rules should apply to financial intermediaries, the third difficulty
is determining a workable definition o f a financial intermediary to which the special
rules would apply. (This chapter initially focuses on issues related to banking.
Consumption tax issues relating to insurance companies are discussed below in
section D.)
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In general, under a value-added tax, interest income is not included in the tax
base and interest expense is not deductible. This makes sense in the case o f most
businesses (e.g., a manufacturer) because interest income does not emanate from any
value generated by the business (i.e., it is just income flowing through the business)
while interest expense is a payment to providers of capital used to generate value.
This general rule, however, makes little or no sense in the case o f a traditional
financial intermediary, as shown in the following simple example:

Table 15.1
The Problem with Measuring the Value Added of a Financial
Institution Under Conventional Methods
(Total Bank Assets = $100 Loans
Total Bank Liabilities = $90 Deposits plus $10 Equity )
Income Statement:
$8.00
($5.40)

Interest Income @ 8%
Interest Expense @ 6%

$2.60
($0.80)
($0.20)

Gross Profit
Salaries
Materials

$1.60

Net Profit
Subtraction Method:
Business Receipts
Business Purchases

$0.00
($0.20)

Value added

($0.20)

Naive application o f standard VAT methods in this case leaves the bank with a tax
base o f negative $0.20. As shall be shown later (in Table 14.6), the bank in this
example actually has value added of $1.60. The gross inaccuracy of standard VAT
rules has lead most countries with value-added taxes to remove financial institutions
from the VAT system, but this leads to other problems as discussed below.
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B.

Problems with Placing Financial Institutions Outside the VAT System

The main problem of removing financial institutions from the VAT system is
that this special treatment will usually result in economic distortions. Some bank
customers will be favored and others penalized, and certain types o f financial
institutions may be given a competitive advantage. Moreover, the nature o f the
distortion will depend on the type of VAT (credit-invoice or subtraction), the method
o f relief (zero-rating or exemption), and the type o f bank customer (business or
consumer).
In the case o f the credit-invoice VAT, the problems o f exemption and zero
rating for financial institutions are largely the same as those discussed for taxpayers
generally in Chapter 3. Under the credit-invoice method, exemption does provide
some relief in the case o f financial services provided to consumers, but at the same
time can result in overtaxation of (or cascading o f tax on) services provided to
business customers. Zero-rating solves the overtaxation problem o f business
customers under the credit-invoice VAT, but it exacerbates the distortions on
consumer financial services by entirely eliminating tax.
Under the subtraction method, business customers are unable to deduct implicit
fees for financial services because these fees cannot be identified. This offsets any
benefit to the bank from exemption, so the net result is that business services with
implicit charges are fully taxed.168 (Financial services for explicit charges still enjoy
the benefit o f exemption.) In the case o f financial services provided to consumers,
exemption eliminates the tax associated with bank value added. The discussion in
this paragraph is summarized in Table 15.2.

168Note that this differs from the effect discussed in Chapter 4 of exemption of a business providing services to
other business. In the case o f exemption of a nonfinancial firm providing services to other businesses, that firm’s
value added is excluded from the tax base and its customer is able to deduct the cost of those services.
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Table 15.2
Summary of Problems with Relief for Financial Institutions
Business Custom er

Consum er Custom er

Overtaxation o f Financial
Services Due to
Cascading (No credits
for business customers)
Full Taxation (Bank's
undertaxation offset by
customer's overtaxation)

Undertaxation o f
Financial Services
Because Bank's Value
Added Not Taxed
Undertaxation o f
Financial Services
Because Total Value
Added Not Taxed

Full Taxation (Bank's
undertaxation offset by
customer's overtaxation)

Undertaxation of
Financial Services
Because Bank's Value
Added Not Taxed

Credit-Invoice M ethod:
Exemption

Zero-Rating

Subtraction M ethod:
Exemption

C.

Methods o f Including Financial Institutions in a VAT System

M ost countries have abandoned attempts to include financial institutions in
their VAT systems. There are, however, many aspects o f the new consumption taxes
currently under consideration in the United States that differ from the experience of
other countries. It is likely that any serious attempt to enact a consumption tax will
include efforts to put financial intermediaries on a level playing field with other
businesses. It is possible in theory to calculate bank value added under either the
subtraction or addition method. This section explores the viability o f either o f these
alternatives in practice.
The reasons for the enormous errors in the calculation o f bank value added
under standard approaches (see Table 15.2) is that implicit fees for financial services
are often embedded in interest charges and netted against interest payments. For
example, banks provide a range of services (e.g., free checking) to depositors without
explicit charges. Banks receive payment for these service by paying depositors lower
rates of interest than would be charged on financial exchanges for more convenient
sources of funds, such as commercial paper. Banks also provide services to borrowers
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(e.g., processing, assumption o f risk) often without explicit fees. In these cases banks
receive payment for these services by charging borrowers higher rates o f interest than
would be paid for less cumbersome investments, such as corporate bonds.169
These implicit fees for financial services provided to customers should be
included in gross receipts when calculating VAT liability. The central problem
concerning the treatment o f banks under a consumption tax is that these charges
usually are not separately identified. These points are illustrated in the example of
Table 15.3.

Table 15.3
$8.00

(1) Interest Income @8%
(2) Implicit Service Charge @ 0.5%

$0.50

(3) Pure Interest @7.5%

$7.50
($5.40)

(4) Interest Expense @6%
$1.35

(5) Implicit Service Charge @1.5%

($6.75)

(6) Pure Interest @7.5%
(7) Gross Profit

$2.60

(8) Operating Expenses

($1.00)

(9) Salaries

($0.80)

(10) Materials

($0.20)
$1.60

(11) Net Profit
Notes:
Value Added Applying Normal Credit-Invoice
Rules (zero less line 10)

($0.20)

Note: Actual Valued Added Using the Subtraction
Method and Making Service Charge Explicit (line
2 plus line 5 less line 10)

$1.65

Actual Value Added Using the Addition Method
(line 11 plus line 9 plus line 6 minus line 3)

$1.65

169It should be noted that there is an increasing trend for banks to separately state fees for specific financial
services.
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In this example, the bank charges its borrowers 0.5 percent annually per dollar o f loan
principal and therefore can charge 8 percent instead o f the simple market rate o f 7.5
percent. Similarly, the bank charges its depositors a rate of 1.5 percent for each dollar
o f account balance. The bank nets this charge against a simple market rate o f interest
o f 7.5 percent and therefore pays its depositors 6 percent.
As noted above, the problem with straightforward calculation o f the creditinvoice method is that it is invariably inaccurate. Under this method, interest income
is not included in gross receipts and interest paid is not deductible. It is in interest
charges, however, that bank fees are included. (Note that in the above example only
the items in bold are observable.) Thus, the credit-invoice method does not take into
account the major source of bank value added. In this example, the credit invoice
method would measure bank value added as minus $0.20 when it is actually $1.65.170
Under the subtraction and credit-invoice methods the problem could be solved
if the implicit fees charged by banks all would be made explicit. In this case, fees
would be included in gross receipts (just as with any other service business) and
interest paid and charged would be excluded entirely from the calculation. (Of
course, many bank fees (e.g., for safe deposit boxes) are explicit and these are already
correctly treated under the credit-invoice method.) Bank fees could be estimated by
trying to disentangle service fees from "pure" interest.
This estimate might be accomplished by taking the difference between a
market rate o f interest and actual bank interest charges and assuming that the
difference is implicit bank charges that should be included in gross receipts. The
administrative problems with this approach are formidable. A market or 'standard'
rate o f interest would have to be chosen that would have to vary with the estimated
maturity o f the corresponding loan or deposit. In a period o f volatile interest rates,
these rates would have to be adjusted frequently. Because tax liability depends on
spreads between interest rates, small measurement errors could result in large errors
in tax liability. And, o f course, the compliance burden involved would hardly
represent tax simplification.

170Under the subtraction method, and assuming implicit fees were made explicit, value-added ($1.65) equals
total fees ($0.50 plus $1.35) minus business purchases ($0.20). Under the addition method, value added ($ 1.65)
equals net profit ($1.60) plus salaries ($0.80) minus net interest paid ($6.75 minus $7.50).
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Under the addition,17method,171 bank value added is equal to profit plus wages
plus net interest paid. In this case, an imputation would need to be made to calculate
net interest paid because net interest calculated should not include charges for
financial services. Thus, under both the addition and subtraction method, estimates
must be made o f a 'pure' rate o f interest. It turns out that, given a standard rate o f
interest, both methods yield the same results, and so neither is more accurate than the
other. Some sample calculations shown in Appendix indicate that one o f these
methods might be acceptable when used under a general subtraction method if
administrative and compliance costs are not prohibitive and if the standard rate o f
interest can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
D,

Taxing Insurance Companies Under a Consumption Tax

The problems with taxation o f insurance companies under a consumption tax
are analogous to those which arise with the taxation o f banks. Application of
standard VAT rules yield highly inaccurate measures o f true VAT liability. If
insurance companies are exempted from a credit-invoice VAT, insurance services
provided to business customers will be overtaxed, and insurance services provided to
consumers will be undertaxed. If insurance companies are exempted under the
subtraction method, undertaxation results for services provided to both businesses and
consumers.
Any attempts to bring insurance companies into the system are thwarted by
measurement problems. Premiums paid to insurance companies often have three
elements: (1) funding for current and future claims, (2) savings for the policyholder,
and (3) compensation for the owners o f the insurance companies (profits), their
lenders (net interest), and their employees (wages). Only the last element is value
added. Because of the difficulty in identifying pure interest, it is difficult to measure
net interest under the addition method. Because o f the difficulty in identifying the
value o f implicit fees, it is difficult to measure gross receipts under the subtraction
method. Thus, taxation o f insurance under a VAT is largely similar to the problems
o f taxing other financial services.
E.

Definition o f Financial Intermediary

If financial intermediaries are going to be exempt or zero-rated (and perhaps,
subject to a special separate tax), the term 'financial institution' would need to be
defined for tax purposes. Clearly, banks and insurance companies fit that definition,
but questions may arise in the case of other financial intermediaries and service

171If the addition method is found to have acceptable results for financial institutions, it is possible to implement
the addition method for financial institutions even when all other taxpayers use the subtraction method. If financial
institutions use the addition method when all other taxpayers are using the credit-invoice method, this would result
in overtaxation o f financial services to businesses that is even larger than the overtaxation from exemption.
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providers such as finance companies, mortgage companies, and securities dealers and
brokers. Special problems may also arise in the case o f financing subsidiaries of
nonfinancial corporations and self-insurance by nonfinancial corporations.
F.

Conclusion

Financial intermediation poses special problems for the design o f value-added
taxes. Most other nations with VATs simply exempt financial institutions (or most
o f their value added) from tax.172 It may be possible, however, to implement some
rules that reasonably approximate the correct amount o f VAT liability for financial
services. Unfortunately, such rules would almost certainly be complex and
cumbersome.

172There are indications that these countries are reconsidering this position. See, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (1994).
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Appendix 15A
Financial institutions may be taxed under either the subtraction or addition
method in a system where taxpayers are generally subject to the subtraction method.
Both methods, however, require estimates and imputations to approximate the correct
amount o f liability.
Under the addition method, a bank’s tax base would equal wages plus profit
plus net interest paid. In this case, an imputation would need to be made to calculate
net interest paid. Under the subtraction method, bank liability would equal explicit
and implicit fee income less purchases from other business. In this case, an
imputation would be needed to calculate implicit fee income. In both cases,
imputation would depend on the choice of the pure rate o f deposit interest and a pure
rate o f loan interest.
A sensitivity analysis was conducted in the following table to determine which
method would generally be more accurate and how large errors could be under either
method. In this example, a bank has $100 o f loans and $95 o f deposits. The bank
charges its borrowers 8.5% and earns annual implicit fees equal to 1.0% o f loan
balances. The bank pays its depositors 5.5% and charges depositors implicit fees
equal to 2.0% o f deposit balances. The "pure" rate o f interest is 7.5%.173
In the first column, it is assumed that the pure rate o f interest and implicit fees
can be identified. Under the subtraction method, the tax base is $1.90, the sum of
implicit fees ($2.90) and explicit fees ($1.00) less purchases from other businesses
($2.00). Under the addition method, the tax base is also $1.90, the sum o f net interest
paid calculated using the pure rate o f interest ($7.13 - $7.50 = -$0.37), salaries
($2.00), and net profit (0.28).
The following six columns calculate the error in calculation o f the correct tax
base when the pure rate o f interest is not estimated correctly. Even when the pure
interest rate is in error by 100 basis points, the error in the calculation o f tax liability
is less than three percent.
Thus, the table shows that for a given estimate o f a pure rate o f interest both
methods provide the same result, so neither is more accurate than the other. It shows
that if pure interest estimates are not grossly inaccurate, the margin o f error due to
inaccurate imputations may be acceptable.

173The “pure” rate of interest is the rate o f interest that would prevail if no financial services were provided with
transaction. The rates o f interest on a marketable security is an example of a pure rate of interest.
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Table 15A.1
Error in Measured VAT Liability Due
to Inaccurate Imputation of "Pure" Interest Rate
Error in 'Pure’ Rate

0.00%

0.25%

-0.25%

0.5%

-0.5%

1.0%

-1.0%

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

95

95

95

95

95

95

95

Loan Rate
Implicit Fee

8.50%
1.00%

8.50%
1.25%

8.50%
0.75%

8.50%
1.50%

8.50%
0.50%

8.50%
2.00%

8.50%
0.00%

Pure Interest

7.50%

7.25%

7.75%

7.00%

8.00%

6.50%

8.50%

Deposit Rate
Implicit Fee

5.50%
2.00%

5.50%
1.75%

5.50%
2.25%

5.50%
1.50%

5.50%
2.50%

5.50%
1.00%

5.50%
3.00%

Pure Interest

7.50%

7.25%

7.75%

7.00%

8.00%

6.50%

8.50%

8.50
1.00

8.50
1.25

8.50
0.75

8.50
1.50

8.50
0.50

8.50
2.00

8.50
0.00

7.50

7.25

7.75

7.00

8.00

6.50

8.50

5.23
1.90

5.23
1.66

5.23
2.14

5.23
1.43

5.23
2.38

5.23
0.95

5.23
2.85

7.13

6.89

7.36

6.65

7.60

6.18

8.08

Explicit Fees

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Gross Profit
Material
Salaries
Operating Expense

4.28

4.28
2.00
2.00
4.00

4.28
2.00
2.00
4.00

4.28
2.00
2.00
4.00

4.28

4.28

2.00
2.00
4.00

4.28
2.00
2.00
4.00

2.00
2.00
4.00

2.00
2.00
4.00

Net Profit

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

Value Added —
Subtraction Method

1.90

1.91

1.89

1.93

1.88

1.95

1.85

Value Added —
Addition Method

1.90

1.91

1.89

1.93

1.88

1.95

1.85

Error in Calculation o f VAT

0.00

-0.01

0.01

-0.03

0.02

-0.05

0.05

Bank Assets

Bank Deposits

Interest Earned
Implicit Fee
Pure Interest
Interest Charged
Implicit Fee
Pure Interest
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Chapter 16
The Treatment of State and Local Governments and
Charitable Organizations Under a Consumption Tax

Summary
•
State and local governments could be subject to large, new financial
burdens as a result o f a new Federal consumption tax.
•
State and local governments have several concerns. They would suffer
fin a n cial hardship i f their taxes were not deductible against Federal taxable
income and i f their services were subject to tax under a comprehensive
consumption tax. State and local governments are also particularly worried that
a Federal VAT or sales tax might encroach on their ability to levy their own sales
taxes.
•
In many respects, the potential burdens o f charitable organizations under
a consumption tax are comparable to those o f state and local governments.
Charitable organizations would suffer i f charitable contributions were not
deductible, and services provided by charitable organizations might be subject
to tax under a comprehensive consumption tax.
A.

State and Local Governments
1. Introduction

State and local governments would be affected by the replacement of the
current income tax with a consumption tax in a variety o f ways. The five most
important potential effects o f a replacement consumption tax are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

infringement on state and local governments sales tax base;
loss o f Federal income tax deduction to state and local citizens and
residents for state and local property and income taxes;
taxation of government activities;
loss o f tax-favored status to investors in state and local government
debt; and
loss o f ability o f state income tax systems to piggyback on Federal
system once Federal income tax system is repealed
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For state and local governments, any one o f these changes could pose a major new
burden. The impact o f the loss o f all five o f these benefits could be devastating. It
is therefore likely that a consumption tax that did not provide relief from these
problems would face stiff opposition from state and local governments. If state and
local governments keep existing income tax systems, taxpayers will still have the cost
o f complying with multiple systems.
2. Infringement on Sales Tax Base
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, a retail sales tax and credit-invoice VAT would
pose problems for state and local governments in a variety o f ways. First, as a
political matter, it may be more difficult for these governmental units to raise
additional revenue through sales tax increases if the combined Federal and state tax
rate is high. For example, there may be less tolerance for a sales tax increase from
five to six percent if the Federal government has just imposed a 15-percent--let alone
a 25-percent--Federal sales tax. Second, it is widely believed by tax administrators
that enforcement problems begin to be unmanageable when retail tax rates get into
double digits. Third, state and local governments would be under much pressure to
conform to Federal sales tax rules in order to simplify taxpayer compliance. This
would, however, greatly lessen the ability o f state and local governments to achieve
policy objectives through adjustments in the sales tax base. Finally, even with total
conformity in the tax base, there must be some coordination o f the tax rates between
the Federal and local tax bases: it must be decided whether, for example, the Federal
tax will include local tax in the Federal tax base.
Almost all of these problems disappear under a subtraction method VAT or an
individual consumption tax. Concerns only remain if public perception likens them
to a sales tax. Although the equivalence o f consumption taxes is widely recognized
by economists, this is not the case for the public at large—particularly if the tax is not
separately stated at the cash register. Thus, while the infringement issue looms as a
large problem for the states in the case o f a Federal sales tax or a Federal VAT, it
does not appear to be a major problem for a subtraction method VAT or an individual
consumption tax.
3. Loss o f Federal Income Tax Deduction fo r Income and Property Taxes
In 1993 individuals deducted $175 billion o f state and local income and
property taxes from their Federal income taxes. If the average marginal Federal
income tax rate is 30 percent, this deduction provides taxpayers a benefit o f
approximately $50 billion annually. Taxpayers in high-tax states—such as New York
and California—would face a larger burden.
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Individuals would not be able to deduct local taxes under a retail sales tax or
a VAT. Although it would be possible to do so under a Flat Tax, no such proposal
has yet been offered. Just as under the individual income tax, the deductibility of
local taxes under an individual consumption tax can be made available. Under the
Nunn-Domenici proposal, deductions for state and local taxes are allowed.
Moreover, it is likely under this tax that there may be greater Federal tax benefits for
local tax payments than under current law for two reasons. First, the value o f these
deductions is greater for a larger number o f taxpayers because most state and local
taxes are likely to be paid by taxpayers in the 40-percent bracket (Under the NunnDomenici plan, taxpayers with taxable income as low as $12,000 (in the case o f a
single individual) face a 40-percent rate while under current law only taxpayers with
taxable income in excess o f $250,000 pay tax at a 39.6 percent rate). Second, under
the Nunn-Domenici proposal, all taxpayers—not just itemizers as under current la w -may deduct taxes paid to state and local governments.
4. Taxation o f Government Activities
In theory there is no reason that goods and services provided by governments
should not be subject to a retail sales tax or a VAT at the same rate as goods and
services provided by the private sector. In practice, however, government goods and
services are almost always excluded from tax. This gives government an unfair
competitive advantage over private industry. Political pressures from private firms
that compete with governments, as well as need for revenue, mean that this issue is
likely to be revisited during any debate about a Federal consumption tax.
If governments are provided relief under a credit-invoice VAT, the issue arises
as to whether they should be exempt from tax or "zero-rated.” As noted in Chapter
3, zero-rating is likely to provide more relief, and it is possible that exemption may
result in overtaxation o f governments relative to private business.
An individual consumption tax effectively taxes all government services.
R elief is provided, however, to the extent state and local services are financed by
income and property taxes and the individual consumption tax does allow them to be
deducted. It is also relevant to note that the Flat Tax is partially effective in taxing
governments because wages are subject to tax under the individual component o f the
Flat Tax and—because government is extremely labor-intensive—wages paid are a
relatively accurate measure of value-added in the government sector.
5. Loss o f Tax-Favored Status fo r State and Local Debt
Under a retail sales tax, value-added tax, and the Flat Tax, all interest income
would be exempt from tax. Thus, state and local governments, and investors in their
securities, would not lose the benefit o f tax exemption o f interest on their
indebtedness (and, in fact, they would benefit from removal o f regulations and
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restrictions dictated by Federal tax rules). However, under these taxes, state and local
governments would lose the special status that allows them to issue securities
providing yields approximately 35 percent less than yields on taxable securities of
comparable maturity and risk. The interest on all debt would be tax-exempt, so there
would no longer be large interest-rate spreads between yields on private bonds and
state and local bonds. How much this lack o f distinction hurts state and local
government depends on how much interest rates in general decline as a result o f a
new tax regime. It is likely that interest rates will decline, but it is unlikely that they
will decline to such a level that would be available to state and local governments if
they were the only type of tax-exempt security. Moreover, it removes the competitive
advantage governments currently enjoy over various private offerings.
The impact o f an individual consumption tax on the municipal bond market
can be more problematic. Under the general principles o f individual consumption
taxation, all interest income would be subject to tax, but purchases o f new securities—
if they represented new saving--would be deductible. (In contrast, all interest income
is exempt under the Flat Tax, but purchases of securities are not deductible.) Without
special transition rules retaining tax-exemption for the interest income they generate,
previously issued bonds--now facing the prospects o f taxation—would decline in
value.174 Because purchased newly-issued securities could be deducted, they would
effectively be tax exempt.175
The individual consumption tax included in the Nunn-Domenici proposal
retains tax-exemption for all state and local government bond interest and, in
addition, allows purchases o f newly issued securities to be deductible. Thus, state
and local bonds retain a special status under the Nunn-Domenici proposal despite the
general relief from taxation on all capital income.
6. Relationship Between Federal and State Income Taxes
Most states that collect income taxes rely heavily on the Federal income tax.
Taxable income for state income tax purposes often is based on taxable income for
Federal tax purposes. States also benefit indirectly from Federal enforcement efforts.
The elimination of Federal income taxation will increase the complexity o f state
income taxation. The likely heightened dissatisfaction with state income taxes will
likely increase pressure on states to reduce or reform their income taxes.

174This decline in value would begin once the markets perceived the possibility of loss of deductions for interest
might occur. Value would rise and fall as the prospects for overall legislation and the particular details changed
through the legislative process.
175The equivalence o f tax-exemption of interest and tax deductibility of the purchase price of bonds is discussed
in Chapter 6.
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7. Conclusion About State and Local Governments
Consumption taxes can result in a real challenge for state and local
governments. Yet, it is possible to design consumption taxes that do not impose new
hardships on state and local governments. It is even possible, as exemplified by the
Nunn-Domenici proposal, to design a consumption tax that in many respects makes
state and local governments better off than under current law.
B.

Charitable Organizations
1. Possible Elimination o f the Deduction fo r Charitable Contributions

The elimination of the deduction for charitable contributions could be a serious
blow to the charitable sector. In 1993 deductions against the individual income tax
for charitable contributions totaled approximately $100 billion. If the average
marginal tax rate is 30 percent, this could represent a loss in value o f approximately
$30 billion annually to the charitable sector. The imposition o f this burden could be
particularly burdensome at this time when it seems likely there will be less
government spending for social services and a corresponding increase in demand for
privately-funded charity. It may be the case that charitable contributions would not
change as a result of this change in tax benefits (i.e., such contributions are "inelastic"
with respect to tax changes). It is the feeling among those working in the charitable
sector, however, that recent experience with changes in the tax rates and in tax rules
regarding the alternative minimum tax treatment o f appreciated property has had a
significant impact on the timing and amounts o f charitable giving.
As noted in the case o f deductions for state and local taxes, a replacement
retail sales tax or VAT would entirely eliminate this deduction for individuals. It
could be made available under the individual component o f the Flat Tax (but no
version of the Flat Tax has yet been offered that does so). The deduction is optional
under the individual consumption tax (as it is under the individual income tax). In the
tax case o f the Nunn-Domenici version o f the individual consumption tax, the
deduction is available and is, in fact, enhanced because o f the generally higher
marginal tax rates and the availability to taxpayers who currently are precluded from
taking the charitable deduction because they use the standard deduction.
2. Possible Taxation o f Activities o f Charitable Organizations
Under current law, charitable organizations' business activities that are
unrelated to their exempt purpose are subject to unrelated business income tax
(UBIT). These unrelated activities would almost certainly continue to be subject to
tax under any consumption tax imposed on businesses. The real question is whether
activities related to charitable purposes (e.g., educational services provided by
universities, medical services provided by hospitals) would be included in the new
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consumption tax base. Economists assert that it would be more efficient to tax all
services—whether provided by an exempt organization or a private firm—equally.
This proposition is, however, also true under the current income tax, but has had little
impact on policy. Tax-exempt hospitals, for example, continue to enjoy a competitive
advantage over taxable hospitals. It is unclear whether the political dynamics of a
new consumption tax would result in inclusion o f all charitable activities in the
consumption tax base.
Even if all activities of all charitable organizations are not subject to tax, some
curtailment of tax advantages to certain types o f tax-exempt organizations may be on
the horizon. For example, the Nunn-Domenici proposal repeals the tax exemption for
certain types o f educational organizations (more commonly known as "think tanks")
as well as certain organizations whose activities may be in the public interest but are
not considered to be purely charitable.
3. Other Issues fo r Charitable Organizations
Many charitable organizations, like hospitals and universities, have been able
to issue tax-exempt securities. As noted above in the discussion relating to state and
local government debt, a new consumption tax may result in some new burdens for
entities currently issuing—and investors currently holding—tax exempt debt.
The Nunn-Domenici proposal includes a deduction for post-secondary tuition
(limited to $2,000 annually per eligible student). This may provide some relief to
universities and other institutions o f higher learning that wish to raise tuition.
4. Conclusion fo r Charitable Organizations
As in the case of state and local governments, organizations that are currently
tax exempt could be severely affected by the imposition of a Federal consumption tax.
This would be a particularly onerous burden in light o f possibly reduced direct
government support to these institutions and potentially increased needs for their
services given other government cutbacks. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the
Nunn-Domenici proposal, it is possible to design a Federal consumption tax that is
generally favorable to tax exempt organizations.
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Chapter 17
Financial Statement Implications

Summary
•
Investors, bankers, appraisers, and regulators rely heavily on financial
statements to evaluate the financial health o f businesses. Replacing the current
system o f income taxation with a new system o f consumption taxation can have
a major impact on both income statements and balance sheets.
•
Without transition relief, the impact o f a new consumption tax on the
income and net worth reported on financial statements in many cases would be
highly adverse. This could have a detrimental or even disruptive impact on
financial markets. Without transition, very large special charges to income
statements and reduction in shareholder equity may result.
A.

Introduction

The financial reporting impacts of new consumption taxes are likely to be
an issue o f major importance to the business community. There are many aspects
of a replacement consumption tax that have the potential to adversely affect the
financial health o f the firm as reported on financial statements. Because financial
reporting is of critical importance to investors, creditors, bankers, appraisers, and
regulators evaluating the financial soundness o f firms, these impacts deserve
careful consideration before adoption o f any replacement consumption tax.
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding o f these issues,
the discussion is divided into two parts: (1) the financial reporting involved in
repealing the income tax and (2) the financial reporting involved in adopting a
new consumption tax.
B.

Accounting
1. The Benefit from Eliminating Deferred Tax Liability

If the corporate income tax rate is 35 percent, and book profits are $100,
the after-tax book profits on a business are $65. If the availability o f accelerated
depreciation for tax purposes reduces taxable income to $90 and the actual
current tax liability to $31.50, after-tax profits o f a business are still recorded at
$65. The $3.50 o f tax reduction is really only a deferral o f tax. Accountants
207

record this $3.50 tax effect of the temporary difference o f $10 in taxable income
which results from the excess o f tax over book depreciation as a deferred tax
liability.
Another example o f tax deferral is the treatment o f repatriated foreign
source income for tax purposes. Corporations with overseas subsidiaries
recognize foreign source income for book purposes as its accrues, but generally
foreign source income from overseas subsidiaries is only subject to U.S. tax when
paid out in dividends to the U.S. parent company. Thus, if there is an expectation
that income will be repatriated, unrepartriated income in foreign subsidiaries can
generate a deferred tax liability on financial statements (to the extent it is
expected to be reinvested overseas indefinitely, no such liability need be
reflected).
A reduction in the rate o f income tax reduces deferred tax liabilities.
Similarly, without transition provisions, total elimination o f the income tax
reduces deferred tax liabilities. Under the accounting rules for the treatment of
income taxes—Financial Accounting Standard Board Statement 109: Accounting
fo r Income Taxes—businesses would eliminate their deferred tax liabilities and
increase their recorded book income (and resultant shareholders’ equity) by the
amount o f deferred tax liability all in the accounting period in which the tax was
repealed.
2. The Burden o f Eliminating Tax Assets
Sometimes taxable income of businesses exceeds their book income. For
example, a large commercial bank may record $100 o f book income and $65 o f
after-tax profit. The nondeductibility o f bad debt reserves for tax purposes can
cause that same bank to have taxable income of $120. The $20 excess o f tax over
book income gives rise to $7 more tax actually paid than recorded on the
financial statements (i.e., 35% of book income). This is considered a $7 deferred
tax asset on the balance sheet o f the bank’s which will be realized in tax
reductions in the future when the bank loan is written off. Similar tax assets
result to corporate America when other expenses are recognized earlier in
financial statements than are allowed for tax purposes.
W ithout transition provisions, the elimination of the income tax would
eliminate deferred tax assets. In the year in which the income tax was eliminated,
businesses would be required to eliminate their deferred tax assets and decrease
their recorded book income by the amount o f deferred tax assets. This tax asset
elimination would then be a dollar for dollar reduction in book income and
shareholders’ equity.
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3. Other Tax Assets: Carryforwards o f Losses and Credits
Besides deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences, businesses
may cany other tax assets on their books. These arise from unused net operating
losses, alternative minimum tax credits, foreign tax credits, research tax credits,
and other business credits. If it is more likely than not that these credits can be
utilized against future tax liability, these unused tax benefits are book assets.
Elimination o f the income tax assets for unused losses and credits, without
special transition rules that allow that use o f these losses176 and credits against
any new tax, would result in the write-off o f those assets and an immediate
reduction in book income and shareholders’ equity by the amount o f the write
off.
4. Conclusion About Elimination o f the Income Tax
For firms that have accumulated a net deferred tax liability, the elimination
o f the income tax taken in isolation would result in a large improvement to
balance sheets and a one-shot improvement to the income statement as these
liabilities were eliminated. Over the long term, the impact on income statements
of the elimination from the income tax could be favorable: a firm that previously
would record $100 o f before-tax and $65 o f after-tax income might now record
considerably more than $65 o f after-tax income, depending on the new
consumption tax rate and mix of factors comprising the tax base. Those with tax
assets would be detrimental. Still on an overall basis, business would benefit
since tax liabilities significantly exceed tax assets. Yet for any specific firm, the
change could be o f crucial impact.
C.

Imposition o f a New Consumption Tax

1. Introduction
The accounting treatment o f any new consumption tax depends critically
on whether the new tax would be considered an income tax or a sales tax for
accounting purposes. If the new business tax is considered an income (or profits)
tax, FASB Statement No. 109 would apply. In this case, permanent differences
between book and tax income—such as the lack o f deductions for wages under a
value-added tax—would be reflected in the income statement every year.
Temporary differences—such as immediate tax deductions for items capitalized
for financial statements—would be reflected on the balance sheet.

176Even if net operating losses could be deducted under a new consumption tax, their value would have to be
reduced if the rate o f tax were reduced. For example, a $100 net operating losses for a corporation could result
in a $35 deferred tax asset under current law. Under the Nunn-Domenici proposal, net operating losses generated
under the income tax cannot be deducted against the new business tax, but even if they could, their value in this
example would have to be reduced from $35 to $11 given the 11 percent rate of tax under the plan.
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As a collection agent, the business would establish a liability account for
any taxes collected until such time as they are remitted to the government. There
would be no impact on revenue or expenses. As a sales tax the new consumption
tax would not give rise to deferred tax assets or deferred tax liabilities. If the new
consumption tax enacted is a retail sales tax or a credit-invoice VAT, it seems
probable that this tax will not be considered an income tax. Conversely, the
FASB could provide that some o f the FASB Statement No. 109 concepts be
applied as described below.
Although in many ways similar to a credit-invoice VAT, the case might
be made that a subtraction method VAT is akin to a business income tax, and that
the principles o f FASB Statement No. 109 should apply. Certainly there is a
legitimate question about whether a tax that disallows deductions for interest
expenses, wages, salaries, and fringe benefits is an income tax. On the other
hand, proponents o f subtraction method VAT (and related proposals) stress that
the tax is based on income concepts and accounting, and they often refer to the
tax base as “gross profit.” (It should also be noted that, because the Flat Tax
allows deductions for wages and salaries, the Flat Tax is even more likely to be
categorized as an income tax than would be a regular subtraction method VAT.)
If the new tax is accounted for under the principles o f FASB Statement
No. 109, there would be numerous important effects on financial statements.
Some o f the more notable effects are listed below. The first o f these effects has
potentially significant implications for financial statements.
2. Treatment o f Transition Basis
Loosely speaking, the term basis refers to that portion o f the cost o f an
asset that will not be subject to tax. For depreciable assets, the remaining basis
may be deducted over the useful life o f the asset. For assets that are sold, only
sale proceeds in excess of basis are income and therefore subject to tax. In
contrast, under a consumption tax without transition relief all o f the book basis
in existence on the date o f enactment would eventually be subject to tax. Without
transition relief, deductions for depreciation o f existing assets would not be
allowed under the new tax, and the entire proceeds from a theoretical sale o f
assets at the end of the reporting year for the initial application of the new tax law
would be included in the tax base. These future tax payments would be booked
as deferred tax liabilities equal in amount to the book value o f these assets times
the new tax rate.
Data from the Statistics o f Income Division o f the IRS indicate that U.S.
corporations have approximately $20 trillion dollars in book basis. If the new
business tax had a tax rate o f 10 percent, and no transition relief (i.e., deductions
for existing depreciable assets over their useful life and deductions for basis upon
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sale) were allowed under the new system, it is possible that $2 trillion o f deferred
tax liabilities would be created upon the enactment o f this new tax! Under the
principles of FASB Statement 109, this entire amount would be reflected on the
income statement in the year o f enactment. This amount would be reflected net
o f all tax liabilities and tax assets that also would have to be “written off” as
discussed above. Precise information on these latter two items is not readily
available from statistical sources. If one assumes tax liabilities o f $600 billion
and tax assets of $100 billion, the net charge to income statements and
shareholders’ equity would be $1.5 trillion ($2 trillion less $.6 trillion plus $.1
trillion). This would more than wipe out total corporate profits in any one year
and severely reduce the amount o f shareholders’ equity.177 Thus, financial
statements would have to reflect the enormous increase in future taxes that results
from lost depreciation deductions or taxable gain on sales due to the elimination
o f tax basis. The majority o f major U.S. corporations would likely reflect
substantial losses in the year o f enactment.
3. Treatment o f Expensing and Other Temporary Differences
As just noted, in the absence o f transition rules, old assets might be treated
harshly under a new consumption tax. In contrast, new asset purchases receive
favorable treatment because these costs may be deducted entirely in the year of
purchase, i.e., they may be “expensed.” Under income tax accounting principles,
expensing allows tax payment to be deferred on an equal sum o f value added or
consumption tax base. This tax liability is like a loan from the government and,
like a loan, is recorded as a liability on the balance sheet since the assets are
capitalized for financial statement purposes.
4. Treatment o f Permanent Differences
Under a subtraction method VAT like the Nunn-Domenici business tax,
interest expense, wages and employee benefits are not deductible. (Under the
Flat Tax wages are deductible, but interest and employee benefits are not
deductible.) For most firms, the inability to deduct these result in the tax base
being far in excess of book income. In this case, the firm’s effective tax rate (i.e.,
the ratio of tax to book income) will far exceed the statutory rate o f the new tax
(e.g., 17 percent under the proposed Armey Flat Tax). Whether or not the firm’s
effective tax rate will exceed the statutory corporate rate o f 35 percent under
current law will depend on how many o f expenses for financial purposes are not
deductible and also--on the plus side--and on how much o f gross receipts (for
example, exports and interest income) is excluded from the tax base.

177In 1993, total corporate profits were measured at approximately $486 billion. See, U.S. Executive Office
o f the President (1995), Table B-25, p. 303.
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D.

Conclusion

In order to determine the impact o f elimination o f the income tax on
financial statements, businesses need to determine (1) the net balance o f their
deferred tax assets and liabilities on their balance sheet, (2) the new tax rate, and
(3) the amount o f transition relief (if any).
In order to determine the impact o f the enactment o f a new consumption
tax, firms need to determine (1) the book basis o f their existing assets, (2) the
new tax rate, (3) the amount o f transition relief (if any), (4) the net balance of
their existing deferred taxes, and (5) if the new tax would be considered an
income tax for accounting purposes in which case FASB Statement No. 109
applies. If there is no transition relief and FASB 109 applies, there could be
significant financial reporting effects in the year the new tax was enacted. These
issues are summarized in the following table.
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Table 17.1
Summary of Major Impacts on Financial Statement Resulting From
Repeal of Income Tax and Enactment of New Consumption Tax
I. Repeal of Current
Income Tax

W/ NO TRANSITION
Results in . . .

A. Transition
Depreciation and Other
Temporary Differences

. . . Elimination o f
Deferred Tax Liability
(Assets) That Increases
(Reduced) Equity and
Income in Year o f
Enactment

. . . Reduction in Deferred
Tax Liability (Assets)
Value Due to Reduction in
Tax Rate

B .1 Carryforwards:
Losses

. . . Elimination o f Tax
Asset That Reduces
Equity and Income in
Year o f Enactment

. . . Reduction in Tax
Asset Amount Due to
Reduction in Tax Rate

B.2 Carryforwards:
Tax Credits

. . . Elimination o f Tax
Asset That Reduces
Equity and Income in
Year o f Enactment

. . . No Impact on
Financial Statement

C .1 Unremitted Foreign
Earnings:
Remittance Assumed

. . . Elimination o f
Deferred Tax Liability
That Increases Equity
and Income in Year of
Enactment

. . . Reduction in Tax
Liability Amount Due To
Reduction in Tax Rate

No Impact

No Impact

C.2 Unremitted Foreign
Earnings:
Indefinite Reinvestment
Overseas

W/ FULL TRANSITION
Results in . . .

II. Imposition of
Consumption Tax
(A ssum ing F A S B 109
Applies)
Existing Assets

W /N O
TRANSITION
Results in . . .

W / FULL TRANSITION
Results in . . .

A. Book Basis of
E xisting Assets

. . . Creation o f
Deferred Tax Liability
That Reduces Equity
and Income in Year o f
Enactment

. . . No Impact on
Financial Statement
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Conclusion:
Some Remaining Questions
This study has attempted to introduce readers to some issues that are likely
to receive attention in the upcoming consumption tax debate. The preceding
seventeen chapters, however, do not do justice to the enormous issues involved
in totally revising Federal tax policy. As a conclusion to this study, this chapter
lists some questions about consumption taxes that deserve further attention and,
in some cases, further research.
A.

Questions o f Tax Administration

•

Will the Internal Revenue Service administer the new tax? Will its budget
over the transition have to be increased?

•

What are the additional administrative costs of transitioning into a new
consumption tax?

•

How much time is needed after enactment to prepare for administration o f the
new tax?

•

How will tax administrators be trained? Over what time period?

•

W hat new audit procedures need to be developed? How will they be
coordinated with State audits? How will they be coordinated with on-going
income tax audits?

•

What new forms and instructions will have to be produced?

•

W hat new regulations will need to be written? How quickly can these
regulations be written?

•

What implications does a replacement consumption tax have for existing tax
treaties and new tax treaties?

•

Should the new system be phased in over a number o f years?

B.
•

Questions fo r State and Local Governments
Would a national sales tax force States to conform to Federal rules?
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•

How would States administer their income taxes in absence o f the Federal
income tax? How would taxes be calculated without reference to the Federal
return? Would States need to increase their income tax audits? (Indeed, how
much simplification is there for taxpayers who must still file State income tax
returns?)

•

I f a replacement consumption tax reduces property values, what effect will
this have on property tax revenue?

•

What activities and services o f State and local governments will be subject to
this new tax?

C.

Questions fo r Businesses

•

What will be the new recordkeeping and reporting requirements? How should
computer software and information be changed? How will tax staffing
requirements change? How will tax staff be retrained? What are the costs of
these changes?

•

Should businesses reconfigure their multinational operations that are currently
structured around current rules?

•

How are plans for business reorganizations affected by the change to a
replacement consumption tax?

•

Given that interest is unlikely to be deductible under these taxes, should
businesses be reducing their indebtedness?

•

Given that fringe benefits are unlikely to be deductible, should businesses
continue to provide health insurance to their employees?

•

Should partnerships and sole proprietorships consider incorporating now that
they are subject to the same tax as corporations?

•

With all forms o f savings tax favored under a consumption tax, should
pension plans be altered?

2).
•

Questions fo r Households
How should financial planning be adjusted in anticipation o f this tax? Will
there be an estate and gift tax under the new system? Could the returns on
existing investments be adversely effected by incomplete transition relief?
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•

Should some types o f investments not favored under the current system (e.g.,
stock with high dividends, certificates o f deposit) be given additional weight
in personal portfolios?

•

Should some types o f investments currently tax-favored (municipal bonds,
whole life insurance) receive less weight in personal investment portfolios?

•

If there are no deductions for charitable giving, should contributions be
accelerated before the effective date? Should charitable giving be reduced
over the long term?

•

If there are no deductions for state and local income and property taxes,
should relocation decisions be reconsidered because cost differences between
low- and high-tax jurisdictions will increase?

E.

Economic Questions

•

Will consumption taxes have adverse pre-enactment effects? For example,
will taxpayers delay capital purchases until the date the new system takes
effect in order to expense their purchases? Will taxpayers delay exports, and
rush imports, before border adjustable taxes take effect? Will taxpayers defer
recognition o f capital gains until the effective date?

•

What quantitative effect will consumption taxes have on employment, wages,
inflation, and productivity? How long will it take for any positive effects to
take hold?

•

What effect will these consumption taxes have on the distribution of income?

•

What effect will a replacement consumption tax have on Federal revenues?
If there is a shortfall or excess in revenue from predicted levels will there be
automatic adjustments in tax rates? Will pre-enactment behavioral responses
significantly reduce revenues in the early years o f the tax?

•

What effect will a replacement consumption tax have on real estate values?

F.

Political Questions

•

Should revenue estimates include “dynamic” revenue effects, i.e., the impacts
on revenue from any changes in economic growth that results from the tax?
I f yes, which economic models will be used? How will differences in
estimates between the executive and legislative branches be reconciled?

•

W hat are the benefits in terms of compliance and administrative costs o f
switching to a new system? Among the widely varying estimates o f the
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compliance costs o f the current system, which should be used as a guide for
policy makers in the current debate? How will the compliance costs o f the
new consumption tax system be estimated?
•

What is to prevent the political process from weighing down any replacement
consumption tax proposal with amendments that result in additional
complexity? This applies not only to the original legislation, but also to
actions by subsequent Congresses.

•

Will likely "losers" under a consumption tax (e.g., realtors, insurance
companies, State governments, unincorporated businesses, retailers, etc.) be
accommodated with special tax relief? If so, how?

•

Is there any room for compromise on the notion of totally replacing the
current income tax system? Could a new consumption tax be used to reduce
income tax rates? Or perhaps just eliminate the corporation income tax?

•

Can a replacement consumption tax be enacted without strong presidential
leadership?
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